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Discussion of convergence in the European Union in recent years has centred
on macroeconomic indicators, in line with requirements for participation in
the single currency. But it is convergence of living standards that is an
ultimate goal of European integration - the greater “economic and social
cohesion” emphasized by the Treaty on Union. We assemble evidence on
whether the well-being of one part of Europe’s people, children, has been
converging over the last two decades. We discuss methodological issues raised
by measuring child welfare and its convergence in a group of countries, and
then look in turn at trends in the economic well-being of children, mortality
among children and young people, education, teenage fertility, and teenagers’
own views of their life satisfaction. Evidence of convergence is mixed, and
includes some trends of an unwelcome sort - convergence at a lower average
level of welfare. The conclusions include comment on the need for more
measurement of child well-being in Europe.
Keywords: children, living standards, European Union, convergence
JEL classification: F02, I12, I30, J13, O57 n
1. Introduction
The introduction of a single currency in most of the European Union in
January 1999 has seen great attention paid to the process of convergence
among Member States in a handful of macroeconomic indicators: inflation,
the government deficit, the national debt, and long-term interest rates. Interest
in these indicators has been natural since their convergence was required for
participation in monetary union under the terms of the 1992 Maastricht
Treaty; a requirement in turn based on the idea that the single currency would
not survive if it were introduced across economies which did not resemble
each other in fundamental ways.
However, national performance in the EU risks being judged excessively
on such macroeconomic criteria. Monetary union, a conclusion of the con-
vergence process, is just a tool to reach a further end of increasing human
welfare in Europe – as the Treaty on Union puts it, “the raising of the stan-
dard of living and quality of life” (Article 2). The Maastricht criteria should
not divert attention from measuring progress towards these goals directly.
And not only is the average level of well-being in Europe of concern, or that
in particular countries, but also whether well-being is becoming more simi-lar across Member States as a whole – whether it is converging. Reduction
of disparities in well-being among Member States is at the heart of the
European project. In this paper we ask whether that is the direction in which
we are moving, focusing on the situation of children. Is the welfare of chil-
dren in the Union’s Member States becoming more or less similar over
time?
1
To some extent this sort of measurement of trends in human welfare in the
EU does already take place. While it is macroeconomic convergence that has
received the most attention, the Maastricht Treaty also called prominently for
“the strengthening of economic and social cohesion”, so as to promote the
Union’s “overall harmonious development” (Articles 2 and 130a). The Treaty
established a Cohesion Fund to help those countries with relatively low GDP
per capita: Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain – the so-called “Cohesion
Four”. And it gave the European Commission the task of preparing a report
on economic and social cohesion every three years. The first of these reports
has been published (European Commission, 1996). But it concentrates on a
fairly narrow concept of well-being: income and employment.
2 Other analy-
ses of cohesion in the Union, e.g. Sala-i-Martin (1996, 1996a) and Quah
(1997, 1997a) have had a similar focus. In this paper we take a wider view of
development and of individual well-being, more similar, for example, to that
taken by the UNDP’s Human Development Reports. 
Why children? The nearly 80 million children in the Union aged under 18
represent over a fifth of the total EU population – see Table 1.1. Many other
people of course live with children and are directly concerned with their well-
being. Figure 1.1 shows for 12 EU countries the proportion of households that
have a child aged 0-18 (the data do not identify the 0-17 years age range of
Table 1.1). The average figure is one-third. In Spain and Ireland over 40 per-
cent of households contain a child.
3 Besides their importance viewed in this
way, it is very obviously the case that the nature of children’s progress to
becoming tomorrow’s adults helps determine the shape of Europe’s future.
Convergence in well-being across the Union as part of its “overall harmonious
2 John Micklewright and Kitty Stewart
1 Our focus is on outcomes and not on policies. There is a large separate strand of inquiry that considers
trends in the latter, including policies with a direct bearing on children. See, for example, Ruxton (1996), Sykes
and Alcock (1998), and the work of the European Observatory on National Family Policies, co-ordinated from
the University of York, UK (Ditch et al., 1998).
2 The Report itself refers to its investigation of trends in incomes and employment as being a “traditional
analysis of the relative circumstances of Europe’s population” (European Commission, 1996, p.46), although
some discussion is devoted to other dimensions of cohesion and it is clearly noted that income and employment
are “insufficient in themselves to assess the full situation” (p.46).
3 We were not able to find information on a comparable basis for EU countries that shows the proportion of
persons living in households in which there are children, which will be substantially higher than the proportion
of all households with children given in Figure 1.1. Jenkins (1999, Table 4) reports a figure of 51 percent for
Britain (defining a child as less than 17 years old).3 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
Table 1.1: Children in Europe, 1996
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Figure 1.1: EU households with children aged 0-18 (percent)
Source: Eurostat, Labour Force Results 1997, Table 117.development” means moving towards similar opportunities for European chil-
dren wherever they are born.
4
Section 2 defines our concept of child welfare, relating this to the wider
notion of human development. We define a vector of indicators but in contrast
to the construction of the UNDP’s Human Development Index we make no
attempt to aggregate these into a summary measure. We also define our mean-
ing of “convergence”. Sections 3 to 7 then deal in turn with our various
dimensions of child welfare, investigating whether different parts of the EU
have become more or less similar over time. We look at the economic well-
being of children, at mortality, education, teenage fertility, and at young peo-
ple’s own views of their lives. The period we consider typically covers the last
15-25 years. (For practical reasons our analysis is at the level of the Member
State rather than at the finer level of the region that has been the focus of much
of the literature on covergence of incomes.)
5
Section 8 concludes. Are the dimensions of child welfare examined in the
paper converging over time? Do they at least show improvement, even on aver-
age – is the welfare of Europe’s children rising? This final section summarizes
what we have discovered. It also points to the further data and analysis that are
needed to put children at the heart of discussion on Europe’s future.
4 John Micklewright and Kitty Stewart
4 There is no direct mention of children in the Maastricht Treaty and only one in the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty
(in the context of co-operation to safeguard children from crime), although children do figure implicitly in ref-
erences to policies on such matters as education. Similarly, although children are not singled out in the First
Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, young people (together with women and the long-term unemployed)
are noted as a particular target for cohesion policies in the employment field (European Commission, 1996,
p.116). The Report also expresses concern for “inter-generational cohesion” (p.46) in relation to the environ-
mental consequences of economic growth
5 For example, the First Report on Economic and Social Cohesion presents analyses at both country and
regional level (European Commission, 1996).5
2. Concepts of Child Well-being and of Convergence
How may child welfare be measured in the countries of the European Union,
given that we wish to track its changes over time? We begin by discussing appro-
priate indicators, before turning to consider how differences between countries
and convergence over time may be judged with the indicators selected.
n 2.1 Child well-being in industrialized countries
The view that human welfare cannot be adequately measured by traditional indi-
cators of economic development such as GDP per capita became widely voiced
in the 1970s and subsequently developed into first the “basic needs” and then the
“capabilities” approaches (e.g. Streeten and Burki, 1978; Sen, 1985 and 1992).
Both reject GDP as the sole indicator of well-being not just as an aggregate mea-
sure that is blind to the distribution of income, but also on the grounds that
income itself is only one of the assets a person needs in order to lead what Sen
has called “a good life”. In the capabilities approach the good life is defined in
terms of human “functioning”: what is important is that an individual has the
“capability to achieve functionings that he or she has reason to value” (Sen,
1992, p.5). These functionings might include “such elementary things as being
adequately nourished, being in good health, avoiding escapable morbidity and
premature mortality, etc.” as well as “more complex achievements such as being
happy, having self-respect, taking part in the life of the community, and so on”
(Sen, 1992, p.39). The UNDP Human Development Reports, first published in
1990, represent the best known attempt to select specific indicators of these
functionings with the aim of comparing human welfare across countries accord-
ing to wider criteria than GDP. They illustrate that the correlation between
national income and a broader concept of well-being is far from perfect.
However, for obvious reasons, the focus of most attempts to measure
human well-being has been the developing world, and the indicators used nat-
urally reflect this: UNDP’s Human Development Index has helped make basic
literacy and life expectancy widely accepted as key welfare indicators, for
instance. Attempts to measure the well-being of children have tended to have
the same focus: in UNICEF’s The State of the World’s Children the basic indi-
cators are infant and under-5 mortality and primary school enrolment, mea-
sures on which one would expect there to be little to separate European coun-
tries by the mid-1990s.
The fact that children in industrialized countries are now protected from
many of the urgent problems affecting children in poorer parts of the world
does not place these children beyond concern; rather, it means that additionalmeasures of their welfare are needed. Other issues demand more attention
once the basic problems of survival are overcome. And, at the same time,
growing wealth brings with it new dangers as well as new opportunities.
A number of recent studies have identified this need to develop measures
of well-being for children in richer countries. One on-going project, some-
times referred to as the ‘Jerusalem initiative’, has held three conferences
aimed at coming up with a list of such indicators appropriate for cross-coun-
try comparison (see Ben-Arieh and Wintersberger, 1997, for the output of the
first).
6 Hauser et al. (1997) report on a similar initiative limited to the USA.
7
Both these studies face the same two problems: the need to choose a limited
number of indicators of the almost endless array of values and failings we
would like to measure once survival is more or less assured; and the need to
reconcile the choice with the hard truth about what data do exist.
The second of these problems is a particular restriction where international
comparison is concerned: studies of a single country do not have to worry
about cross-country differences in measurement or availability of data
(although availability and methods may certainly change over time). Nor is
the analysis disturbed by differences in cultural approach to a range of issues
from education to institutional care.
As yet, then, there is no consensus about the best set of indicators to use in
an international comparison of child well-being in the industrialized world. Nor
is a study of child well-being in Europe free of the constraints of data avail-
ability and differences in methods of measurement. Indeed, this turns out to be
a perhaps surprisingly large obstacle. The EU has its own statistical agency,
Eurostat, dedicated to providing comparative data for each of the Member
States. However, while Eurostat provides extensive comparative information on
many aspects of life in Europe, relatively little attention is paid to childhood.
8
6 John Micklewright and Kitty Stewart
6 For a discussion of the Jerusalem initiative, see also Adamson (1996) writing in the UNICEF publication
The Progress of Nations, which has a section each year containing indicators of child well-being in industrial-
ized coutnries.
7 The USA has a rich stream of data on child well-being at both federal and state level. An excellent publi-
cation at the federal level is America’s Children: Key National Indicators of Well-Being (Federal Interagency
Forum on Child and Family Statistics, 1998). An example at the state level is the “Kids Count” analyses of the
Annie E. Casey Foundation (www.aecf.org). Collection of data and analysis at the state level have been spurred
on in recent years by reform of federal cash transfers to families (“welfare reform”). At the same time, the par-
ticular institutional setting of the USA results in use of some indicators that would not necessarily be relevant
in Europe. For example, an important indicator in the National Survey of America’s Families, which forms part
of the Urban Institute’s project on “Assessing the New Federalism”, is the coverage of children by health insur-
ance (see www.urban.org).
8 For example, A Social Portrait of Europe (Eurostat, 1996) provides an excellent overview of living and
working conditions in the fifteen member states, but contains little information on the situation of children
(especially young children). Further data on specific issues are available in Youth in the European Union
(Eurostat, 1997), Key data on Education in the European Union (Eurostat, 1997a), and the annual Demographic
Statistics and Eurostat Yearbook (e.g. Eurostat, 1990 and 1997c).7 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
The statistical agencies of the Member States of course produce a great deal of
information on children through their various publications (e.g. Central
Statistical Office, 1994, in the case of the UK) but inevitably it is hard to gath-
er consistent data from these on many topics.
Our task in this paper is further complicated by our interest in convergence,
which demands a time-series for each indicator. Eurostat’s concentration on
current members of the Union means that publications and databases prior to
1994 focus on the EU-12 rather than the 15 and so on (although some impor-
tant retrospective analyses are made). The need for a time-series also rules out
reliance on a number of other interesting potential sources which so far pro-
vide only a snapshot portrait of the situation in different countries. (Examples
are the recent WHO Health of Youth surveys (WHO, 1996a), the OECD
International Adult Literacy Survey (OECD, 1995 and 1997), and the IEA
International Assessements of Maths and Science (Beaton et al., 1996a,b)) 
The indicators of child well-being we look at in this paper thus represent a
compromise between what we would like to measure and what we can.
Drawing on a variety of data sources – Eurostat, Eurobarometer,WHO, OECD
and UNESCO – we have put together a range of indicators which cover vari-
ous aspects of child well-being, but not all the aspects we would have liked to
look at.
9 (The Appendix describes the different sources we have used – and the
places where others who wish to find data on children may start their search.)
We consider four domains of welfare, or four key functionings that we
believe a child needs to lead a “good life” in Europe: material well-being,
health and survival, education and personal development, and social inclu-
sion/participation. These turn out to be – perhaps not surprisingly – the same
domains as those covered by the Human Development Report’s new index of
deprivation in industrialized countries (UNDP, 1998). But the precise indica-
tors we choose to capture elements of them differ from the UNDP indicators
in several respects, reflecting both our different judgement of the suitable
measures and the availability of time-series of data, as well as our focus on
children. The four domains also reflect the concept of children’s well-being
and development in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
The UN Convention defines a child as anyone under the age of 18 but this
is not the age limit used in the definition of ‘children’ in many data sources.
The cut-off varies considerably and is sometimes higher than 18 but is often
lower. (The definition for older children can sometimes also include a criteri-
on of study in full-time education.) This is an important practical considera-
9 Use of national statistical offices or of a network of national informants might have extended the possi-
bilities open to us in the paper considerably, but for practical reasons we rely entirely on existing cross-nation-
al collections of data.  tion in the comparison of statistics across different indicators, or across dif-
ferent sources for the same indicator.
From a conceptual standpoint, the precise age cut-off is not that important.
The key point is that ‘childhood’covers several different stages of life and any
choice of indicators of child welfare must reflect this. Some of our indicators
refer to children of all ages taken together while others are specific to partic-
ular age-groups. Several relate to older children, including young people over
the age of 18. While discussion of child welfare in less-developed countries
often focuses on younger children, the various pressures faced by teenagers in
industrialized societies have been the subject of much investigation (e.g.
Rutter and Smith, 1995). However, we do not attempt to analyse indicators for
each of our domains for every stage of childhood systematically, and our
analysis is inevitably somewhat eclectic as a result.
Despite the industrialized country setting, several of our indicators turn out
to be more traditional at the end of the day than we had envisaged. For exam-
ple, our indicator of health is restricted to mortality: hence we ignore the top-
ical issues of sexually transmitted diseases and drug and alcohol abuse, as
well as new illnesses affecting younger children in industrialized countries
(such as the growing incidence of asthma). Our analysis of education focuses
on expenditure and enrolment data, rather then learning achievement
(although we shed some light on the variation in the latter across Europe at
one point in time, together with its relationship with enrolment). Another gap
is the lack of any analysis of children in institutions, both in prisons and in
institutions of public care.
All these restrictions are to be regretted, but they are forced on us by the lack
of available data. To take but one example, despite the enormous interest in the
spread of sexually transmitted diseases that has in part been generated by the
rise of HIV/AIDS, it seems that no data are readily available from any inter-
national organization that gives the prevalence of the various diseases across
the different European countries among the standard demographic group of
15-24 year olds.
10  Our conclusions at the end of the paper include recommen-
dations for further data collection so as to give a more complete picture of the
well-being of Europe’s children and how it is developing over time.
The indicators we are able to consider are listed below. Our choice of each
is discussed in greater detail in the sections that follow, but the domains in
which indicators can be argued to fall are given in brackets (H=survival and
health, E=education and development, M=material well-being; S=social
8 John Micklewright and Kitty Stewart
10 This is not to say that the data do not exist; it is simply that they do not appear to be readily available on
a cross-national basis from a single source. (This is a good example of a subject where a network of national
informants might have been able to provide us with the necessary information.)9 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
inclusion). (In one or two cases the reasons for our classification may only
become clear later in the paper.)
Economic well-being
l GDP per capita (M)
l Child poverty rate – children living in households with income below 50
percent of the national median (M, S)
l Prevalence of worklessness among households with children (M, S)
l Unemployment among all 20-24 year olds (M, S)
Mortality 
l Under-5 and young persons’ mortality (H)
l Death rate from motor vehicle accidents, 5-14 year olds (H, E)
l Suicide rate among young men aged 15-24 (H, S)
Education
l Percentage of 16 year olds in education (E)
l Expenditure on education as % of GDP, adjusted for age-structure (E)
Teenage fertility
l Birth rate to 15-19 year olds (E, S; perhaps also a risk factor for H, E, M, S)
Finally, we include one subjective indicator of well-being:
Life satisfaction
l Percentage of 15-19 year olds who classify themselves as ‘satisfied’or ‘very
satisfied’ with their life. (H, E, M, S)
To give an initial idea of where European countries stand on these indica-
tors, Table 2.1 presents the data for each for the most recent year available.
(The full set of data used in the paper are given in the Appendix tables.) The
final line in the table shows the correlations with GDP per capita (in the rele-
vant year), the focus of much earlier work on cohesion and the first of our
indicators. While we would not necessarily expect to see any particular rela-
tionship between GDP per capita and some of the indicators (such as child
poverty, for which we take a relative measure), others seem likely to be broad-
ly linked to GDP, such as the under-5 mortality rate and the education indica-
tors. Others, such as surviving the threat of traffic accidents, might even be
inversely related to national income; while whether or not life satisfaction
increases with income is an open question.
In fact, as the table shows, the link is not clear-cut in several cases, startingwith the fact that the highest under-5 mortality rates are found in the countries
with the second highest GDP per capita in the EU (Belgium) and the second
lowest (Portugal). Only life satisfaction has a correlation with GDP per capi-
ta that exceeds 0.6 (we discuss in Section 7 whether there is any causal rela-
tionship). Most indicators have a correlation of 0.3 or less in absolute value.
Dividing countries on the level of overall child welfare is also difficult. The
Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden stand out as having excellent records on
most indicators and Portugal does badly on many, but in general countries
have mixed reports. For instance, the UK has a very good road safety record
but the highest rates of child poverty and of teenage fertility in the EU. Spain
has the highest unemployment among 20-24 year-olds but a low teen suicide
rate; France has a relatively high suicide rate but a low poverty rate.
10 John Micklewright and Kitty Stewart
Economic Well-Being Mortality
Austria 107.5 - 4.9 - 6.7 3.4 26.5
Belgium 112.6 15 11.0 12.0 9.6 5.6 20.2
Denmark 115.2 5 - 9.7 6.3 4.4 15.9
Finland 93.1 - 11.8 19.6 5.0 4.7 50.5
France 106.4 12 8.8 14.4 7.1 3.4 23.5
Germany 108.3 13 8.6 6.5 7.1 3.2 16.5
Greece 64.9 19 4.5 15.3 9.0 4.7 4.2
Ireland 99.8 28 15.4 16.1 7.3 3.5 23.4
Italy 105.1 24 7.6 16.8 8.5 3.4 7.6
Luxemb. 168.9 23 3.8 4.3 4.4 4.3 28.0
Netherlands 104.7 16 9.3 7.6 6.8 3.7 9.9
Portugal 67.5 27 3.3 8.9 9.6 7.4 15.8
Spain 77.0 25 10.1 26.6 7.6 4.6 7.1
Sweden 97.2 - - 10.9 4.7 1.9 15.7
UK 99.0 32 19.5 11.4 7.2 2.9 18.5
EU weighted  100.0 20 10.5 13.8 7.5 3.6 15.2
average
max / min 2.6 6.4 5.8 6.1 2.2 3.9 12.0
correlation 1.00 -0.28 -0.06 -0.56 -0.58 -0.26 0.31
with GDP
per capita
Table 2.1: Child welfare indicators in the European Union
GDP 
per capita
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n 2.2 Measuring differences and convergence
While a static comparison of current national performance on these indicators
is of interest, our focus in this paper is on trends over time, in particular
whether countries are becoming more similar in different dimensions on child
well-being. Today’s disparities could represent a mid-point on the path of
movement of countries towards each other – or they could be points on diver-
gent paths. Furthermore, all countries could be improving their performance
in absolute terms, and yet still not be getting closer to eradicating cross-
national differences.
Of course, convergence need not necessarily mean a movement towards the
best performance; it could equally well be achieved by a general deterioration
towards the standards of the worst. But as the First Report on Economic and
Sources: Appendix Tables A1, A2 (ECHP figures), A4, A5, B1, B3, B5, C2, C4, D1, E1.
Note: The weights used to calculate the means are described in the Appendix. Correlations
with GDP per capita (in PPS) are for the year in question (1992 is taken in the case of satis-
faction) and are unweighted for differences in population size.
Education                                          Teen Fertility Happiness
Austria 5.7 90 17.5 -
Belgium 5.9 100 9.2 89.1
Denmark 8.7 92 8.7 97.9
Finland 7.7 92 9.8 -
France 5.5 92 9.6 85.5
Germany 5.3 96 13.0 87.8
Greece 3.5 79 12.9 74.7
Ireland 4.6 91 15.1 90.0
Italy 5.1 - 7.0 87.4
Luxemb. - 77 10.6 97.0
Netherlands 5.3 89 5.8 98.6
Portugal 4.8 78 20.2 86.7
Spain 4.5 89 8.3 85.0
Sweden 8.3 95 8.6 -
UK 5.0 82 28.5 90.5
EU weighted 
average 5.2 89.5 10.7 87.7
max / min 2.5 1.3 4.9 1.3






















1990-94Social Cohesion puts it: “Cohesion is concerned with ... new opportunities in
the poorer regions and for disadvantaged social groups” (European
Commission, 1996, p.14). Where cohesion is reached through a reduction of
opportunities in areas initially better off, the Report talks of “negative con-
vergence”. Naturally in this paper we too are hoping to find “positive” con-
vergence, not convergence at any price. Where convergence represents a
movement to reduced disparities around a lower average level of welfare we
make sure to point this out – in this situation it would have been better had the
Member States remained as they were rather than converged.
How do we decide whether convergence has taken place? The literature on
economic growth makes a distinction between two concepts: ‘beta’ conver-
gence and ‘sigma’convergence (see for example Sala-i-Martin, 1996, 1996a).
Beta convergence refers to the relationship between a country’s initial perfor-
mance and the change in its performance over time. If one country starts off
with a poor record on a particular indicator but records good progress, while
in another country that indicator starts off well but improves more slowly (or
even declines), we have beta convergence between the two countries. In the
case of the national incomes of a group of countries, there is said to be beta
convergence if a negative relationship is found between the GDP growth rate
and the initial level of income, with poorer countries growing more quickly.
Sigma convergence, on the other hand, refers to the change in the overall
dispersion in the distribution. If the dispersion falls over time there is sigma
convergence, irrespective of how particular countries are moving in the distri-
bution. Sigma convergence is usually measured with the standard deviation of
the log of income (e.g. DeLong, 1988; Sala-i-Martin, 1996a) but sometimes
using the coefficient of variation – the standard deviation divided by the mean
(e.g. Dowrick and Nguyen, 1989; Raiser, 1998). Occasional reference is also
made to the ratio between maximum and minimum (e.g. Baumol, 1986).
Beta convergence is a necessary condition for sigma convergence – the
overall dispersion cannot fall unless the countries with poorer records are
moving towards those with better records.
11 But it is not a sufficient condition:
countries which start off doing worst might surpass those initially doing bet-
ter, leading to a changing of places in the distribution but no reduction (or
even an increase) in the overall dispersion. In this paper we are largely con-
cerned with sigma convergence – the change in the ‘spread’in the distribution
– but the beta concept is useful in isolating what is driving this overall dis-
persion. For each indicator of welfare we pick out movements by individual
12 John Micklewright and Kitty Stewart
11 Assume that the log of income in one period is expressed as the sum of a fraction, b, of its value in the
previous period, a constant term, and a random element. Strictly speaking, the condition for beta convergence
to be necessary for sigma convergence requires not only that b<1 but also that the random element has a con-
stant variance and is independent across both time and countries.13 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
countries and draw attention to changes in the rankings that occur, as well as
reporting how the overall spread changes.
The coefficient of variation, the standard deviation of the log and the ratio
between the maximum and minimum all describe the relative variation in the
data. A conclusion about whether or not convergence is occuring will not
depend on the absolute values in any year. This property of ‘scale invariance’
is typically sought in inequality measures by researchers working with data on
incomes or expenditures. But what would the use of a scale invariant measure
imply in this paper, given our selected indicators of well-being?
Imagine that under-5 mortality in countries A and B is 100 deaths and 25
deaths respectively (per 1,000 live births) in 1960, but falls to values of 20 and
4 deaths in 1990. Should we conclude that infant mortality in these two coun-
tries has become more similar or less similar over time? The scale invariant
measures would indicate divergence between the two countries in 1990, the
ratio of maximum to minimum, for example, rising from 4 to 5. However, as
an alternative, one might consider the absolute distance between the two coun-
tries, and reason that a difference of 16 deaths per 1,000 children compared to
one of 75 deaths implies that the two countries had moved closer together.
This alternative approach, focusing on the absolute differences, has the
advantage of giving a conclusion that is robust to what might at first seem an
innocuous change in the way we look at the data. Unlike income and expen-
diture, many of our indicators have a natural ‘dual’ or complement: survival
instead of mortality, and employment rather than unemployment. This dual is
obtained trivially by a simple transformation of the data – survival is what is
‘left over’ after mortality, and the under-5 child survival rate is simply 1,000
minus the under-5 mortality rate (hence the label “complement” in the math-
ematical sense). Unless there is a good argument for looking at the data in one
way rather than the other, we need to be sure that our conclusions concerning
convergence do not depend on the choice we make.
12
Use of the scale invariant measures does not guarantee this. In the example
just given of child mortality, the survival rates would be 900 and 975 in 1960
and 980 and 994 in 1990, and the ratio of maximum to minimum falls over
time, from 1.083 to 1.014. The conclusion about convergence in this example
is sensitive to the way the data are presented. The alternative approach based
on absolute differences gives exactly the same answer in both cases – that
inequality fell.
13
12 The analogy with income or expenditure is in fact better with the dual concept – ‘more’ representing a
higher level of welfare – although this does not seem a particularly strong argument.
13 A switch to the dual concept does not necessarily overturn the conclusion about convergence based on a
scale invariant measure. For example, in the example of the two countries’mortality rates considered in the text,
imagine that country B had an mortality rate of 6 in 1990 rather than 4. In this case the ratio of maximum to
minimum would have fallen for the mortality rate as well as for the survival rate.The standard deviation is based on absolute differences and is therefore
unchanged by the switch from mortality to survival or between any other pair
of complementary indicators – conclusions about convergence will hence be
robust to the choice over the way in which to present the data. This advan-
tage in terms of robustness comes at a price: one has to accept a view of
inequality based on absolute rather than relative differences. But the attrac-
tion of obtaining a robust result is clearly large and we therefore take the the
standard deviation as our principal measure of dispersion. We include, how-
ever, the coefficient of variation and the ratio of maximum to minimum
among the summary statistics in the tables in the Appendix, and in present-
ing our findings we note when these scale invariant measures lead to differ-
ent conclusions.
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An important issue that arises in calculating the degree of variation across
Member States in any indicator is whether to take into account the greatly
varying populations of the different countries. Germany has a population of
82 million people; Luxembourg has just 400,000. Three other countries have
populations of over 55 million; eight others have 10 million or less. Should
one let the figure for Luxembourg have equal weight in the calculations with
that for Germany? Or should one let the German figure be 200 times more
important?
The answer to this question depends on what one is trying to measure.
Suppose that we are concerned with the full extent of the variation in an indi-
cator across the entire population of the EU, e.g. poverty risk or satisfaction
level. The total variance can be decomposed into the variation within Member
States and that between them. The latter may be calculated from the average
values of the indicator concerned for each country – the average poverty rate,
the proportion of persons satisfied with their lives, etc. The formula for this
between-group element of the total variation does indeed weight the contribu-
tion of each country according to its population. Greece should get a weight that
is twice that of Denmark and nearly three times that of Ireland. Luxembourg
should not get an equal weight in the calculation to that of Germany. In this case
our interest is in the variation across Member States because it is one part of the
total variation across the European population. In general, a reduction over time
in this between-group variation – “convergence” –  is in fact neither a necessary
nor a sufficient condition for a reduction in disparities across the European pop-
ulation as a whole, since changes in the differences within countries have to be
14 John Micklewright and Kitty Stewart
14 It is important to distinguish the issue of relative versus absolute differences from another one which aris-
es when large changes occur over time in the average value of an indicator, as in the example given in the text
of child mortality. In this case it may be difficult to separate in one’s mind the concept of ‘pure inequality’from
a measure of welfare that incorporates the average value as well as the degree of dispersion. (In the terminolo-
gy of the economic measurement of welfare, people may think in Generalized Lorenz and not Lorenz terms.)15 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
considered as well. Nevertheless, change in the between-group variation is cer-
tainly one influence on the total variation.
15
On the other hand, we may not be concerned with variation across the EU
population as a whole but rather with the variation across the countries them-
selves, viewed as separate entities. The principle of ‘subsidiarity’implies that
it is the Member States that will have the responsibility for policy within the
Union whenever possible. Imagine we want a measure of variation in child
welfare that shows when one country is out of line with the others, signalling
the need for possible action by the Member State concerned. In this case the
different sizes of the countries is irrelevant and we certainly would not want
the calculation to be dominated by the large countries. For this reason we
think that both unweighted as well as weighted calculations are of interest and
we present both in the Appendix, pointing out in the text when they tell a dif-
ferent story.
16 Unless otherwise noted, however, the figures we present for
both the mean and standard deviation are the weighted ones.
Finally, there is the issue of the time-period in which we are interested.
The paper has a dual-focus. On the one hand, we are interested in the issue
of long-run cohesion in Europe; we consider whether or not child well-being
has been converging in the last 25 years. We are able for some indicators to
put this into the context of a longer period, while for others the available
time-series are shorter. On the other hand, we are also interested in the imme-
diate term: has child welfare been converging in the 1990s, during the run up
to monetary union itself, or have the patterns across countries been moving
in a different way to those for the macroeconomic indicators? Unfortunately,
a lack of data means that for many indicators we cannot explore this fully.
For instance, did the tight terms of the Maastricht Treaty lead to an increase
in child poverty in countries working hard to meet the criteria for member-
ship of the single currency? This is not a question we can answer with the
published data for child poverty shown in Table 2.1, which end in 1993. But
where possible we ask whether the 1990s give us evidence of a different
trend to that observed in the previous two decades.
15 Suppose that the value of the indicator for any person in a given country is made up of a country-specific
constant, equal for all persons in that country, plus an element that differs from person to person, the value of
which is distributed randomly across the country’s population. Suppose the variance of the latter is constant over
time in each country – the within-group variation is unchanged – and that the relative populations of the countries
are constant. In this case the changes in the total variation in the indicator over time across the EU population are
driven entirely by the changes in the country-specific constants, summarized by the between-group variation.
16 The weights used depend on the indicator in question, e.g. the child population in each country is taken
for indicators relating to all children, the teenage populations for teenage indicators etc. The First Report on
Economic and Social Cohesion does not explicitly discuss the issues of scale invariance or weighting
(European Commission, 1996). In general, scale invariant measures were used together with weighting by pop-
ulation size.3. Economic Well-Being
To argue that child welfare goes well beyond consideration of national income
is not to deny the importance to children of the economic strength of the coun-
tries in which they live. We therefore start this section by looking briefly at the
indicator that has been the focus of much earlier work on convergence of living
standards in the EU, GDP per capita. If national incomes are converging suffi-
ciently strongly, then differences among member states in at least some aspects
of the economic well-being of children and their families should be narrowing.
Figure 3.1 summarizes the change in disparities of GDP per capita since the
early 1980s, measured in puchasing power standard (PPS) terms.
17 (We follow
the example of the First Report on Economic and Social Cohesion (European
Commission, 1996) and do not consider earlier periods.) In this instance we
do measure disparities using scale invariant indicators – measures of relative
rather than absolute differences – that are standard in the literature on con-
vergence across countries in national incomes. 
Between 1983 and 1996, real GDP per capita in the EU-15 rose by about a
third. A substantial reduction in relative disparities in national incomes took
place during this period up until the early 1990s, the weighted coefficient of
variation falling by a quarter between 1983 and 1993. The unweighted figure on
the other hand (not shown in the diagram) was unchanged on account of a sharp
rise in income in what is both the richest and the smallest country, Luxembourg,
where income per head rose to about two-thirds above the EU average (with the
effect also of increasing the ratio of the maximum to the minimum).
16
17 In the case of countries such as Ireland and Luxembourg where foreign firms are a very prominent part
of the economy, GNP per capita (which excludes repatriated profit and includes remittances from abraod) might
be considered a more appropriate measure of average income.


























Figure 3.1: Disparities in national income (GDP per capita in PPS)
Source: see Table A1.17 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
The convergence in the weighted data was associated in part with faster
growth by the Cohesion Four – Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain – which are
shown in Figure 3.1 as moving-up relative to other Member States. (By con-
trast, the absolute difference in real incomes between the Cohesion Four and
the other 11 Member States was broadly the same in 1983 and 1996.) The sit-
uation, however, varied substantially among these four countries. While Irish
income per head rose from 64 percent to 83 percent of the EU average over
1983-93, the Greek figure increased from 62 percent to only 65 percent.
(Greece slipped behind Portugal in 1989 to become the country with the low-
est GDP per capita.) The 1990s, however, have seen little or no continuation
of the trend towards convergence (at least in the period up to 1996). Among
the Cohesion Four, only in Ireland has catch-up growth continued – in fact
here GDP per capita in 1996 was at exactly the Union average.
GDP per capita is of course a very crude proxy for average incomes of fam-
ilies with children, especially in those Member States where the proportion of
households with children is relatively low. It does have the advantage of
including government expenditure on basic social services, such as education
and health, which provide important non-cash income to families. (We return
in Section 5 to the issue of public expenditure on education.) But this aside,
any serious analysis of trends in average incomes of families in the EU would
need an indicator more directly related to the household sector, and, within
that sector, to children.
18
An analysis of average incomes of families would, however, refer to just
that, average incomes, ignoring the variation in family incomes within each
Member State. Our principal concern in this section is with children at the
margins of society in the Union. We first consider child poverty, on which the
distribution of income within each country has a direct bearing. We then
address a related issue, but one also important in its own right, that of children
living in households with no adult in work. Finally, we look at disparities
across the EU in the unemployment of young persons themselves.
n 3.1 Child poverty
Much more information on poverty in Europe is now available than was the
case in the mid-1980s (Atkinson, 1995, 1998b). There are more national stud-
18 Vijay Verma of the University of Essex kindly provided us with information on mean equivalized house-
hold cash income per child in ten EU countries in 1993 from the European Community Household Panel (see
next sub-section). (The countries are those for which there are poverty rates in Table 2.1, excluding Germany.)
After converting the means to PPS terms, the weighted coefficient of variation is 0.163, which may be com-
pared to that for GDP per capita for these countries in 1993 of 0.143. The weighted correlation between the two
is only 0.78. (The unweighted correlation is much higher, 0.96, due to the greater influence of the high-income
outlier, Luxembourg.)18 John Micklewright and Kitty Stewart
ies, and at the European level there have been several important initiatives,
including the work by Hagenaars et al. (1994) for the late 1980s based on
existing national data sets. Hagenaars and her colleagues covered all the then
EU-12 and included figures for child as well as overall poverty. The European
Community Household Panel (ECHP), sponsored by Eurostat, is a major
development in terms of data (Eurostat, 1997d, 1999). The figures for child
poverty in 1993 shown in Table 2.1 are taken from Eurostat’s own analysis of
Wave 1 of ECHP, and as further waves become available ECHP could provide
considerable additional insight into how family incomes have changed in the
1990s during the run-up to monetary union.
The ECHP figures refer to the proportion of children living in households
with incomes below 50 percent of the average income in their own countries.
This is a measure of relative poverty, implementing the European Union’s
broad definition of poverty as persons with “resources (material, cultural and
social) that are so limited as to exclude them from the minimum acceptable way
of life in the Member States in which they live” (Eurostat, 1997d, p.3). The fig-
ures, which refer to the EU-12, vary widely, with as few as 5 percent of chil-
dren classsified in poverty in Denmark and as many as 32 percent in the UK. It
is notable that three of the worst performers are the cohesion countries of Spain,
Portugal and Ireland, countries where income inequality is comparatively high.
Poverty figures from Wave 1 of the ECHP have been the subject of consid-
erable attention, not least since they give a different picture in some respects
to earlier analyses, stimulating debate as to whether this is due to the differ-
ences in the nature of the sources. In Table A2 in the Appendix we give the
ECHP figures for child poverty together with those from Hagenaars et al.
(1994) and from the source we use to look at changes over time, Bradbury and
Jäntti (1999). The reader should note the differences in methodology and cov-
erage shown at the top of each column of results; these notwithstanding, the
comparison raises questions in particular about the position in the Benelux
countries shown by the ECHP data.
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Has the degree of exclusion of children, as measured by relative poverty,
become more or less equal across the Union over time? Convergence of average
income per head shown in Figure 3.1 has no direct bearing on this question – the
answer depends on (i) changes in the distribution of income within each coun-
try and (ii) changes in the position of families with children in those national dis-
19 Callan and Nolan (1997) compare the poverty rates for all individuals in ECHP (not just children) with
those of Hagenaars et al. (1994), having put the data onto the same basis (in terms of the measure of resources
taken, the poverty line etc). (This contrasts with our Table A2, where the differences in methodology remain.)
They comment that the size of the apparent rise in poverty indicated by the comparison between the late 1980s
and 1993 “would indeed be remarkable” (p.64) for such a relatively short period and the implication is that
some caution with ECHP data is needed.19 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
tributions.
20 Our ability to provide the answer is limited by available analyses of
the existing data. While subsequent waves of ECHP should shed light on the sit-
uation during the 1990s, the trends prior to the 1990s are harder to establish. The
availability of data differs across countries, the data and methods are not always
sufficiently comparable, and results do not always separately identify children.
Our results refer only to nine countries and cover just the period between
the mid-1980s and the early 1990s. The source is the analysis of child pover-
ty by Bradbury and Jäntti (1999) which uses the household survey data sets
held in the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS). The data sets available in the
LIS certainly do differ but have been harmonized to make them sufficiently
comparable at a broad level across country as well as across time. And the
treatment of the data by the authors – the method used to calculate poverty
– is the same in each case. (The differences in methodology shown in Table
A2 between the different studies are a reminder of the need for such stan-
dardization.) Figure 3.2 shows child poverty rates based on a poverty line of
50 percent of the median national income. This contrasts with the figures
from the ECHP in Table 2.1 in which the poverty line is based on the mean,
which results in higher numbers in poverty, although other differences in the
treatment of the data and in the nature of the data sets also affect the com-
parison.
These data show a rise in child poverty in the nine member states con-
cerned, taken together, from 10.5 percent to 13.5 percent. Only in Finland
and Sweden, countries with below average poverty in the 1980s, is any real
fall recorded. Large rises occur in the two countries with the highest rates in
the 1980s, Germany – four percentage points over a 10 year period – and
Britain – six percentage points over a five year period. (It should be noted
that the German data for the 1990s include former East Germany.) This pat-
tern of changes drives up the dispersion in poverty rates across the countries
concerned. If data for France for 1981 and 1989 and for Spain for 1980 and
1990 are also included (treating 1989 in the former case as “1990s”), the pic-
ture is more or less unchanged – the same story emerges concerning the over-
all levels of child poverty, the dispersion across countries and the changes in
both of these over time. Several Member States are absent from this analysis,
notably three of the Cohesion Four, and it would be particularly interesting
to see the trends in child poverty in these countries. Among countries for
which data are available, however, the conclusion seems to be that disparities
among Member States rose between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s
20 A crude argument based on the Kuznets curve would provide a link between, on the one hand, conver-
gence in average incomes as a result of catch-up growth by the poorer countries and, on the other, a reduction
in income inequality within these countries leading to convergence in relative poverty rates. We do not enter
into the merits of such an argument here.against a background of an increasing average level.
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This conclusion of course relates to a particular measure of poverty: one that
takes no account of differences in average national incomes. A child in Spain is
classified as poor solely on the basis of a comparison of his or her household’s
income with the Spanish median. But it may be argued that poverty measure-
ment within the EU should take account of living standards in the Union as a
whole, reflecting the notion of social cohesion among member states.
22
Countries with lower average incomes would then record higher poverty rates
for a given distribution of income. And catch-up with the rest of the EU by the
Cohesion Four in terms of national income per head would have the effect of
reducing poverty in those countries, other factors remaining unchanged.
Whether this in turn would lead to reduced dispersion in poverty rates across
the Union would depend on each cohesion country’s point of departure com-
pared to those of other member states, which depends on the distribution of
income as well as on average income, but the likelihood is that this reduction
would occur. However, changes in the distribution of income within countries,
and any alterations in the position of families with children within these distri-
butions, would remain critical, something true of all members states and not
just the Cohesion Four. These may greatly moderate the impact of economic
growth on poverty when the latter is assessed using an absolute yardstick.
Measuring poverty using the official US poverty line in constant price terms,
child poverty in the UK is estimated to have fallen by less than 2 percent points
between 1986 and 1995, despite growth in real GDP per capita of 20 percent.
23
n 3.2 Children in workless households
One dimension of children’s economic well-being is the strength of their
households’ contact with the labour market. This has an important effect on
the risk of being poor. In the late 1980s, children aged under 14 in EU house-
holds with no working adult were on average four times more likely to be in
poverty than were children in households in which someone worked
(Hagenaars et al., 1994, Appendix 3 Tables A3.1), although this figure varied
substantially from country to country. On the other hand, a feature of the rise
in unemployment in Europe since the late 1970s has been the lack of a clear
link in a number of countries between the changes in unemployment and the
changes in poverty among the population as a whole (Atkinson, 1998c). 
20 John Micklewright and Kitty Stewart
21 These results seem consistent with the conclusion of Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding (1995) that continu-
ing progression towards reduced income inequality in Europe was the exception in the 1980s rather than the rule.
22 Another possibility suggested by Atkinson (1995, 1998b) is for a poverty line that is a weighted average
of the EU and national averages.  This would reflect both differences in the levels of development across the
Union as well as the notion of social cohesion.
23 We are grateful to Markus Jäntti for this calculation made using LIS data (other definitions are as those
in Table A3).21 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
But it is not just the impact on poverty that is of concern. Households with-
out work are more precarious than are other households, with a greater need
for income support from the state. Other aspects of worklessness go beyond
the economic dimension. The lack of work in a household may cause tension
within the family and may limit a child’s aspirations and contacts. For these
different reasons, the proportion of children living in households without
work may be taken as one measure of economic and social exclusion.
24
The analysis of workless households in Europe has been advanced by Gregg and
Wadsworth’s investigation of whether there has been growing “polarization” in
OECD countries – a simultaneous rise in the number of households with all adults
present in employment and in the number with no adult employed (Gregg and
Wadsworth, 1996). The picture appears to vary between countries, with some dis-
playing polarization and some not. But the debate has not tended to focus on the sit-
uation of children – on the changing proportion of children who live in workless
households in different countries.






















Figure 3.2: Child poverty in the 1980s and the 1990s
Source: Table A3.
Note: a child is defined as in poverty if equivalized household income is less than 50 percent of
the national median.  The notes to Table A2 give the equivalence scale used and Table A3 gives
the years to which the data refer. Children are defined as all persons aged 0-17.
24 This is not to say that lack of work should be viewed as a bad thing in every case, and the extra time that
parents without work may spend with children may of course be beneficial. The quality of jobs done by par-
ents is also important from the child’s point of view, including the number of hours worked and the degree of
mental and physical stress.
25 In the case of the USA, the annual government publication Trends in the Well-Being of America’s Children
and Youth gives the proportion of children with both resident parents (or the only resident parent) in the work
force, which rose from 53 percent in 1980 to 66 percent in 1994 (DHHS, 1996, Table ES 3.1). But the numbers
without any resident parent in the labour force are not given.by the OECD provides an important source of information that we draw on here.
Figure 3.3 shows for eleven European Union countries the percentage of work-
ing-age households containing one or more children aged under 15 that had no
working-age adult in employment. The data refer to 1985 and 1996, years in which
the (unweighted) average unemployment rate for the countries concerned was the
same. The unit of analysis is the household and not the child; unfortunately the data
do not show the percentage of children living in households where no adult is in
work, which is the figure of more interest from a child welfare perspective. Data for
two further countries, Austria and Finland, are given for 1996 in Table 2.1. (The
only countries for which no data are available are Denmark and Sweden.)
The incidence of worklessness among households with children clearly
varies substantially across the EU. The figure in 1996 ranges from less than 4
percent in Portugal and Luxembourg to 15 percent in Ireland and almost 20
percent in the UK. The value of the standard deviation shows disparities to
have risen somewhat since 1985. Moreover, this increase in dispersion went
hand-in-hand with a higher overall rate of joblessness – the weighted average
for the EU-11 rose by over 2 percent points over the period concerned, despite
the unemployment rate showing little change.
What lies behind the figures? Polarization of work along the lines suggest-
ed by Gregg and Wadsworth could result in higher worklessness among fam-
ilies even if overall conditions in the labour market are unchanged. Figure 3.4
plots the change in worklessness among households with children against
























Figure 3.3: Households with children that have no working adult (rate, percent)
Source: Table A4.
Note: children defined as aged under 15; unit of analysis is the household.23 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
changes in the unemployment rate. Although a number of countries lie close
to the 45 degree line, in several the change in unemployment is a poor guide
to the change in worklessness. In Greece, Belgium and the UK the changes
have been in opposite directions.
The case of the UK stands out. This is underlined by the contrast with the
situation of Portugal. The two countries had the same labour force participa-
tion rate in 1996 for 25-54 year olds (83 percent) and very similar unemploy-
ment rates (6.2 and 7.0 percent, respectively, for the same age group).
26 And
yet there is a 16 percent point gap between these two countries in the propor-
tion of households with children with an adult in work.
The association across countries at any one point in time between labour
market conditions and worklessness among families is, not surprisingly, quite
strong in general. But this association is moderated by the big differences that
exist in household structure, in particular in the number of working-age adults
present in households with children. In Portugal less than 5 percent of house-
holds with children have only one working age adult – something true also of
the other Southern European countries, Greece, Italy and Spain. By contrast,
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Figure 3.4: Change in worklessness among families and change in unemployment, 1985-96
Source: workless household rates from Table A4; unemployment rates are OECD standardized rates,
which are bench-marked to labour force survey estimates, and are from Eurostat, 1997c, p304 and
OECD, 1990, p36 (with the exception of the 1996 figure for Germany which is taken from OECD,
1998, p190).  The 1985 rates, which were taken from the latter source, were adjusted by the ratio of
figures for 1986 given in both sources.
Note: the unemployment rate is the economy-wide figure for all 25-54 year-olds while the no adult
working rate refers to households with children (aged under 15).  The diagram shows the percent
point changes in each of these rates over 1985-96.
26 These figures for unemployment and labour force participation are taken from OECD (1998, pp195-6).as much as 18 percent in the UK. Single-adult households are far less likely
to have work than are other households with children – averaging across all
EU countries for which there are data, 40 percent and 6 percent respectively
of these two types of household had no adult in work in 1996.
27 All the
Southern European countries have a “workless family” rate below the unem-
ployment rate for 25-54 year olds, while the opposite is true in Belgium,
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK.
The differences in household structure can be expected to affect the impact
of the economic cycle on the overall level of worklessness among families,
together with the dispersion in levels across Member States. But household
structure itself changes over time. And in contrast to the economy, these
changes represent trends rather than cycles, producing more lasting effects on
worklessness. All countries featured in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 experienced an
increase in the importance of one-adult households with children between
1985 and 1996, reflecting in part a rise in births to lone parents and in divorce.
However, the extent of this increase varies markedly. In seven countries the
rise in the share of single-adult households among all households with chil-
dren was 2 percent points or less. In France it was 3 points, in Belgium and
Ireland 4-5 points, while in the UK it was over 10 points. It is this large rise
that drives the change in the overall worklessness rate for UK families.
28
Patterns of worklessness for families in the EU, including the extent of differ-
ences among Member States, therefore depend on a variety of factors – the eco-
nomic cycle, polarization in the labour market, and changing household struc-
ture. If household structure in Southern Europe moves towards that in Northern
Europe then further convergence in household worklessness at a higher overall
rate could be the outcome, although the future is of course hard to predict.
n 3.3 Unemployment among young people
For older children, concern about the impact of the labour market on well-being
must include consideration of their own employment opportunities. Rather than
looking at the teenage years we focus on unemployment rates among those
aged 20-24. A concern with child welfare extends beyond the years up to the
age of 18 – looking at the prospects for children when they pass over the age of
majority is essential for any rounded picture of their well-being.
29
24 John Micklewright and Kitty Stewart
27 It should however be noted that there are large differences in the rate of worklessness even when holding
this aspect of household structure constant. Over 60 percent of single-adult households with children have no
work in Ireland and the UK, compared with only 25 percent in Spain, Portugal and Austria.
28 The rate of worklessness in fact fell slightly in one-adult households in the UK – as for other household
types – but the shift in the distribution towards this high risk group pushed up the overall rate.
29 There are also data problems with looking at unemployment for a younger age-group using official register data: in
some countries young people do not qualify for unemployment benefit until they are 18, making cross-country compari-
son of unemployment among 15-19 year olds based on register data misleading. The data we use are drawn, however,
from labour force surveys in which the measurement of unemployment does not depend on registration for benefits.25 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
The high rates of youth unemployment in much of the EU are a disap-
pointing feature of labour markets in many Member States. Unemployment
rates among 20-24 year-olds exceeded 20 percent in 7 out of 14 countries
in 1994 (we have no data for Austria). Spain tops the league at over 40 per-
cent. 
These rates refer to unemployment among young people who have joined
the labour market, that is among those who are part of the labour force. But
labour force participation rates among the young differ substantially across
the Union, driven in large measure by differences in enrolment rates in full-
time education. Whereas over 75 percent of 20-24 year-olds in Denmark and
the UK were in the labour force in 1994, the figure was less than 55 percent
in France and Italy. There is also a reasonably clear association between par-
ticipation in the labour market and unemployment, as shown by Figure 3.5.
Participation is lower where the risk of unemployment is higher. One result
is that the variation across the EU Member States in the proportion of all
young persons aged 20-24 who are unemployed is somewhat less than that
among those who are part of the labour force.
Our interest in unemployment is as an inverse measure of well-being
among young people, as opposed to a measure of disequilibrium in the youth
labour market. It is thus the incidence among the full age cohort that is
arguably of most interest. Hence in looking at trends over time we remove
the influence of differences – and changes – in labour force participation and
Figure 3.5: Labour force participation and unemployment, 20-24 year olds in 1994
Source: Tables A5 and A6.
Notes: unemployment follows the ILO/OECD definition and the rates displayed refer to those



























































)thus calculate unemployment rates as a percentage of all persons aged 20-
24.
30
Figure 3.6 shows the unemployment rate for 20-24 year-olds on this basis
for 1979 and 1994, and for two intervening years. The rates for just 7 coun-
tries are shown, but the weighted EU mean and standard deviation are
reported in Table 3.1 for 14 countries (Austria is the country not included)
for 1983-94 and for 1979-94 for the 8 countries for which we have data for
all four years. (Ireland is the country excluded from Figure 3.6). Following
the rise in unemployment in the early 1980s, the EU-8 mean changes little
over 1983-94. The EU-14 figure shows nearly 1 in 7 of the age group unem-
ployed in 1994.
How have differences in the risk of unemployment among Member States
varied over time? The standard deviation for the 14 rose by almost half
between 1983 and 1994, although it is notable that it fell back somewhat in
the five years from its peak in 1989 when unemployment was at a cyclical low.
Among the 8 countries for which we have data since 1979 the standard devi-
ation was 80 percent higher by 1994. Absolute differences among this group
of Member States therefore rose substantially. Exactly the same percentage

















Figure 3.6: Cohort unemployment rate, 20-24 year olds: 1983-1994
Source: Tables A7.
Note: Unemployment rates are calculated as a percent of all persons aged 20-24 and not just
those participating in the labour force.
30 Tables A5 and A6 give the unemployment rate with the conventional denominator and the participation
rate for several years; the (unweighted) average EU-14 participation rate fell by over 8 percentage points
between 1983 and 1994 while unemployment rose by 3 points.27 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
increase occurred in the mean over 1979-94, hence relative differences were
in fact unchanged.
The rise in unemployment over 1979-94 saw the countries’rankings change
in several respects. For example, the experiences of the neighbours Spain and
Portugal, which started the period in a similar position, contrast sharply. A 20-
24 year-old in Spain was two and a half times as likely to be unemployed in
1994 as in 1979, while the probability fell over time in Portugal. There were
sharp rises in unemployment between 1989 and 1994 in two countries with
previously low rates, Sweden and, especially, Finland, where the early 1990s
saw a notable shrinkage in the economy on account of fall-out from the break-
up of the Soviet Union. Germany and the UK, however, are among the coun-
tries where unemployment fell between these two years.
Unemployment may reduce the welfare of young people in various ways,
including a direct impact on incomes, wastage of their talents, and a feeling
of exclusion from society. The impact on living standards will depend on the
types of households in which young unemployed people live. Those that live
in households where others are employed will be cushioned from part of the
impact. But many young unemployed live in households where no other adult
works, a fact that is often overlooked. In 1996, this applied to 40 percent of
the unemployed aged 15-24 in 4 out of 12 Member States for which data were
available. The unweighted average figure across all 12 countries was 32 per-
cent (OECD, 1998,Table 1.5). Among the lowest figures (but still over 20 per-
cent) were those for Spain, Italy, and Greece – countries with high unem-
ployment rates among the young. The lowest of all was that for Portugal; it is
only here that less than 1 in 5 of unemployed 15-24 year-olds were living in
workless households.
These differences across the EU reflect a number of factors, one of which
is the variation in household structure between Northern and Southern
Table 3.2: Cohort unemployment rate, 20-24 year olds summary statistics
1979 1983 1989 1994
EU-8 Mean 8.3 13.9 13.6 14.8
Std. Dev. 3.8 4.7 7.1 6.8
EU-14 Mean - 14.0 12.4 13.8
Std. Dev. - 4.2 6.4 6.1
Source: Table A7.
Note: The EU-8 are Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden.
Austria is the country missing from the EU-14.  Unemployment rates are calculated as a percent
of all persons aged 20-24 and not just those participating in the labour force.Europe, with young people staying on for longer in the parental home in the
South.
31 The result is a levelling in the disparities in one dimension of the
impact of unemployment on the young.
n 3.4 Summary
We started with the traditional indicator of average income per head – GDP
per capita – for which relative disparities are now significantly less than in the
early 1980s, against a background of higher average income in the EU as a
whole. This contrasts with the situation for each of the other indicators we
have considered in this section: child poverty, worklessness among house-
holds with children, and unemployment among young people. In each case,
the disparities among countries (measured in absolute rather than relative
terms) have tended to rise over the period considered – against a background
of a worsening average for the EU as a whole.
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31  The proportion of 20-24 year-olds still living with their parents in 1995 was in the range 47-55 percent
in France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK in 1994, but over 70 percent in Greece, and over 85 percent
in Italy and Spain (Eurostat, 1997, p.63).29
4. Mortality
n 4.1 Traditional mortality indicators
Mortality indicators have become widely accepted as key non-economic mea-
sures of a population’s well-being. Sen (1998) gives three reasons for their worth.
First, of course, we attach intrinsic importance to life itself. Second, many other
capabilities that we value are contingent on our being alive; and third, mortality
is correlated with and therefore a rough proxy for a number of other dimensions
of well-being for which data are less readily available – most obviously morbid-
ity. Underlining all is the fact that mortality is not as easily explained by nation-
al wealth as might be expected. Although GDP is broadly correlated with both
infant mortality (IMR) and life expectancy if countries at all income levels are
included, over groups of countries with similar GDP wide disparities in mortali-
ty exist. This seems to be because traditional mortality indicators respond well to
investment in basic public services and to the raising of the incomes of the poor,
and because increasing national wealth is neither a necessary nor a sufficient con-
dition for these improvements (see Anand and Ravallion, 1993).
At very high levels of national income, however, we would expect disparities in
traditional mortality indicators to have been more or less eliminated. Indeed, in
Europe today no country has an IMR higher than 9 deaths per 1000 live births,
and while disparities do persist they are negligible in the light of those in the
past: in 1960 the IMR varied across Europe from 16 in Sweden to 81 in
Portugal – the latter figure, for comparison, is higher than that for the Sudan
in 1996 (UNICEF, 1998, Table 1). Similar progress has been achieved in the
wider measure of under-5 mortality, as illustrated in Figure 4.1. The overall
EU-15 rate fell by more than two-thirds over 1970-95 – see Table 4.1. There
is also clear evidence of convergence, with the standard deviation falling by
some 90 percent.
32 As the bulk of child mortality in any one year is made up
of deaths to the under 5s, this progress has in turn meant similar convergence
32 Relative disparities also fell considerably over this period: the coefficient of variation fell by about two-
thirds between 1970 and 1990. Since 1990 it has risen slightly, but this is due to significant progress in reduc-
ing mortality by the two best-performing countries, Sweden (as shown in Figure 4.1) and Luxembourg (the
unweighted measure rises more substantially – see Appendix Table B1). Persistent disparities in child and infant
mortality across Europe seem to be partly explained by persistent differences in GDP: there is a negative corre-
lation of –0.45 between IMR and per capita GDP in 1993. (See also the correlation with under-5 mortality in
Table 2.1.) But this is driven entirely by the extremes – the performances of Luxembourg at the top and Greece
and Portugal at the bottom. Remaining differences may owe something to the degree of disparity in child health
inside certain countries, between social or regional groups. For instance, in Italy in 1991 infant mortality varied
from 5.2 in the North-West to 11.8 in the South (Saraceno, 1997, Table 10.1); while in England and Wales the
rate varied from around 7 for social class 1 to 11 for social class 6, with the children of lone mothers recording
a rate of around 14 (Commission on Social Justice, 1994, Figure 1.11). In Sweden, in contrast, the rates for the
top and bottom classes were similar at about 5, with the children born to lone mothers closer to 7 (ibid.). in the mortality of all those under 18.
33 Death rates for boys and girls under 20
are about one third of what they were in 1970.
However, this progress does not mean that mortality data are no longer use-
ful as measures of child well-being in the industrialized world. First, despite
achievements, there are still unnecessary deaths. Imagine that all EU countries
had the same under-5 mortality rate as that of Sweden. There would have been
over 10,000 fewer deaths among the under 5s in 1995.
34 Second, given that
deaths among young children dominate the total for children of all ages,
improvements in the survival rates of very young children may disguise what
is happening among other under 20s.
Indeed, when we look at older groups of children, we find progress has
been more limited. Table 4.1 shows summary statistics for mortality rates
among two older age groups alongside those for the under 5s. Among 5-14
year olds, death rates have been falling steadily since 1970, but much more
slowly than for the under 5s. As a result, the standard deviation has also fall-
en much more slowly – starting off below that for under-5 mortality, it finish-
es much above it. Among 15-24 year olds the overall European mortality rate
has fallen by only a quarter and with almost no progress over the last decade,
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Figure 4.1: Under-5 mortality rates in selected EU countries 1970-95
(probability of dying before reaching age 5 per 1,000 births)
Source: Table B1.















33 Under-5 mortality accounted for over 75 percent of deaths of under 20 year olds in 1970 and about 60
percent in 1995.
34 The great bulk of deaths in Europe under the age of 5 are among infants (children aged under 1) – this is
the case for over 80 percent of the 30,000 deaths among the under 5s in the EU-15 in 1995. And among infant
deaths, about 45 percent are in the first week of life – and about 60 percent in the first month (Eurostat, 1997b,
pp178-9) As far as mortality among many young infants is concerned, the issue is not just one of reducing the
number of deaths but also of preventing any disability stemming from the conditions generating that mortality,
e.g. premature birth. This requires action to both reduce the factors leading to premature births (which include
poverty, alcohol and drug abuse) and to improve intensive care for children who are prematurely born.31 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
while the standard deviation has come down by a little under half. In both
cases, relative disparities have not improved at all: the coefficient of variation
for both 5-14s and 15-24s has been more or less constant across the period.
35 
Figure 4.2 presents trends in the death rate for the oldest age-group for
selected countries. A varied picture appears and it is clear that there has been
some notable re-ranking within the league table. In the Southern European
Cohesion countries and in Italy death rates were as high for this group in 1995
as they had been in the early or mid-1970s. In Greece and Italy, for example,
mortality rates started in 1970 at very similar levels to those in the
Netherlands, but by 1995 the rates in both countries were nearly 50 percent
higher than the Dutch rate. Portugal experiences a similar divergence from the
EU average. At the same time, rapid progress has been made in the three
countries which started with the highest youth mortality rates, Austria,
Germany and Luxembourg (not shown). (German data to 1985 are for the
Federal Republic only and from 1990 for the united Germany: the higher
death rates in the former East Germany are reflected by the slight rise in the
German series between 1985 and 1990.)
There are obvious reasons why Europe has seen less improvement in bring-
ing mortality rates down among older than younger children. Deaths among
young children have been predominantly due to infectious disease, and in turn
highly responsive to the improvements in nutrition, education and basic health
care which have accompanied growing national wealth. In contrast, the major-
ity of deaths among older groups are related to behaviour, making interven-
35 The chances of dying before the age of 5 are still much higher than for either of these older age groups,
however. It is not until a person reaches their late 30s/early 40s that the death rate again becomes as high as in
the first years of life.
Table 4.1: Means and standard deviations for mortality rates among three age
groups of children, EU 15
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Mean Under 5 25.8 20.8 14.9 11.3 9.2 7.5
5 to 14 40.7 34.1 29.9 22.6 20.1 17.6
15 to 24 88.5 84.9 80.2 67.7 69.6 65.0
SD Under 5 8.9 6.0 3.6 2.3 1.1 0.9
5 to 14 7.3 5.8 5.4 4.1 4.0 3.3
15 to 24 18.8 18.3 16.6 12.7 12.5 11.3
Source: Tables B1 and B2.
Note: Both means and standard deviations are weighted figures. The under-5 mortality
rate measures the probability of dying before the 5th birthday expressed per 1,000 live
births. The mortality rates for 5-14 and for 15-24 year olds measure the total deaths
among persons of these ages per 100,000 in the age group. tions harder to determine and to implement. Furthermore, these behavioural
issues have themselves grown in size with economic development, which has
brought with it the rise of motorized transport and, often, increased violence
and the breakup of traditional social networks. 
Unfortunately, therefore, premature mortality is still common enough in
Europe to make it a useful measure of well-being, among both older and
younger children. (If mortality among all three of the age groups shown in
Table 4.1 were to converge on those of Sweden, there would be 25,000 fewer
deaths in the EU among those aged under 25.) And in keeping with Sen’s third
argument, mortality indicators may also proxy other problems that may be
difficult to measure by other means. The two death rates examined below are
thus chosen for two reasons: as significant contributors to remaining child and
youth mortality in Europe, and because they represent wider problems faced
by the young in industrialized societies today. 
First, we look at traffic death rates among the 5 to 14 age group, on the
grounds that the rise of the use of the car has presented one of the greatest
changes of recent decades to children’s safety and independence. While many
children benefit from the increased mobility rising car ownership has afforded
their families, the same development has led to significant new constraints on
their own personal freedom. Activities which their parents may have taken for
granted – playing football in the street, cycling to school – are out of bounds
32 John Micklewright and Kitty Stewart
















Figure 4.2: 15-24 year old death rates in selected EU countries 1970-95 
(deaths per 100,000) 
Source: Table B2.33 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
to many European children today. Unfortunately, mortality rates are almost
certainly not the best way to measure the effect the car has had on children’s
freedom of movement: although they may proxy the wider number of non-fatal
accidents (which are difficult to compare across countries), accident rates will
be affected by the degree to which parents adapt to the perceived threat (by
keeping children indoors) as well as by the extent to which cars are kept in
check by safety measures and pedestrian zones. This problem is discussed fur-
ther below. Still, taken in conjunction with other data the mortality rate gives
us some insight into the problem – while also, of course, giving us direct infor-
mation about the most tragic outcome of the proliferation of the car. 
The second mortality measure we look at is the death rate of young men from
suicide and self-inflicted injury, a problem of increasing concern in many indus-
trialized countries. Suicide death rates among the young have been rising sig-
nificantly in a number of countries in Europe, with men particularly affected. In
addition to the waste of human potential each death represents, the level of
youth suicide in a country suggests itself as one of the few available proxies for
a wider phenomenon of stress, dispair and disaffection affecting young people. 
n 4.2 Child deaths from motor vehicle accidents
Motor vehicle accidents are now the single most important killer of children in
Europe between the ages of 5 and 14. In 1994 they were responsible for 20 per-
cent of deaths of both boys and girls of this age group – a total of 1500 children
killed on European roads. However, this still represents a considerable improve-
ment on 30 years ago: in 1960 3500 children in this age group were killed. So
despite the increasing level of car ownership, Europe has seen a steady improve-
ment in road safety: between 1960 and 1994 the death rate for children 5-14
halved from 7.2 to 3.6 per 100,000. This apparent success raises two questions.
First, how universal is the pattern: are all European children sharing in improve-
ments? And second, what can we say about how far falling death rates are due to
restrictions on children and how far to curbs on the speed and reach of traffic?
Figure 4.3 shows the main trends in road accident mortality rates for 5-14 year
olds with data for selected countries. Most countries experienced a peak in the
death rate in 1970, although the peak is at various different levels: Germany and
Denmark (not shown), for instance, reach a maximum of 16 deaths per 100,000,
compared to Austria and the Netherlands (12), and Italy and Ireland (9). From
the early 1970s on, there is a steady decline in fatality rates such that by 1994
the death rate varies between 3 and 5 deaths per 100,000 in most of Europe.
The Southern European Cohesion countries provide an exception to this
rule. In Portugal and Spain road death rates keep rising until 1980 and in
Greece until 1990: in all three countries death rates in 1994 are higher than in1960. The trend in Portugal is particularly striking: the number of children
killed in road accidents per 100,000 doubled from 6 to 12 between 1960 and
1975, before falling back to 8 by 1994. 
Naturally, this different trend in the Cohesion countries is explained by
their later development: as the number of traffic accidents is to some extent a
factor of the number of cars, surviving the threat of death by traffic accident
is one welfare indicator likely to be negatively correlated with GDP. Greece
and Spain in particular start off in 1960 with much lower traffic death rates
than any of the more advanced European countries, and so the fact that these
rates increase over the period is of little surprise.
However, there is clearly a point at which traffic accidents no longer
increase with income, and countries turn their attention to improving road
safety measures – hence the 1970 turnaround in Northern Europe. The
Cohesion countries appear to have reached this turning point already: the road
death rate in Portugal, as noted, has been falling since 1980; while in Greece
the death rate fell in the first half of this decade, although it is too early to say
whether this is a permanent trend. It is also worth noting that, even in
Portugal, rates in the late 1970s did not reach the highest level of the 1970
peak: the pattern of road death rates in Portugal is an echo of the Austrian
trend, for instance, rather than the German one.
34 John Micklewright and Kitty Stewart









             SD     Max/min
1970     4.2       5.1
1975     2.2       3.3
1980     1.7       3.1
1985     1.1       2.4
1990     1.1       3.4












Figure 4.3: Death from motor vehicle accidents among children 5-14, selected EU
countries (deaths per 100,000)
Source: Table B3
Note: The CV and the EU-15 rate are the weighted figures.35 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
The graph also includes measures of convergence from 1970 onwards. Both
standard deviation and maximum/minimum ratio fell considerably between
1970 and 1985. Since then, however, the standard deviation has been stable
while the maximum/minimum ratio has been on the rise. This is due on the
one hand to continuing progress in reducing deaths in Sweden, and, on the
other, to Portugal’s failure to keep pace with the rest of Europe. 
As suggested above, however, there is a potential problem with reaching con-
clusions about children’s welfare on the basis of road death figures. It has been
argued that road accidents are falling, not because of increased safety on the
roads, but because parents are keeping their children cooped up at home away
from traffic and other perceived dangers. A study for the UK Policy Studies
Institute argues that “the streets have not become safer; they have become …
extremely dangerous. It is the response to this danger, by both children and their
parents, that has contained the road accident death rate.” (Hillman et al, 1990,
p.2; see also Hillman, 1993). For instance, according to the study, in 1971 80
percent of British 7 and 8 year olds went to school on their own, but in 1990
only 9 percent were allowed to do so (Hillman et al, 1990, p.106).
36 Half of 9
year olds in 1990 were allowed to cross the road unaccompanied, compared to
70 percent in 1971 (op.cit. p.44). Thus while European children may be less
likely to be killed in traffic today than 20 years ago, this may be at the cost of
a deteriorating quality of life for the young. 
Once children’s effective independence is considered alongside road fatality
statistics, comparisons of road death rates across countries become complicat-
ed. For example, the Netherlands, Germany and the UK have near identical
child death rates from traffic accidents in the early 1990s. But in the
Netherlands sample surveys suggest that 61 percent of boys aged between 12
and 14 and 60 percent of girls travel most places by bike, while in Britain the
figures are 13 percent and 4 percent. Similarly, in Germany in 1990, 60 percent
of 7 and 8 year olds sampled were travelling to school unaccompanied, and 90
percent of 9 year olds were allowed to cross the road alone; much higher than
the figures given above for Britain (Hillman et al., 1990, p.73). This suggests
that UK roads may be much more dangerous than statistics suggest and that it
is parents and children rather than drivers who have adapted.
It would be very much in children’s interest if this sort of data were collect-
ed systematically. In its absence, what other types of information might shed
light on how far falling death rates are really due to parental caution and how
far to tighter controls and more responsible motorists? One way might be to
look at road death rates among poorer children – those more likely to be on the
36 Traffic danger was cited by 43 percent of parents as the primary reason for concern, compared to 21 per-
cent who cited molestation and 21 percent who said their child was too unreliable. street. For instance, a 1990 survey of primary school children in Lisbon found
that 68 percent were unsupervised after school (Silva, 1997). This may be a par-
tial explanation of the higher child death rate in Portugal. In Britain, a child
from Social Class VI is more than four times as likely to be killed in a traffic
accident as a child from Social Class I (Report of the Commission on Social
Justice, 1994, p.44), putting poorer children in Britain at similar or greater risk
to the average child in Portugal. The problem with this approach though is that,
while a disparity in fatality rates between social classes is good evidence that
the roads are not as safe as the averages make them appear, the opposite is not
necessarily true. An absence of such disparities may indicate that all children
are supervised, rather than that even those on the streets are safe.
An alternative way of assessing the extent of children’s diminishing inde-
pendence may be to look at child road death rates within the context of trends
in road deaths in the wider population. Is road safety improving in general, or
are children simply being better protected from constant or increased dan-
gers? Evidence suggests that in most of Europe roads are becoming safer for
all, but that children have benefited more than other groups. As one illustra-
tion, Figure 4.4 shows road death rates in 1994 relative to those in 1970 for
two groups of males: 5 to 14 year olds on the horizontal axis, and 15-24 year
olds (the age range at which most young people become fully independent for
the first time) on the vertical axis. 
All points in the graph are above the 45 degree line, meaning that child rates
have fallen by more than rates for young people. In most countries child death











































































1994 death rate for males 5-14
as ratio of 1970 rate
Figure 4.4: Road death rates in 1994 for two groups of young males relative to those
in 1970
Source: Table B437 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
rates are a third or less of what they were in 1970, while death rates for young
people are still at least half of the 1970 level. In the Cohesion countries, child
death rates have fallen (except in Greece) while rates for young men have actu-
ally risen over the period – the points are all well above the horizontal axis. A
scatterplot of child death rates against those for the whole population shows a
very similar picture. It does seem as though children are being increasingly
insulated from traffic death rates in wider groups, in turn suggesting that it may
be their behaviour more than that of the traffic which is being curbed. 
n 4.3 Deaths of young men from suicide and self-inflicted injury
Traffic deaths are still the leading cause of death for young people in their late
teens and early twenties. But it is the second most common cause of death for
this age-group, suicide and self-inflicted injury, which is attracting increasing
concern. In part this is because suicide is responsible for a growing number of
early deaths: while Figure 4.4 shows that in most of Europe road death rates
for this age group are in decline, the average suicide rate for 15 to 24 year olds
has grown by 40 percent since 1970. In part it is because a rising suicide rate
suggests a wider phenomenon of disaffection and malaise among young peo-
ple. Young men are particularly affected: over four times as many young men
as young women die from suicide each year.
37 In 1994 over 3000 males and
some 750 females between the ages of 15 and 24 are recorded as having taken
their own lives in the EU, and an additional 800 males and nearly 200 females
died from violent causes undetermined whether deliberate or not.
38
Furthermore, in absolute numbers, suicides for men have gone up while those
for women have remained fairly constant: in 1970 2200 men and 800 women
in this age-group were recorded as having taken their lives, with 300 men and
just over 100 women recorded as having died through undetermined violence.
(The population of both men and women aged 15-24 rose by some 5 percent
over this period.)
The importance of including figures for deaths from undetermined causes
arises from the problems involved in the classification of suicide deaths. It is
widely held that official suicide statistics significantly underestimate the true
number of suicides (see e.g. Pescosolido and Mendelsohn, 1986; Diekstra et
37 It is interesting though that ‘parasuicide’ (attempted suicide) seems to be more prevalent among young
women than among young men: in the UK young women between 15 and 19 form the highest risk population
group (The Samaritans, 1996). This may be because women happen to choose less violent means of death
which allow room for discovery; or because female suicide attempts are more often cries for help than deci-
sions to end life. Whichever is the explanation, parasuicide would in itself be an interesting measure of well-
being, but data are obviously much less easily available.
38 In comparison to both these categories, homicide was responsible for a tiny number of deaths. In 1994,
for instance, there was less than one homicide for every ten deaths from suicide or undetermined causes.al., 1995). A suicide death is one which is self-inflicted and intended, and the
establishment of intent after death is not always easy. In many cases the deci-
sion hinges on witness testimony about the dead person’s circumstances and
state of mind, which introduces an element of uncertainty. In an investigation
of verdicts reached on deaths of people run over by London Underground
trains, Taylor (1982) illustrates how apparently identical deaths can end up
being classified differently purely on the basis of whether or not a witness tes-
tifies that the person had seemed depressed. 
This room for ambiguity is likely to result in a universal downward bias in
suicide figures, as coronors and magistrates usually prefer to record an open
verdict if in doubt, rather than cause unnecessary distress to surviving family.
The key question for a cross-national comparison of suicide rates, however, is
whether the degree of the bias is likely to vary across countries. There are two
reasons to believe that it might. First, the taboo associated with suicide varies,
providing differing motivations to disguise the circumstances of death. The
long accepted inverse relationship Durkheim established between Catholicism
and suicide rates is now often put down to a greater degree of under-reporting
of suicide in Catholic countries (e.g. Pescosolido and Mendelsohn, 1986).
Second, the procedures used to register cause of death themselves vary across
countries. In particular, in England and Wales in order to record a death as a
suicide a coronor must prove ‘beyond reasonable doubt’that a person intend-
ed to take their own life – a relic of the times where a suicide verdict was a
criminal verdict. No other European country has a comparable system: gener-
ally evidence of intent is not required and the decision on cause of death is
made ‘on the balance of probablities’ (Madge, 1999). 
In the case of England and Wales, it is now widely accepted that more realis-
tic levels of suicide are achieved by combining suicide verdicts with deaths from
undetermined causes (see Charlton et al., 1992; Department of Health, 1992). In
this paper we take this combined definition for all countries, both to ensure that
(at least in one sense) we compare like with like, and because this should also
have the effect of making suicide figures more representative for countries in
which suicide is still relatively taboo. In fact, this approach turns out to increase
noticeably only the rates in Portugal, which has a very low official suicide rate
which is tripled by the inclusion of undetermined deaths, and, to a lesser extent,
the UK, Sweden, Denmark and France. (In the other Catholic or Orthodox coun-
tries of Europe – Greece, Spain, Italy,Austria and Ireland – using this definition
has little impact.
39) Even this definition has problems, of course: some undeter-
38 John Micklewright and Kitty Stewart
39 It is worth noting that in Ireland a coroner is not permitted to pass a verdict of suicide: official recording
of a death is determined at the statistical office on the basis of a confidential police report (Madge, 1999). This
is likely to prevent sensitivity to family or community considerations from affecting the classification (ibid). 39 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
mined deaths may be accidental, and some suicides may be recorded as fully
accidental rather than as undetermined – for instance there are suggestions that
youth deaths in car accidents are often disguised suicides (see e.g. Hassall, 1997,
on the latter, and Madge and Harvey, 1999, on the general problem). But it is as
close as we can get with publicly available data. As a word of final encourage-
ment, Diekstra et al. (1995) conclude their survey of studies of measurement
error in suicide rates by noting that ‘these errors are more or less random, at least
to an extent that allows useful comparisons to be made between countries,
between socio-demographic groups, and over time’ (p.695). 
Measured in the broader way then, we find that male suicide rates are rising
across the EU, although at several different speeds.
40 Figure 4.5 illustrates the
main trends since 1970. The slow but steady increase in the EU average reflects
trends in the UK, Denmark, Belgium and France, all of which have rates at
roughly similar levels. A much better record is found in parts of Southern
Europe, the Italian trend representing similar patterns in Spain and Greece:
while suicides are also on the increase in these countries they are still much
below average. The Netherlands (not shown) has a rate just above that of Italy. 
Not all of Southern Europe does so well, however. The trend in Portugal is
40 If deaths from undetermined violence are excluded, suicide deaths are still found to be rising, but by
slightly less: the EU average death rate for deaths classified as suicide and self-inflicted injury rose from 9.0 to
12.0 per 100,000 between 1970 and 1994; with undetermined violence included the rate rose from 10.4 to 14.9.
The national trend is the same for the two measures in every country except Portugal, where the death rate for
suicide alone falls over the period, while the rate for suicides and undetermined causes doubles.
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994
Measures of dispersion
             SD     Max/min
1970     7.1       13.5
1975     9.6       21.2
1980     8.1       12.1
1985     7.4         7.0
1990     7.3       11.1















Figure 4.5: Death rates from suicide and unexplained violence, males 15-24 
Selected EU countries 1970-94 (deaths per 100,000)
Source: Table B5very similar to that shown for Ireland. In both countries suicides start very low
but climb steadily, surpassing the EU average in the mid-1980s. Ireland is also
unique in displaying a steep increase in suicides in the first half of the 1990s
(Portugal records a considerable drop between 1990 and 1994).
But the really striking phenomenon illustrated in Figure 4.5 is the very differ-
ent patterns followed since 1970 by countries in Northern and Central Europe.
Austria, Finland, Sweden and Germany (which follows roughly the Swedish
trend) all started off in 1970 with fairly similar suicide rates. Since then rates in
Sweden and Germany have (alone in Europe) slowly fallen, the Austrian rate has
remained fairly stable and suicides in Finland have increased dramatically.
What these differing patterns boil down to in terms of change in the over-
all degree of dispersion is shown by the figures for the standard deviation and
the ratio of maximum to minimum. The maximum/minimum ratio is largely
driven by the pattern of Finnish suicide rates, rising to 1975, then falling to
1985 before rising again over the following decade. The ratio in 1994 is in fact
lower than that in 1970, but this is due to a rise in the minimum (Greece). The
standard deviation fell during the decade to 1985 but has remained constant
since, while the fall itself has not been enough to compensate for the increase
between 1970 and 1975. In sum, since 1985 there has been no convergence in
youth suicide rates, while convergence in the previous decade could be clas-
sified as negative convergence given the background of the rising mean. 
What explains these trends – both the general rise in youth suicide across
Europe and the particularly dramatic pattern followed in Finland? High male
mortality in Finland is a phenomenon which Finnish researchers have long
been aware of, but for which satisfactory explanations are still lacking. In a
paper appropriately entitled ‘The Mystery of the Premature Mortality of
Finnish Men’, Valkonen (1985) writes: ‘Violent and risk-taking behaviour
seems to be characteristic of the male role in Finnish culture, especially
among the working class and in Eastern Finland. This role often manifests
itself in uncontrolled drinking. The roots of this (hypothetical) violent Finnish
male role are perhaps to be found as early as the traditional rural culture, but
the role may also have been influenced by the violence connected with the
Civil War [1918] and the class situation after it’ (p.240). 
Yet while the nature of the Finnish soul may be a factor behind high suicide
rates in Finland in general, it does not make sense of the fact that the suicide
rate for young men has doubled since 1970, nor of the fact that it has done so
while the rate in neighbouring Sweden has been falling. The same is true of
other standard explanations of differing suicide rates, such as the availability
of a means of death. Access to guns is relatively widespread in Finland as the
hunting tradition is strong, and shooting deaths appear to be an unusually
common means of suicide for young Finns (Madge, 1999), but again, this is a
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better explanation of a high level of suicide than of an increase over time.
There is no evidence that increase in suicides by shooting in Finland has been
accompanied by a change in the availability of firearms (Ohberg et al, 1996)
– nor, for that matter, by a change in the availability of alcohol. 
Some factor which has changed or intensified in Finland is required as an
explanation. A link is often made between unemployment and psychological
ill-health, particularly in men (see Morrell et al., 1998, for a good survey of
the literature on the relation between unemployment and young people’s
health; Viren, 1996 for some evidence of a historical link between unemploy-
ment and suicide in Finland in particular). But has unemployment been much
worse in Finland than elsewhere over this period, or likely to have had a deep-
er impact on young men? Ironically, the period at which Finland did suffer an
unusually deep recession, the early 1990s (youth unemployment as a share of
the cohort rose from 4 to nearly 20 percent, as shown in Section 3), is actual-
ly a time at which suicides were falling. Similarly, the big jump in the suicide
rate in the late 1980s took place at a time when unemployment was stable or
even falling: the cohort unemployment rate fell from 6 percent to 4 percent
between 1983 and 1989. The pattern of youth suicide rates in Finland remains
a mystery. 
Concrete causes of the general European rise are also hard to pin down
beyond vague formulations about social disintegration and alienation. Youth
unemployment is again one explanation often put forward. Another, oppos-
ing, theory blames rising national incomes directly: some studies have sug-
gested a positive relationship between national or community income and
suicide (e.g. South, 1984; Huang, 1996), supporting this with the sociologi-
cal explanation that suicide is less likely when people can attribute their mis-
ery to external events, such as their material circumstances (see e.g. Lester,
1992).
One key issue here of course is to put the rise in youth suicide in the con-
text of suicide rates in general. Is the increase something which is specific to
young people, or are youth suicide rates just one example of a wider social
phenomenon? To do this we compared youth rates over the period with rates
for an older age group, men between the ages of 45 and 54. It turns out that
rises in youth suicide rates since the 1960s are largely matched by rises in the
older age group: the phenomenon appears to be a general one, not just con-
fined to the young. However, there are exceptions, which are illustrated in
Figure 4.6. In Finland, while the peaks and troughs of the time series have
been the same for both age-groups, the youth suicide rate has been gradually
catching up with the rate for the older group. The same is true of the UK. In
Austria, the youth suicide rate has remained stable while the rate for the 45-
54s has fallen slightly. In Ireland the change over the full period is very sim-ilar for the two rates, but the rate for the older group has been much more
volatile in the years between.
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A final question of interest is the relation between suicides and homicides.
Arguments have been put forward hypothesizing both a positive relation (vio-
lent societies leading to more of both) and a negative relation (see Durkheim
[1897] 1956).
42 In fact, little relation can be found between the two mortality
rates which cannot be explained by the experiences of one or two countries.
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41 Figure 4.6 also allows us to see the differences in the level of suicide among younger and older age groups.
In most European countries the suicide rate for 45-54 year old men is considerably higher than that for 15-24s
(about double), as in the figure for Austria. Finland, Ireland and the UK are the exceptions: in 1994 in Finland the
suicide rate for the older age group was only 20 percent higher than that for the younger; while in Ireland and the
UK the rates were the same. In Finland and the UK this is because of the faster growth in youth rates; in Ireland,
uniquely, youth rates have often been as high, although the rate for older men appears much more volatile
42 Durkheim expounds the thesis of an Italian school of criminology which argued that homicide and suicide
are the same instinct manifesting itself in differently structured societies (Book Three, Chapter Two).
Durkheim’s own view is that there are different kinds of suicide. ‘Egoistic’ suicide is characterized by depres-
sion and apathy and is unlikely to coexist with homicide, ‘a violent act inseparable from passion’ (see pp.356-
357, English translation). ‘Anomic’suicide, in contrast, springs from ‘a state of exasperation and irritated weari-
ness which may turn against the person himself or another according to circumstances’ (such as the moral con-
stitution of the agent – ‘a man of low morality will kill another rather than himself’). As anomic suicide is the
‘more modern form’, Durkheim implies that we should expect a positive relationship to dominate in the future. 
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Figure 4.6: Male death rates from suicide for two age groups: 15-24s and 45-54s
(deaths per 100,000)
Source: Tables B5 and B643 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
Up until 1994, Finland is found to have a high homicide rate, driving a posi-
tive correlation if country figures are left unweighted. But in 1994 homicides
in Finland are at roughly the average EU level, and the high homicide rate in
Italy drives a negative correlation. With the exclusion of Italy – and
Luxembourg – no relation emerges between the two rates, as can be seen in
Figure 4.7. (Note the different scales: homicides among 15-24 year olds in
Europe are far rarer events than suicides, at roughly one-tenth the number.
This contrasts sharply with the situation in the USA, where the homicide rate
was some 70 percent higher than the suicide rate for young men of this age
group in 1992 (WHO, 1996).
43)
The high homicide rate in Italy reflects the continuation of a steady increase
in homicide deaths in that country since 1970, when Italy had one of the lower
homicide rates in Europe. The other country which stands out in Figure 4.7 is
Luxembourg, which recorded no homicides for this group in 1994. However,
the population of Luxembourg is too small for this to be given much impor-


















































Figure 4.7: Suicide and homicide rates for young men 15-24, EU-15 1994
(deaths per 100,000)
Source: Tables B5 and B7
43 It is the homicide rate in the USA, of course, which stands out: the suicide rate is about 22 deaths per
100,000, similar to that in several European countries.
44 Homicide rates have shown little convergence since 1970: the weighted coefficient of variation fell from
0.82 to 0.55 by 1980, but has since risen to 0.75. The mean has hovered at around 1.9 deaths per 100,000. n 4.4 Conclusions: convergence in mortality?
To conclude, this section has illustrated the significant progress made in
Europe in bringing down under-5 mortality rates, and through them death
rates for all children. Rates of death for the under 20s have halved even since
the early 1970s. With the less developed countries of Southern Europe (and
Portugal in particular) exhibiting especially rapid progress, cross-country dis-
parities in under-5 mortality and in total child mortality have been dramati-
cally reduced. 
Child death rates from traffic accidents have also converged considerably
since 1960, although most progress was made prior to the mid-1980s. In the
last decade disparities in road accident rates have tended to stagnate. In part
this is due to Portugal, where death rates are falling too slowly to keep up with
the rest of Europe; but in part to continuing achievements in countries where
road deaths are already relatively rare. 
However, we also pointed to the fact that it is difficult to know how far
falling road fatality rates are due to additional restrictions being placed on the
child rather than on the car. The fact that in most of Europe traffic death rates
are coming down for all age-groups, not just for children, is good news. But
road death rate data really need to be supplemented by data on children’s
activities such as bicycle use and unaccompanied journeys to school if we are
to have a more complete picture of what the rise in the use of the car has
meant for children’s independence. The small amount of this type of data that
exists so far suggests that there would be an interesting cross-national story
to be told. 
Finally, the suicide rate shows little sign of convergence. Responsibility for
this can partly be pinned on Finland, where young males have shown a fright-
ening increase in tendency to suicide: the suicide rate for 15-24s has doubled
since 1970. In 1970 suicide rates for this group were similar in Finland and
Sweden; today Finnish young men are three times as likely to die from sui-
cide as Swedish young men. However, while the problem appears of very seri-
ous proportions in Finland, the suicide rate is also a cause for concern across
much of Europe. If Finland is excluded, we find that the standard deviation
falls slowly between 1975 and 1995, but this has been convergence not to a
low point but to a high to middling point. While Sweden, Austria and
Germany have seen suicide rates stagnate or fall from relatively high levels,
all other countries have seen rates rise. Besides Finland, the increase has been
particularly sharp in Ireland, where youth suicide rates are now the third high-
est in Europe. Explaining these increases is beyond the scope of this paper, but
it is an area which demands further attention. 
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5. Education
Education indicators can be divided into three types, input indicators, process
indicators and output indicators. What interests us most about an education
system is really its output, what people come out of school knowing, and how
they are able to apply this knowledge. But output indicators which are con-
sistent over time are notoriously difficult to find, and measures valid across
countries with different examination systems are next to impossible to put
together.
45 Most studies are therefore restricted to looking at input measures –
the resources that go into education; and process indicators – enrolment rates
and (where data are available) dropout rates and repetition rates.
In this paper we look at trends in each of the first two types of indicator. We
begin with public expenditure on education as a percentage of GNP, a stan-
dard input measure conducive to cross-national comparison and clearly
reflecting government choice about priority given to education.
46As a process
indicator we choose the percentage of 16 year olds still in education; 16 is
chosen as the first age at which education is no longer compulsory in the
majority of EU countries.
47 Finally, we explore how far one new source of
comparative data on output fits in with our findings by looking at some results
from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS).
n 5.1 Expenditure as a percentage of GNP
Figure 5.1 shows the percentage of GNP spent on education since 1980 in a
number of countries. The share of the young in the population varies across
Member States and we have standardized the data for each year to take account
of the difference from the EU average in the share of 5 to 24 year olds (see
45 Recent suggestions by UK employers and universities that there has been a ‘devaluation’of the ‘gold stan-
dard’ of the A level (the final school exams in England and Wales) provide evidence that even within a single
country it is difficult to know whether exam results can be compared across years. Seventeen percent of pupils
received the top grade in 1998, compared to 11 percent ten years previously (see for example The Guardian,
August 20th 1998). In the USA, declining average performance in a standardized aptitude test of high school
students since the 1960s has provoked much discussion of the causes, including the possibility that increases
in enrolment have led to a change in the composition of the pool of students taking the test, rendering infor-
mation on changes in mean scores of little value (Murray, 1996).
46 The 1997 OECD report on education indicators, Education at a Glance, notes that “the share of total
financial resources devoted to education is one of the key choices made in each country” (OECD, 1997a, p.51).
In fact, as the report goes on to point out, public expenditure is now only one part of this choice, with resources
coming from private sources of funding playing an increasingly important role. But private resources are still
responsible for a very small share of the total in most EU countries (see OECD, 1997a, p.52), while time-series
data which include private funding are not easily available. There is also independent reason to focus on the
share spent publicly if our interest is in the priority given to education by government. 
47 The minimum school-leaving age in 1994/95 was 15 in all EU countries except Italy (14), the UK, France
and the Netherlands (16) and Belgium and Germany (18) (UNESCO, 1998). The school-leaving age in Italy
has been increased to 15 as of the academic year 1998-99.Appendix Table C2 for details).
48 In this way the adjusted figures allow a better
comparison across countries (and time) of the proportion of national income
devoted to public spending on education. This adjustment has a big impact on
expenditure levels in Sweden and Ireland in particular: Sweden has a relatively
low share of the population aged 5-24 (24 percent in 1995, for instance) and
therefore adjusted expenditure figures are somewhat higher than unadjusted,
while in Ireland this group makes up a relatively large share of the population
(35 percent in 1995), and the adjusted expenditure figures are lower than the
unadjusted. Commitment to public education in Sweden, in terms of spending,
is higher than the raw data imply, while that in Ireland is lower. A smaller
impact is seen on spending levels for Denmark, Finland and Germany (adjust-
ed figures are higher) and for Portugal (adjusted figures are lower).
As Figure 5.1 shows, education expenditure seems to be broadly converg-
ing on the level of 5 percent of GNP. Spending in Sweden and the Netherlands
falls from very high levels; in Spain, Greece and Portugal (not illustrated in
the diagram) on the other hand, spending rises from very low levels, although
the Cohesion Four nevertheless occupy the last four places in the ranking by
the end of the period. (The trend in Ireland is an exception in this group.)
Elsewhere, expenditure is stable at around 5 or 6 percent of GNP.
49

















           SD    Max/min
1980   1.5     4.5
1985   1.2     3.0
1990   0.9     2.9














































Figure 5.1: Public expenditure on education as a percentage of GNP adjusted by
share of 5 to 24s in population, selected EU countries 1980-95
Source: Table C2
48 We follow one of the methods used by the OECD in Education at a Glance (OECD, 1997a) although we
use a slightly different population share (and the OECD adjustment is in relation to the OECD rather than the
EU average).
49 Five percent of GNP should not be viewed as a ‘natural’ figure, but neither is there reason to expect the
share of spending on education in national income to rise indefinitely, especially in industrialized countries with
high enrolment rates at all levels of education.47 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
The measures of dispersion given in the graph support the visual impres-
sion, showing reasonable evidence of convergence during the period –
although mostly this took place during the 1980s. The smaller change of the
early 1990s is due to rising expenditure in higher spending countries –
Denmark and Finland – preventing Spain, Greece and Portugal from catching
up despite their own progress.
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The other interesting phenomenon is the contribution towards convergence
made by countries where the education share has been falling, notably the
Netherlands and Sweden. The Netherlands falls from the third highest spender
on education, with a similar share to Denmark, down to the EU average. (GDP
growth has been similar in Denmark and the Netherlands.) The UK and
Ireland are the only other countries where the spending share falls much over
the period, in the UK from 5.7 percent in 1980 to 5 percent in 1985 and sub-
sequently, and in Ireland from 5.2 percent to 4.6 percent, but against a back-
ground of rapid GDP growth.
Finally, Figure 5.2 shows the division of expenditure by level of education


















































Figure 5.2: Public expenditure on education by level, 1995
Source: Table C3
Note: The German data do not distinguish primary and secondary levels separately.
50 Some care needs to be taken in interpreting these big rises in education shares, as what they mean for real
expenditure levels will clearly depend on what is happening to national income. For instance, Finland suffered
a severe recession in the 1990s: GDP fell by over 10 percent between 1990 and 1993, recovering only by 1996
(Eurostat, 1997c, p.208). The large increase in the Finnish education share in the 1990s thus reflects the pro-
tection of education spending in time of recession. In Denmark, in contrast, the education share rose against a
background of steady GDP growth.concentrated at particular levels.
51 (We have again adjusted the data for differ-
ences in the age-structure of the population.) The figure suggests that higher
spending levels in Scandinavia can be explained in part by higher spending on
secondary education, but are mostly attributable to expenditure at the tertiary
level. Disparities may therefore be somewhat exaggerated: for example, the
Swedish tertiary education figure appears to be unique in including research
expenditure. But higher levels of tertiary spending in Scandinavia are proba-
bly also due to spending on student grants and loans: Sweden and Denmark
both spend over 15 percent of total education expenditure on financial aid for
pupils/students, compared to an EU average of under 6 percent.
At the other end of the spectrum, Luxembourg emerges as a low spender but
only because of the low level of expenditure on tertiary education (Luxembourg
has no university and most young people study in neighbouring countries). 
n 5.2 Enrolment at age 16
Our process indicator, the share of 16 year olds in education, shows strong
evidence of convergence over the period for which data are available.
52 This is
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51 The following two paragraphs and Figure 5.2 are based on Eurostat (1998). Unfortunately total spending
levels given differ somewhat from the UNESCO figures presented in Figure 5.1. In part this is because the
Eurostat figures are for education expenditure as a share of GDP, while those from UNESCO are as a share of
GNP (this may affect data for Ireland in particular, for reasons given in Section 3). But differing definitions of
education expenditure and discrepancies in the calculations of GDP are also likely to be responsible. These are
a common problem in comparing public expenditure figures from different sources. For example, Puryear
(1995) finds that ‘OECD figures indicated that the proportion of total public expenditure going to education in
Austria in 1988 was nearly half as great as did UNESCO’s figures’. 


















Luxemb.       SD  Max/min
1970     13.8         3.3
1975     12.2         2.2
1980     14.9         2.3
1985     11.6         1.7
1990     11.4         1.7
1995       5.5         1.3
Figure 5.3: Percentage of 16 year olds in education 1965-95, selected EU countries
Source: Table C449 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
illustrated in Figure 5.3 (data are missing for Denmark, Germany and Italy).
53
Convergence is driven by strong achievement among countries which had
been lagging behind, alongside understandably slower progress among coun-
tries which already had high shares of the population in education, notably
Scandinavia. Not all the countries lagging behind are those which might be
expected, however. The group includes Portugal and Spain, where less than 20
percent of 16 year olds were in education in the 1960s, but respectively 80 and
90 percent by 1994.
54 But it also includes the UK, where the share in educa-
tion was just 27 percent at the start of the 1960s, less than that in Greece, Italy
and Ireland, and still only 57 percent in 1990. By 1994, 82 percent of UK 16
year olds were in education. This improvement drove a sharp fall in the stan-
dard deviation between 1990 and 1994, although the UK position was still the
fourth worst of the 14 countries for which data are available, and only just
ahead of Greece, Portugal and Luxembourg.
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Luxembourg presents an interesting case: in the mid-1960s it was the coun-
try with the best enrolment rate in Europe, and today it ranks bottom. As
Figure 5.3 illustrates, this deterioration in its relative standing is not due to
stagnation, but rather to a big drop in enrolment in the late 1960s. The expla-
nation for this strange development is not clear, although it is worth noting
that Austria experiences a similar phenomenon: enrolment drops from 71 per-
cent in 1964/65 to 33 percent in 1970/74, recovering over the next two
decades to reach 90 percent in the mid-1990s. It may simply be that there is a
problem with the 1964/65 data for both countries. Even were this the case,
however, Luxembourg would still stand out for its low enrolment rate in the
1990s – striking given that Luxembourg’s GDP per capita is the highest in the
EU. This surprising finding is supported by data from the 1995 Eurostat
Labour Force Survey, which found that only 51 percent of 25 to 29 year olds
in Luxembourg had completed upper secondary education. This is the same
share as that found in Spain and Italy, and the second lowest in Europe after
Portugal (36 percent); the EU average was 69 percent (Eurostat, 1997, p.15).
53 There are too many missing observations to put together a series for Denmark, Germany or Italy. For six
of the remaining twelve countries, data were interpolated for certain years on the basis of those for preceding
and following years. These points can be identified in Figure 5.3 as no data marker is given.
54 The minimum school-leaving age has increased over the period from 11 to 15 in Portugal and from12 to
15 in Spain.
55 The UNESCO administrative enrolment data used here was compared to responses to the question ‘How
old were you when you left full-time education?’, in the Eurobarometer surveys used in Section 7. The two
series are reassuringly similar. For instance, there is a correlation of 0.91 between national 16 year old enrol-
ment rates in 1989/90 and the share of 16 to 24 year olds interviewed between 1990 and 1994 who claimed not
to have left school at age 16 or below. Seventy–eight percent of Spaniards put themselves into this category
(UNESCO enrolment rate 77 percent), 82 percent of Irish (87 percent), 60 percent of Portuguese (68 percent)
and 55 percent of those in the UK (57 percent). These data are given in Appendix Table C5.What is driving rising enrolment? In part the trend must be explained by
increases in the minimum school-leaving age. But it is also likely to be related
to both rising national income (education is a consumption as well as an invest-
ment good) and to changes in unemployment: lack of job opportunities for
school-leavers will encourage the young to stay on for post-compulsory educa-
tion. Hence the rising levels of youth unemployment discussed in Section 3 are
probably responsible in part for the trends in enrolment illustrated here.
56
Finally, Figure 5.4 shows the most recent figures for the two indicators
together. Clearly we would expect a positive link between expenditure and
enrolment: higher enrolment demands higher spending; while higher spend-
ing is an indication of a commitment to education which we would expect to
affect (among other things) post-compulsory enrolment rates. Indeed, the top
six countries ranked on spending as a share of GNP all have 16 year old enrol-
ment over 90 percent, with enrolment on average lower among the lower
spenders. The noticeable exceptions are Germany, Spain and Ireland, where
enrolment appears high in relation to spending. In part, the peaks and troughs
in the enrolment data simply reflect the law: in Germany and Belgium the
school leaving age is 18, while in Portugal and Greece (among other coun-
tries) it is still 15.





























































Figure 5.4: Enrolment among 16 year olds and public spending on education,
EU 1994/95
Source: Tables C2 and  C4
56 Evidence for the UK, for example, shows changes in enrolment at the post-compulsory level to be indeed
related to income and unemployment (Pissarides, 1981, Whitfield and Wilson, 1991).51 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
n 5.3 Output measures: The Third International Mathematics and
Science Study
Principal interest lies in what children are learning, rather than simply how long
schools are holding on to them. Unfortunately, no good time-series data exist
on learning achievement, but the Third International Mathematics and Science
Study (TIMSS) shows how pupils across Europe compared in achievement in
maths and science in one recent year, 1993/94, and hence gives an idea of how
far enrolment rate data might be misleading if we were to rely on them as the
main indicator of educational progress (Beaton et al, 1996a,b).
Figure 5.5 shows the percentage of 16 year olds in education against the per-
centage of eighth graders with TIMSS scores for science at or above the 50th
percentile measured across all participating countries.
57 The average age of the
children in these TIMSS data was 14 years old, which is below the minimum
school leaving age in all the EU countries present in the study; the variation in
scores across the Member States does not therefore reflect a different mix of
children beyond compulsory school age from country to country.
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Figure 5.5: Relationship between TIMSS Science results for 14 year olds 1993/94 and
16 year old enrolment rates 1994/95
Source: Table C6
Note: the score for the UK is a weighted average of scores for England and Scotland.  The score
for Belgium is a straight average of scores for the Flemish and French educational systems.
57 We could have looked at average scores rather than the share of pupils above the international median, but
the latter is more appealing in principle since it takes account of the spread at the bottom of the distribution of
scores for each country, as well as the overall position of the distribution as summarized by the average. In fact
there is near complete correlation between the two (0.99) on all measures mentioned in this section.TIMSS success. Countries performing relatively badly in the TIMSS include
low participation countries like Portugal and Greece, but also Denmark and
France, where 16 year old enrolment is above 90 percent. Belgium is another
country where less than half of pupils were found to be above the international
median, despite the fact that all 16 year olds are in full-time education. (This,
however, is entirely due to performance in French-speaking Belgium: 64 per-
cent of children in Flemish speaking schools were above the international
median, compared to only 29 percent of children in French schools.) At the
other end, the UK (a weighted average of results for England and Scotland)
achieves the third best TIMSS result despite having the third worst enrolment
record, while the Netherlands and Austria perform the best although ranking
only around average on enrolment. 
This weak relation illustrates the danger of reading enrolment rates as if
they were measures of educational quality. Indeed, measures of educational
standards are themselves not without contradictions. The TIMSS scores given
in Figure 5.5 are for science results for eighth graders but results are also
available for seventh graders and for mathematics achivement. While there is
a very high correlation within each subject area for scores for seventh and
eighth graders (0.96 for maths, 0.97 for science), there is less correlation
between achievements in the two areas (0.68 for seventh graders, 0.55 for
eighth graders). The rankings of France, Belgium and Denmark benefit par-
ticularly from a measure which takes mathematics achivement: France and
Belgium rank in the top four with the Netherlands and Austria on maths, while
in Denmark 47 percent of pupils were above the international median in maths
compared to only 32 percent in science. The UK, in contrast, slips in the rank-
ings when judged on maths than on science: 48 percent of English pupils were
above the median in maths compared to 60 percent in science.
Results from an alternative measure of learning achievement, the OECD
International Adult Literacy Survey (OECD, 1997), give a different impres-
sion again for an older age group, 16 to 25 year olds. Like the TIMSS, the
data relate to the early 1990s, but cover just six EU Member States. Sweden,
the Netherlands, Germany and Flemish speaking Belgium all score well
under the survey as under the TIMSS (no data were collected in French
speaking Belgium). But the UK and Ireland both come out badly. For
instance, over 75 percent of pupils in Sweden, Flemish speaking Belgium
and the Netherlands and 66 percent of pupils in Germany were classified at
or above the third of five levels of ‘document literacy’, compared to only 56
percent of this age group in the UK, and to 50 percent in Ireland. Not only
then are enrolment data far from adequate as a measure of educational well-
being, but it is clear that measures of educational standards themselves must
be handled with care.
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6. Teenage Fertility
It is widely accepted that teenage fertility is associated with negative outcomes
for both mother and child. A series of studies in the UK and the US suggest that
women who give birth before they are 20 are less likely than other women to
finish school, more likely to be poor at the end of their 20s, and more likely to
bring up their children as single mothers (Hofferth and Moore, 1979;
Furstenburg et al., 1987; Maynard, 1997). The disadvantages for their children
appear to begin at birth and last into adolescence. Children of teenage mothers
seem to be more likely to be born with low birth weight, less likely to be breast-
fed and fully immunized, and more likely to die in the first year of life. They
have also been shown to be at greater risk of physical abuse and accidental
injury, and to do less well in education (see Butler et al., 1981 and Manlove,
1997 on the UK; Furstenburg et al., 1987 and Maynard, 1997 on the US).
Despite the general perception, however, the causal impact of teenage fer-
tility on subsequent events in the life of mother and child in industrialized
countries is in fact the subject of genuine debate. The evidence of the harmful
nature of teenage births is not as conclusive as it seems at first sight. We there-
fore start this section by considering in more detail the extent to which
teenage fertility really can be considered an (inverse) measure of young
women’s well-being, illustrating the arguments with evidence from the EU
country where, as we will see later, teenage fertility is at its highest, the UK.
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n 6.1 What information is conveyed by teenage fertility?
Not all studies in industrialized countries have found a link between a moth-
er’s age at birth and the outcomes for her child, either in terms of immediate
birth outcomes or in a longer developmental perspective. Examples of studies
where no link is found are those by Osbourne et al. (1981) on obstetric out-
comes of women in Glasgow, and Wolkind and Kruk (1985) on child health,
development and behaviour of children in the seven years after birth.
Macintyre and Cunningham-Burley (1993) give a list of further references:
they argue that these studies have less impact on public perception than those
which find evidence of a negative link: ‘Because of the perception that
teenage pregnancy is a problem… investigators or their readers may focus on
the evidence of difficulties and ignore evidence of lack of them’ (p.65). 
58 This section refers to teenage fertility in the EU, with some reference to other industrialized countries. It
does not have any clear relevance to teenage fertility in developing countries, where the social, cultural and eco-
nomic factors surrounding teenage fertility are vastly different. In developing countries, UNICEF policy, stat-
ed in broad terms, discourages early pregnancies on grounds of maternal and infant mortality and morbidity,
maternal and infant nutrition and education, and of course on demographic grounds.  That women who become mothers as teenagers are themselves less likely than
their peers to do well in education and in the labour market seems to be less con-
troversial. However, here the nature of the relation has come under question: it
is not clear that teenage childbearing is itself the cause of the outcomes
observed, rather than merely an associated factor. Teenage motherhood is very
strongly correlated with a background of social and economic disadvantage, and
it may be this disadvantage itself which is responsible for the mother’s life
path.
59 (It may also, of course, drive health and development outcomes of the
child). While most studies do control for a series of socio-economic factors, they
have been open to the criticism that important background variables are likely to
remain unobserved. Studies from the US which try to avoid this problem by
using carefully selected control groups reach much less clear cut conclusions.
60
Nevertheless, even if the impact of teenage birth on future outcomes for
mother and child is uncertain, there does seem to be good reason to use it as
a negative indicator in itself of the current well-being of teenage girls. There
is strong evidence in the UK that most teenage pregnancies do not represent
genuine choices on the part of young women.
61 Rather, they reflect, on the one
hand, a lack of the information, the access to contraception, and/or the confi-
dence which would allow them to prevent unwanted pregnancies; and on the
other, the absence of educational and job opportunities which would motivate
them to avoid early motherhood.
Surveys based on interviews with teenage mothers repeatedly suggest that
the mothers were either badly informed about the need for contraception or
were blocked from getting it by not knowing where to go, by embarrassment,
or – if under 16 – by their parents.
62 (Sharpe, 1987,Allen, 1991, Phoenix, 1991
and Schofield, 1994, all paint a vivid picture of the problem.) None of these
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59 For evidence of the relation between teenage fertility and socio-economic disadvantage, see Smith (1993),
Jacobson et al. (1995), Kiernan (1995, 1997). Kiernan, for example shows that 92 percent of the teenage moth-
ers in the National Child Development Study (NCDS) had left school at 16 (for most of them this would have
been before pregnancy), compared to 68 percent of women who became mothers between the ages of 20 and
33. Teenage mothers were also around twice as likely to have fallen into the bottom quartile when ranked on
educational achievement at age 7 and 16, and considerably more likely to be from families which had experi-
enced financial difficulties during their childhoods.
60 For example Geronimus and Korenman (1992) and Hoffman et al. (1993) find a reduced but still signifi-
cant difference in outcomes for teenage mothers and those for their sisters who did not become pregnant: the
mothers are less likely to complete high school and are likely to do less well in economic terms. But Hotz,
McElroy and Sanders (1997) find teenage mothers earn more throughout their 20s than women who became
pregnant as teens but miscarried. (Other studies from the US which draw attention to the problems of estab-
lishing causality are Geronimus, 1987, and Ribar, 1994.)
61 Kiernan (1997) finds that 74 percent of teenage mothers in the NCDS claimed at age 33 that their first baby
had been an accident. As she points out, this is likely to be an underestimate due to post hoc rationalization. 
62 Under 16s in the UK can be prescribed contraception by their general practitioner without parental consent,
but only at the doctor’s discretion. Interviews in the surveys cited showed that many under-16s will not approach
their doctors for fear that the doctor will tell the parents. In some cases, doctors themselves had refused to pre-
scribe contraceptives without the permission of a parent (e.g. Sharpe, 1987, p.23; Allen, 1991, p.127).situations could be easily labelled as desirable. Teenage pregnancies can
be seen as a measurable outcome of these problems.
It is not difficult to reconcile this view of teenage pregnancy with the evi-
dence on the disadvantaged backgrounds of most teenage mothers. Access
to contraception and abortion may be lower for this group, due to lack of
information and more limited ability to travel to family planning clinics, for
example. But in addition, girls from disadvantaged backgrounds have fewer
alternative options available to them. Women with better educational
records and fulfilling careers to look forward to clearly have much stronger
reasons to avoid pregnancy than do women who are unemployed or in low-
paid and repetitive jobs. This is not inconsistent with the view that the
majority of teen pregnancies are accidents: clearly the incentive to be care-
ful differs for different women. If they do become pregnant, more privi-
leged women are much more likely to choose abortion.
63 All evidence sug-
gests that teenagers with real alternatives do not choose early motherhood. 
The teen fertility rate thus seems to be an important indicator of lack of
information and lack of opportunities among young women in the UK.
There are reasons, though, why this may not necessarily hold across the
rest of Europe.
64 It is possible that in other parts of Europe teenage fertili-
ty has different connotations: there may be traditions of settling down ear-
lier, with teenage births more likely to be planned. In fact, demographic
trends across Europe are similar enough for this to be of little likely sig-
nificance, but it is an issue explored in greater detail below in discussion
of the share of teen births that take place within marriage, and also the
share which take place to younger teenagers (16 year olds).
n 6.2 Trends in teenage birth rates
Figure 6.1 illustrates the main national trends in teenage fertility since
1960. The broad European pattern is a peak in the teen birth rate in 1970,
followed by steady decline since then, although, as the graph shows, there
have been several exceptions. Denmark, which had a teenage birth rate
over twice the EU average at the start of the period, peaks in the mid-
1960s and then experiences rapid progress over the next two decades,
passing below the EU average by 1980. At the same time, Greece rises
equally quickly from one of the lowest rates in the EU to one of the high-
est. The path followed by Greece reflects similar, though less dramatic,
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63 Bury (1984) and others cited in Phoenix (1991, p.46) claim pregnant teenagers of lower socio-economic
status are more likely to continue with the pregnancy. Smith (1993) reaches the same result in a study of preg-
nant teenagers in Tayside, Scotland, in the 1980s.
64 The causal impact of teenage birth on the life of mother and child may also, of course, be different.trends in Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Italy: these countries start with fairly low
birth rates in 1960 and then rise to a late peak in 1980 (Italy in 1975). Falling
birth rates across northern Europe and this rise in the south are reflected in con-
vergence in both dispersion measures between 1970 and 1975.
From 1975 to 1990, however, the standard deviation is on the rise, while the
maximum/minimum ratio rises, falls and then rises. The initial rise in both
measures is due to “overshooting” on the part of Greece and Portugal. Then,
at the point at which rates in these countries start to come down, a new outlier
emerges – the UK. Unlike the pattern in all other European countries, the birth
rate in the UK has shown no tendency to decline since 1975, but has hovered
around the rate of 30 births per 1000 teenage women, compared to an overall
EU figure of about 11 births by 1995 (and only 6 in the Netherlands). Because
of the UK’s relative size, this affects the weighted standard deviation. Since
1990, both the UK fertility rate and the standard deviation have fallen, but the
latter in 1995 was still no lower than in 1975. Thus absolute disparities in the
fertility rate were similar in 1975 and 1995. Relative disparities have actually
gone up over the period, as measured by both the max/min ratio and the coef-
ficient of variation, which has been rising steadily over the last 20 years.
How far do these trends simply reflect trends in overall fertility? The UK,
for instance, has not experienced as rapid a decline in fertility rates as a num-
ber of other European countries. Does this go any way towards explaining the
stability of teenage birth rates in the UK over the last 20 years? In fact, while
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1970     12.4        4.4
1975       7.3        3.8
1980       7.5        5.7
1985       7.7        5.3
1990       7.9        4.0










Figure 6.1: 15-19 birth rates 1960-95 (births per 1000 women 15-19) selected EU
countries and EU average
Source: Table D157 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
the declining total fertility rate may explain some part of the general down-
ward trend in teenage birth rates, it does not appear to be responsible for indi-
vidual country trends. Birth rates for women aged 15-49 have been falling
steadily in all countries, and at relatively similar speeds when compared to the
varied pattern of teenage birth rates. The result is that teenage births as a per-
centage of the total actually look very similar to teenage birth rates them-
selves: a graph showing teen births as a percentage of the total would closely
resemble Figure 6.1. (Data for births to 15 to 19 year olds as a share of total
births is given in the Appendix in Table D2.) 
There are then clearly factors which affect teenage fertility more than or dif-
ferently than total fertility. On reflection this is not surprising: we might expect
teenagers to have been more strongly affected than the general population by
changes in the availability of contraception and abortion. In much of Europe,
contraception became free and widely available sometime during the 1970s.
65
Abortion laws in most of non-Catholic Europe were reformed at about the
same time to allow fairly unrestricted access to abortion in the first trimester.
66
n 6.3 Conception rates
While it is easy to specify increasing access to both contraception and abor-
tion as an explanation of falling teenage fertility since the 1970s, the degree
to which the decline is explained by one factor rather than the other is an
important question. As explained earlier, our interest is in teenage births as an
indicator of current well-being rather than as a determinant of later outcomes.
As a measure of lack of opportunities for young women the teen birth rate
itself seems the appropriate indicator, but as a measure of poor information
and access to birth control our interest is really in conception rather than birth.
The birth rate is frequently used as a rough proxy for the conception rate given
that data on abortions are often not available or reliable.
67 However, it is cer-
tain to be the case that conception rates differ from birth rates considerably,
both across countries and over time.
65 For example, in the Netherlands, prescription costs for the pill, the IUD and the diaphragm have been cov-
ered by health insurance since 1971 (Jones et al., 1989, p.154); in 1974 free family planning services were made
available nationwide in Britain (op.cit. p.186), while in France women gained the right to claim contraceptives on
health insurance and minors the right to free birth control without parental consent (Rodman and Trost, 1986,
Chapter Six). Developments in southern Europe were some way behind: in Italy in 1971 the law forbidding the
advertisement of contraception was repealed and in 1975 the first family planning clinics were set up (op.cit.
Chapter Nine). In Spain the law prohibiting the use of contraception was repealed in 1978 (op.cit, Chapter Ten).
66 For example, more permissive abortion legislation was passed in the UK in 1967, in Denmark in 1973, in
Sweden in 1975 and in the Netherlands in 1981. (In the latter two cases abortion had been widely available for
some years before the law was clarified). See Jones et al. (1989) and Rodman and Trost (1986).
67 Of course, miscarriage data would also be needed to put together a true conception rate, but births plus
abortions should give a good picture of how conception rates vary across Europe since miscarriages can be
expected to be proportional, broadly speaking, to this total.There are insufficient data on abortion throughout the period to enable us
to establish the role played by the legalization of abortion in bringing down
the teen birth rate. There is some evidence that the share of teen pregnancies
ending in abortion increased during the 1970s, and that this explains part but
not all of the downward trend in teen births – conceptions appear to have
decreased as well (e.g. on Denmark see Rodman and Trost, 1986, p.63, and
on the UK, Phoenix, 1991, p.40).
However, we do have evidence that the importance of abortion varies con-
siderably even across countries in which it is freely available. Figure 6.2
shows births and abortions in 1990 for the ten countries for which data are
available (others tend to be those in which abortion is still illegal and no sta-
tistics are kept). When abortions and births are added together to form a rough
teenage conception rate, there is some re-ranking of countries. In particular,
the Scandinavian countries, and especially Denmark and Sweden, rank much
less well on conception rates than on birth rates: more than half of teen preg-
nancies in both countries end in abortion, and it is high levels of abortions
rather than contraception which is keeping birth rates down. In contrast, the
Netherlands has one of the lowest abortion rates as well as the lowest birth
rate in Europe – and this despite having one of the most liberal abortion laws
in the world. (The Netherlands, along with Spain and England and Wales, is
also one of the places non-resident women travel to obtain abortions, so this
will swell the figures somewhat.)
68The UK remains the country with the worst
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68 See Cossey (1997). In 1995 non-resident women accounted for 6 percent of abortions in England and



















































Figure 6.2: Birth and abortion rates for 15-19s, 1990
Source: Tables D1 and D359 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
record when ranked on conceptions, despite an abortion rate which is lower
than those in Scandinavia.
n 6.4 Births to unmarried teenagers and to younger teens
Finally, we can get a little more insight into cross-country differences in
teenage birth rates by breaking them down into more detail in two ways – by
marital status and by age. As with abortions, this cannot be done for every
year with the data we have, but even a static picture in one year can help us
shed light on how far a teen birth in one country is a similar phenomenon to
one in another. Births to unmarried and to younger teenagers are less likely to
have been wanted: the possibility that these are simply young women choos-
ing to settle down early is smaller.
Unfortunately, of course, grouping teen mothers as married or unmarried
does not pick up exactly the distinction we would like here. First, we only
know whether women were married at the time of the birth; hence women
who marry their partners because they are pregnant are indistinguishable from
those who had decided to marry beforehand. Second, and perhaps more
important, the growing incidence of cohabitation, particularly in Scandinavia,
means that the unmarried group will include mothers in stable relationships
which are effectively marriages along with mothers who are genuinely single.
However, looked at with an eye on the role of cohabitation in each society, the
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Figure 6.3: Scatterplot of teen birth rate against percentage of teens giving birth who
are unmarried, 1995
Source: Tables D1 and D4The share of teenage births to unmarried mothers varies widely across coun-
tries, from a low of 11 percent in Greece to a high of 93 percent in Ireland – see
Figure 6.3. In Italy, Spain and Portugal the percentage is relatively low, at just
over 40 percent of teen births, and here (and in Greece) this may reflect social
mores which make it more likely that a pregnant teenager will face pressure to
marry. The high share of extra-marital births in Sweden, Denmark and Finland
will at least in part be explained by the high rate of cohabitation. However, in
Ireland cohabitation is much less widespread and less likely to explain the high
level of extra-marital teen births: these are more plausibly accidental pregnancies
(20 percent of births to women of all ages in Ireland were extra-marital in 1994,
compared to 50 percent in Sweden and 45 percent in Denmark). The same is true
to a lesser extent of the UK, where one-third of all babies are born outside mar-
riage, while 85 percent of babies born to teenage mothers are extra-marital births.
The second way in which the teen birth rate can be broken down into more
detail is by looking at the extent to which it is composed of births to younger
rather than older teens. Several of the possible reasons for concern about teen
births apply with more force the younger is the mother. As might be expected,
the share of all teen births which are to younger teens tends to be higher in coun-
tries where teen birth rates are higher. Countries with low teen birth rates, in con-
trast, have the majority of teen births to 19 year olds. Thus for instance in the
Netherlands over half of teen births are to 19 year olds, compared to less than
40 percent in the UK and Portugal. The result is that these two countries stand
out even more with respect to the 16 year old birth rate than they do for the over-
all teen birth rate – see Figure 6.4. Indeed, the birth rate for 16 year olds in the



























Figure 6.4: Birth rate for 16 year olds and for all 15-19s, 1994
Source: Table D561 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
UK is roughly the same as the average EU rate for all teenagers between 15 and
19; while the birth rate to Portuguese 16 year olds is higher than that to 15-19
year olds in the Netherlands, Italy, Spain, Denmark and Belgium. As many as
one percent of 16 year-olds in Portugal and the UK give birth each year.
69
n 6.5 Conclusions
Two things in particular stand out from the above analysis: the particularly
dramatic improvement to the teenage fertility rate made in Denmark (which
we have not explained), and the current poor record of the UK, with the high-
est teen birth rate in Europe and the only rate not to have fallen since 1980.
(If the UK is excluded, teen fertility rates show clear evidence of convergence
across Europe since 1980.) When the figures are broken down, we also find
that a higher share of teen births in the UK are to younger teens than anywhere
else in Europe, while only Ireland has a higher share of teen births to unmar-
ried mothers. 
These breakdowns suggest that the phenomenon of teenage fertility is more
serious in the UK as well as being more widespread. Yet contraception is free
in the UK and accessible through family planning clinics where anonymity is
assured. On the surface, the system looks as liberal as that in the Netherlands,
the country with the lowest teen birth rate (and, it seems, the lowest teen con-
ception rate) in Europe. 
The Dutch success in combating teenage pregnancy is generally put down to
an open and unembarrassed attitude towards sex which allows sexual issues to
be discussed frankly and clinics to be advertised widely. This, for instance, was
the conclusion of a conference held in the UK in 1994 to explore exactly this
question (‘Can we learn from the Dutch?’ – see Forum for Family Planning,
1994, cited in Jacobson et al. 1995). Jacobson et al. describe the Dutch system
as one in which ‘[t]he teenager and the doctor feel comfortable discussing sex-
uality in a warm, mutually supporting atmosphere, requests for contraceptive
services are not associated with shame or embarrassment [and] the media is
willing to carry messages designed for young people about contraceptive ser-
vices’ (p. 235).
70 The result appears to be an atmosphere in which the use of
contraception is ‘as ingrained as not going through a red light’, as one Dutch
survey respondent put it in the early 1980s (Jones et al., 1986, p.154). 
69 Even among 13-15 year olds in the UK, the birth rate at the start of the 1990s was as high as 0.5 percent
(5 per 1000), and the conception rate one percent (Central Statistical Office, 1994, chart 2.25); the latest fig-
ures for 1995-96 show the same levels (The Guardian, 12 December 1998).
70 One illustration of the different ways in which sexual issues are treated in the two countries was given
recently by a UK journalist: when AIDS first arrived, Dutch television demonstrated how to use a condom on
prime-time television; in Britain the highly cryptic public service announcement centred around an iceberg
(Toynbee, 1998).In contrast, the situation in the UK may be better summed up by the 18 year
old single mother in the late 1980s who said she had considered it important
not to become pregnant, but: ‘I just stopped taking [the pill] because I wasn’t
going with anyone at the time then I just forgot about it and threw them away
and that was it’(Phoenix, 1991, p.75). The fact that contraceptives are acces-
sible in theory will be irrelevant if teenagers underestimate their importance,
do not know where to get hold of them in practice or are too embarrassed to
raise the issue with their partners. Legislation during the 1980s may have
exacerbated the situation in the UK by a combination of cuts in funding to
health clinics and changes in the law which seem to have made it more diffi-
cult for doctors and teachers to discuss sexual matters with underage
teenagers.
71
As suggested in the introduction to this section, though, a second important
factor in determining teenage births is likely to be the alternative opportunities
young women face – or the lack of them. As noted there, teenage mothers in
the UK come predominantly from disadvantaged backgrounds. While the fact
that most teen pregnancies are unwanted belies the idea that teenagers active-
ly choose motherhood as a more attractive alternative to unemployment or a
dead-end job, women with few prospects clearly have less incentive to be care-
ful about contraception, and also appear less likely to choose abortion. It may
be difficult to use the teen birth rate as a cross-national indicator of lack of
opportunity, as it is possible that circumstances in the UK make motherhood
appear a more attractive escape route than elsewhere: in particular, the chance
of receiving separate housing may mean teenagers in the UK associate moth-
erhood with an independence not available to young women in southern
Europe. But it is likely that rising teen births in the 1980s in the UK are in part
explained by increasing unemployment and social exclusion among the
young.
72
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71 In 1985 the High Court in Britain ruled that girls under the age of 16 could not be prescribed contracep-
tion without parental consent, after a case brought by Victoria Gillick, mother of five girls under 16. The rul-
ing was later overruled by the Law Lords but is believed to have had a permanent effect on the freedom with
which doctors discuss contraception with young teens and on the confidence teenagers have in asking family
doctors for advice – it remains the case, for instance, that a doctor can breach confidentiality if she or he does
not consider an underage girl to be of mature judgement (see Jones et al., 1986, p.110; Schofield, 1994, pp.20-
22). A second significant event in Britain was the passage in 1988 of legislation designed to ensure that par-
ents, not schools, should decide what constitutes appropriate sex education for their children (Phoenix, 1991,
p.20). See also Toynbee, 1998.
72 After we had finished this paper the UK government published a new analysis of teenage pregnancy
together with a strategy for its reduction towards the European average (Social Exclusion Unit, 1999).63
7. Life Satisfaction
This paper has so far explored a variety of objective measures of child well-
being. But what do children themselves say if asked about their welfare? In
Europe a unique source allows us to investigate, if not the attitudes of younger
children, at least what teenagers (aged 15-19) say for themselves about how
happy they are. Eurobarometer surveys have been carried out twice annually
in the EU Member States since 1973, asking questions about public attitudes
and opinion.
73 The question we focus on here is about life satisfaction: ‘On the
whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied, or not at all
satisfied with the life you lead?’This question has been asked regularly since
the survey began, allowing us to reach some conclusions about convergence
in the way young people across Europe see their own quality of life.
74
The use of this kind of subjective information on well-being is somewhat
controversial: although it has had a long history in the psychology literature,
economists have tended to avoid it, perhaps because it does not sit well with the
traditional view that utility cannot be directly measured.
75 However, there are
good reasons to believe that what people say about their own welfare is inter-
esting and important. Obviously it is not the only aspect of welfare we are inter-
ested in: there is cause for concern about someone who is malnourished, for
instance, even if they claim to be happy with their situation. But it seems equal-
ly clear that life satisfaction is one important element of well-being. Echoing
Sen on mortality (see Section 4) we might argue that being happy is, first, of
intrinsic value in itself, and second, a prerequisite for participating fully in
many other aspects of life.
76 And if we are interested in how happy someone is,
asking them seems the most straightforward way to get the answer.
77
If rare, the use of subjective data is not unheard of among economists. In
the early 1970s, Easterlin used self-reported happiness levels to explore the
relationship between national income and welfare (Easterlin, 1974). More
73 The Eurobarometer Surveys are organized by the European Commission. Samples of the population
between the ages of 15 and 64 are interviewed in each survey. (The sample has a multistage probability design
in some countries and a stratified quota design in others.) With data grouped across five year intervals, reason-
able sample sizes are obtained for the 15-19 age group – between 500 and 1500 persons per country (with the
exception of Luxembourg). (See Appendix Table E1.) Unfortunately, though, surveys are only carried out in EU
Member States, meaning they cover the EU 9 since the beginning and Greece, Spain and Portugal only since the
early to mid-1980s. Data on Austria, Finland and Sweden are only available for 1994 and are not analysed here.
74 Unfortunately the question was discontinued in 1995.
75 Argyle (1989) is often cited as a readable introduction to the psychology literature (Clark and Oswald,
1994; Blanchflower and Oswald, 1997).
76 It is perhaps harder to argue that life satisfaction is a proxy for other, harder to measure, variables (Sen’s
third justification for looking at mortality) although to the extent that this is true the case for using data on self-
reported satisfaction is further strengthened.
77 Indeed the only way? Other possibilities might be to measure how many times an individual smiles or
laughs, or to ask others to rate a person’s happiness. Blanchflower and Oswald (1997, p.1) cite evidence that
self-reported levels of well-being are in any case correlated with these ratings.recently, both Clark and Oswald (1994) and Wottiez and Theeuwes (1998)
have used surveys on subjective well-being to ask questions about labour mar-
ket status and welfare, and in particular to look at the hypothesis that unem-
ployment is voluntary. Nor indeed are we the first to use the Eurobarometer
surveys to investigate the well-being of the young: Blanchflower and Oswald
(1997) use the same data to look at the welfare of the under 30s.
Blanchflower and Oswald’s results show a significant increase in life satis-
faction among the young between the 1970s and the 1990s. However, their
work focuses on this general rise and on possible explanations of it; they are
not particularly interested in differences in happiness levels across countries.
(They also use a broad definition of the young in contrast to our own focus on
teenagers.) Of course, trying to compare results across countries leads to
immediate problems: ‘satisfaction’ may be interpreted differently in different
places for both linguistic and cultural reasons. Assuming, though, that the
question is interpreted in the same way in a given country over time, then
comparing national trends is informative. For instance, if the share of the
young claiming to be happy has risen more in one country than in another
over the last two decades, that tells us something even if the happiness levels
themselves are not comparable in any one year.
A second issue of interest is how happy the young are relative to the rest
of the population, and how this has changed over time. Suppose the popula-
tion taken as a whole is increasingly satisfied with life. Are teenagers sharing
equally in the phenomenon, or are they being excluded? Hence in Section 7.2
we look at trends in the ratio of youth satisfaction rates to those of the gener-
al population. These too should be unaffected by national differences in the
way in which the question is interpreted. 
n 7.1 Life satisfaction among the young 1975-1994
In keeping with the findings of Blanchflower and Oswald for the under 30s, life
satisfaction among 15-19 year olds seems to be broadly on the rise across
Europe. The share of this age-group classifying themselves as ‘very satisfied’or
‘fairly satisfied’with their lives was significantly greater in the early 1990s than
in the late 1970s in six of the EU 9 for which data are available for both peri-
ods.
78  79 Furthermore, in one of the exceptions, Denmark, progress could hardly
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78 We chose to group these two categories together to try to minimize national differences in how the ques-
tion is understood. There should be less difference across countries in the perception of the central dividing line
between the two categories of ‘satisfied’ and the two of ‘not satisfied’ than in the interpretations of the words
‘very’and ‘fairly’.Note also that since our main interest is in trends over time, any fixed national differences in
the way the question is understood by respondents are of less concern.
79 The rise in the share of responses in the two categories was significant in each of these six countries on a
Chi-squared test at the one percent level in every case (and often at much more demanding levels).80 The Chi-squared value was over 14. Results are calculated using weights provided in the dataset to ensure
that the Walloon and Flemish populations of Belgium are proportionately represented; hence there is no reason
to believe that this result is due to a change in the sampling of the two groups.  
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have been expected: a striking 98 percent of young people declared themselves
satisfied in the 1970s. The UK is a second exception: satisfaction levels fell
slightly during the 1980s but have since recovered to the levels of the late 1970s.
Only Belgium has seen the share of the young claiming to be satisfied fall over
the period. In 1975-79, 94 percent of young Belgians put themselves in the top
two satisfaction groups while in 1990-94 only 89 percent did so, a difference
that is statistically significant at much better than the one percent level.
80
This in turn has led to convergence in the level of satisfaction across coun-
tries, as the share of the young who are basically happy with their lives grows
towards 90 percent and beyond, as illustrated in Figure 7.1 (measures of dis-
persion are calculated for the EU 9 only). Progress has been particularly strik-
ing in Italy, where the share of young people claiming to be satisfied has risen
steadily from just 62 percent in the 1970s to 87 percent in the early 1990s. 
While, unfortunately, full data series are not available for the other southern
European countries, the evidence which does exist suggests that this Italian
story may reflect something of a regional trend for southern Europe. Data for
Greece are available for the last three periods and suggest a similar low start-
ing point followed by improvement that was steady, though far less dramatic
than in Italy (the increase is still significant at the one percent level if taken
across the full period). For Spain and Portugal only the last two data points are
available: Portugal records a significant rise of 80 to 87 percent across the five
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Figure 7.1: Percentage of 15-19s very or fairly satisfied with their lives, selected EU
countries
Source: Table E1year period (very similar to that in Italy over these years), but the Spanish rate
remains stable at 84 to 85 percent in both years. By the 1990s, the difference
from the average share of the young who are satisfied in the EU as a whole is
small in Italy, Portugal and Spain, while Greece remains a notable outlier.
As Figure 7.1 shows, however, the rise in well-being has not been monotonic
in all countries where increases have occurred. The fall in the satisfaction level
in Ireland between the late 1970s and late 1980s is significant at the one percent
level. (A similar decline was observed for the UK over the same period, but this
is not significant.) This put Ireland and Belgium together on a downward trend
at this time, in contrast to the course followed in the rest of Europe. However in
the 1990s both Ireland and the UK see a reversal of this trend: in Ireland in par-
ticular, the share of satisfied teenagers jumped by six percentage points over the
last five year period (the increases for both Ireland and the UK are statistically
significant). The Belgian decline has continued. (The slight decline observed for
France in the early 1990s in Figure 7.1 is not significant.)
81  82
Do these aggregated figures for all young people hide a gender gap in life sat-
isfaction? Pooling samples across the full 20 years, we find significant differ-
ences between results for boys and girls in only four countries. In three, a slight-
ly higher share of boys than girls were found to be satisfied with their lives: 73
percent against 69 percent in Greece, 79 percent against 75 percent in Italy, and
97 percent against 95 percent in the Netherlands. In just one country, Ireland, a
significantly higher share of the pooled sample of girls than boys claimed to be
satisfied, but again the difference is small – 87 percent against 85 percent.
However, if numbers for each five-year period are looked at separately, one
additional point of interest emerges: it is satisfaction levels among boys alone
which is driving the rising aggregate level in Greece. In the early 1980s there
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81 It should be noted that these results do not fit completely with those of Blanchflower and Oswald (1997)
for the under 30s. Looking at the decade between 1983 and 1992 they find “a positive and statistically signifi-
cant upward time trend over the most recent decade of 1983 to 1992… in each nation except Great Britain and
Northern Ireland”(p.9). We do not find a significant upward trend for the UK, as noted, but we also have no
evidence of an upward trend for Belgium, over any period (it is unlikely that this difference in findings is dri-
ven by the earlier cut-off point, 1992, used by Blanchflower and Oswald). It appears that teenagers in Belgium
have been following a different – and less positive – trend than that followed by their compatriots in their 20s.
82 The share of teenagers declaring themselves ‘not at all’ satisfied with their lives was also examined, to
explore the possibility that the increasing numbers of satisfied teenagers detract attention from a growing minor-
ity of the very excluded. Results tell a very similar story to that already given. The share of the very unsatisfied
has fallen in all of the EU9 except Belgium and the UK, and in the latter two both the level and the increase are
small and the change is unlikely to be significant (in 1990-94 under 3 percent put themselves in this group in both
countries). Italy has experienced considerable improvement to match that illustrated above: in 1975-79 10 per-
cent of teenagers said they were ‘not at all’satisfied, falling to 2 percent by 1990-94. (These figures are still com-
patible with the rising youth suicide rates discussed in Section 4 because suicide is sufficiently rare: even in
Finland in 1994 only 0.05 percent of the male population 15-24 died from suicide.) We also looked at the respons-
es to a separate question on happiness, available for 1975-79 and 1982-86.(Respondents could classify themselves
as ‘very happy’, ‘fairly happy’or ‘not too happy’; we combined the first two categories.) The pattern of respons-
es across countries and the changes over time gave a very similar picture to that given by responses to the satis-
faction question. (For example, the changes over time in happiness and satisfaction had a correlation of 0.81.)67 Is Child Welfare Converging in the European Union?
was no significant difference between the share of boys (70 percent) and girls
(67 percent) who said they were satisfied. But during the course of the decade,
satisfaction among Greek boys increased to 79 percent, while among girls it
rose just slightly to 69 percent. Greek girls appear not to be sharing the gen-
eral rise in satisfaction levels in Europe.
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n 7.2 Levels of satisfaction among the young compared to those in the
general population
How does the life satisfaction of young people compare with that of older
groups? Do the improvements illustrated above reflect a trend shared by the
whole population, or is the relative well-being of the young also improving?
It turns out that the young are more likely than the general population to clas-
sify themselves as satisfied in almost every country, as illustrated in Figure
7.2, which plots the percentage of the young who claim to be satisfied with
their lives against the percentage of the whole population (15-64) for 1990-
94. The data points fall below the 45 degree line if a higher share of the young
than of the general population declare themselves as satisfied; in practice all
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Figure 7.2: Percentage of 15-19s and of 15-64s ‘very satisfied’or ‘fairly satisfied’
wth their lives 1990-94
Source: Tables E2 and E3
83 Only three other countries have significant gender differences in satisfaction levels for any one of the four
periods taken separately: the Netherlands in 1980-84 with boys on 99 percent and girls on 94 percent; Ireland
in the same period with boys on 81 percent and girls on 87 percent; and Luxembourg in 1990-94 with boys on
95 percent and girls on 99.7 percent. of satisfaction are lower, i.e. in Greece, Spain, France, Portugal and Italy. 
Furthermore, the gap between the two series has been increasing over time,
as shown by the summary statistics given in Figure 7.2 for the ratio between
the two (EU9 only). The mean ratio has increased slightly: this is basically
because satisfaction levels have stayed fairly constant among the total popu-
lation and risen among the young, particularly in countries where satisfaction
started low. The increase in the standard deviation is explained by the same
phenomenon: as satisfaction increases, the young leave the older further
behind in Southern Europe and France; while in countries with higher satis-
faction levels to begin with (Denmark, Germany, Luxembourg and the
Netherlands) there is little difference between the two series. There is cer-
tainly no story here of growing exclusion of the young, or of disparities
between the young and the rest of the population across the EU changing in a
way that is an obvious cause for concern. (If there is any concern, it is with
the happiness of adults relative to children in Southern Europe.)
n 7.3 Summary
To sum up, Europe has seen growing convergence in life satisfaction among
young people, largely driven by increasing levels of satisfaction in Southern
Europe, and particularly in Italy. The trend in Spain and Portugal looks likely
to have been similar to that in Italy, but young people in Greece – and most
strikingly Greek girls – remain some way behind.
These results suggest that life satisfaction data do pick up on an area of wel-
fare not reflected by other indicators, although what exactly it is that is mea-
sured is hard to pinpoint. Blanchflower and Oswald put forward increasing
personal and marital freedom as the cause of the growing well-being they
identify among European under-30s: they show that it is predominantly young
single people who are becoming happier, implying that in the past young peo-
ple were constrained by their inability to postpone marriage or choose alter-
native lifestyles. Clearly marital freedom is not the issue among the younger
group we look at here, but the related idea of growing personal freedom could
be of importance. The liberalization of attitudes which have led to the post-
ponement of marriage will have affected adolescents too. 
A more obvious theory is that increasing satisfaction is simply the result of
growing wealth in these countries. In fact rising wealth and liberalization are
likely to come hand in hand, and there may also be direct links between the
two. For instance, increasing GDP in Southern Europe has given the young
much greater access to their own transport – mopeds in particular – which in
turn has enabled them to seize greater control over their own lives than was
ever the case before. (This idea of the moped as the harbinger of liberty, if
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there is any truth in it, presents an interesting counterbalance to some of the
dangers highlighted in Section 4.2 on road death rates. The rise of motorized
transport may have inhibited the actions of the child and increased road deaths
among teens but at the same time furnished the young with a heightened inde-
pendence which has had a profound impact on their quality of life.)
The other story presented in this section is a growing malaise in some coun-
tries of the north. This is best exemplified by the case of Belgium, but Ireland
also experienced a significant decline in the share of teenagers claiming to be
satisfied during the 1980s. While satisfaction appears now to be rising among
young people in Ireland, the continuing downward trend in Belgium calls for
further attention.8. Summary and Conclusions
“Indicators for tracking the well-being of children and their families are important tools
of government. Uses include simple description; monitoring to inform planning and
resource allocation; goal-setting to guide broad policy and co-ordinate efforts across agen-
cies and between levels of government; accountability efforts to hold agencies and even
whole levels of government responsible for making progress toward specific social goals;
and, under limited circumstances, evaluation of comprehensive government initiatives”
(Brown, 1998, p1)
The goal of closer integration in Europe requires the monitoring of various
aspects of the integration process. This is true not only of macroeconomic per-
formance, but also of living standards and the quality of life – which are the
real target of any new policy initiative at the European level. Our aim in this
paper has been to investigate whether the well-being of children in the differ-
ent Member States has become more or less similar over time, and hence to
contribute to the analysis of economic and social cohesion in the European
Union.
Strengthening cohesion in the Union means ensuring that “neither regional
location nor social position are permitted to circumscribe life-chances”
(European Commission, 1996, p.115) and a natural group to focus on in this
context is children. Moreover, children are a group where pan-European sup-
port for action is likely to be high; it is not for nothing that the UN Convention
on the Rights of the Child has been one of the most widely supported inter-
national instruments of all. And the Convention places considerable stress on
economic and social rights of children in domains of well-being measured by
the data we consider in this paper.
What convergence in child welfare in the EU could actually mean in prac-
tice is some startling improvements in the quality of life – we noted, for exam-
ple, that deaths among children under-5 years of age would be reduced by
about 10,000 a year if all Member States were to converge on the under-5
mortality rate of the best performer. On the other hand, we emphasized that
convergence need not be a good thing – converging on the level of the poorer
performers is certainly not desirable.
We first summarize our results and then highlight the need for further
analysis and collection of data on European children.
n 8.1 Summary of results
As noted by the First Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, integration
“should be about the quality of European citizenship in all its facets” (European
Commission, 1996, p.46). The facets of child well-being we have looked at are
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only a sub-set of those that one would wish to consider (a point we return to
below) but their range is sufficiently large that it would be suprising if all the
indicators we have chosen were to move in the same way over time.
We have also emphasized that results can depend in part on the measuring
rod chosen. The definitions of “disparity” and of “convergence” are not trivial
issues; even the way that an indicator is expressed (for example “mortality” ver-
sus “survival”) or whether the data for each country are weighted to account for
differences in population size may be important for the conclusion drawn.  
However, despite these difficulties, some clear and robust results do emerge
from the analysis. In addition to GDP per capita, there is firm evidence of con-
vergence (over varying time periods) on five indicators:
l Under-5 mortality
l Child traffic death rates
l Education expenditure as a share of GDP
l Enrolment in education at 16
l Life satisfaction.
Of the remaining five indicators, three show divergence:
l Child poverty rates
l Worklessness among households with children
lYouth unemployment as a share of the cohort.
And two show stagnation in terms of disparities:
l Male youth suicide rates
l Teenage fertility rates.
These results relate to a measure of absolute disparity, the standard devia-
tion, with measures weighted for differences in population size. Do the con-
clusions depend on these particular choices? 
The five indicators that are found to converge with a measure of absolute
disparity do so with a relative measure (the coefficient of variation), and with
a measure that gives equal weight to all Member States irrespective of their
different sizes. The choice of measure makes little difference to results.
The five indicators which do not converge using the weighted standard
deviation are more sensitive to the choice of convergence measure. If the
weighted coefficient of variation is used, youth unemployment and (to a less-
er extent) child poverty show stagnation or divergence – here there is little or
no change in the picture; but the worklessness and youth suicide rates showconvergence. However, this is convergence against a worsening average – i.e.
it is ‘negative convergence’. Teenage fertility, on the other hand, shows
divergence (rather than just stagnation), but this might be termed ‘positive
divergence’– divergence but against the background of an improving level of
average well-being (lower fertility). In none of these three cases, then, is the
picture given by the weighted standard deviation a misleading one in the
sense that the indicator converges positively when we switch to the alterna-
tive measure.
If an unweighted measure is used, it is usually the degree rather than the
direction of change in disparities which is affected. The two measures most
affected are the youth suicide rate, where unweighted measures show diver-
gence over the last decade rather than just stagnation, because of the greater
impact of rising suicides in Finland; and the teenage fertility rate, where the
opposite is the case. The failure of the UK teen fertility rate to converge has
less impact on the unweighted figures as the UK is one of the European
Union’s largest countries: the weighted standard deviation is more or less
stagnant, while the unweighted standard deviation falls.
Results are fairly robust then to the choice of disparity measure used, and
we find that half of our indicators show convergence while half show diver-
gence or stagnation. Is there any pattern to be found which explains the divi-
sion between converging indicators and those which do not converge? It is
noteworthy that several of the measures which do converge might be thought
of as standard indicators of the Human Development Index type – those cho-
sen if measures of health status and education are used to supplement income-
based measures so as to give us a more complete picture of human well-being.
Child mortality rates and the expenditure and enrolment measures of educa-
tion performance turn out to give a very similar picture of change in welfare
to that provided by per capita GDP. On our measures of health and education
status as well as our proxy for average income, child well-being is both
improving and converging across the EU.
On the other hand, the indicators which tell us more about exclusion –
about whether all children are benefiting from general progress overall – tend
to tell a different story of falling standards and increasing disparities. The
share of the young excluded from rising economic fortunes, as measured by
child poverty rates, worklessness and youth unemployment rates, has been
growing, and disparities across countries have also been increasing. The
teenage fertility rate can also be thought of as an economic exclusion measure
– although here convergence has been prevented by just one country, and aver-
age rates have fallen (welfare has risen). But youth suicide rates across Europe
are higher than in 1970, while disparities have not fallen since 1985.
An argument could perhaps be made, then, that on average children’s qual-
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ity of life (measured in several dimensions) is on the rise across Europe, but
that the risks of being excluded from improvements are also on the rise, and
that these risks are becoming increasingly different across countries. 
However, there is one exception to this rather disturbing picture – the data
on life satisfaction. Despite falling welfare and rising disparities in all other
‘exclusion’measures, a growing share of young people across Europe declare
themselves to be satisfied with their lives. Of course, it should be remembered
that only 15 to 19 year olds were asked for their opinion – we do not know
that today’s younger children would say the same thing, or that they will be
as positive ten years down the line. Also, the phenomenon of rising spirits can-
not be found everywhere: in Ireland and the UK the share claiming to be sat-
isfied fell during the 1980s, and this decline has only been reversed in the last
five years; in Belgium the share of satisfied young people is still falling. But
it remains striking that in Italy, for instance, while youth unemployment rose
from 13 to 17 percent between 1979 and 1994 (the figures relate to all indi-
viduals in the age range concerned), the satisfaction rate rose from 62 to 87
percent of 15 to 19 year olds. The satisfaction data suggest that exclusion indi-
cators may in some cases be painting an overly negative picture of what is tak-
ing place.
It is worth pointing out that it is not always the same countries which are
responsible for rising or persistent disparities (although one or two countries
do stand out as having particularly bad records). This is in contrast to the sit-
uation among indicators which have converged, where the story reflects that
of convergence in GDP per capita: broadly speaking, this is one of rapid
catch-up progress by the Cohesion Four; or, more accurately, the Cohesion
‘Three’ – Greece, Spain and Portugal – often joined by Italy. (Child traffic
death rates prove the exception: rates in Southern Europe have never reached
those of Germany, Luxembourg, Denmark or Finland at their peaks, and con-
vergence has been driven by progress in these latter countries.)
With measures which have not converged the story is less straightforward.
Relationships are complex between different aspects of the welfare of even a
single age-group. Not all the countries with the highest levels of worklessness
have high child poverty rates, for instance, while there is no cross-country cor-
relation in our data between the youth unemployment rate and the youth sui-
cide rate. 
Sweden, Denmark and the Netherlands are found to have consistently good
records on all indicators, while the UK, Ireland and Spain frequently number
among the worst performers in the areas of no convergence. Germany has a
worsening child poverty rate but an improving record on both youth unem-
ployment and youth suicide; while the situation in Finland is the mirror oppo-
site. Finland and Ireland are unusual in that they have seen both their youth
unemployment and youth suicide rates worsen with respect to the average: in
general it is countries in Southern Europe which are doing badly on unem-
ployment while suicide has risen most sharply in the north. However, despite
better records on employment, family worklessness is highest in northern
countries, especially in the UK, Ireland and Belgium. In the south, only Spain
has unemployment high enough to bring family worklessness close to north-
ern levels. 
In general, the Cohesion Three have a mixed record on these non-converg-
ing indicators. All three countries appear to have high child poverty rates.
Youth unemployment and family worklessness are both high and rising in
Spain. Greece and Portugal have low, stable levels of worklessness, and
Greece and Spain consistently low rates of suicide. But in Greece youth
unemployment has remained above the EU average since 1983; while
Portugal has the second highest teenage fertility rate in Europe, and the high-
est rate of death from suicide and unexplained injury in the south. 
In some cases we have been able to provide some explanation for the
observed trends and hence some links to discussion of policy. But our main
aim has been a more modest one, namely the documenting of “what has hap-
pened to children” in Europe in the recent past. This forms the vital first step
for the discussion of policy that can follow. How did country X manage to
reduce its child mortality rate faster than other countries at the same level of
national income? Why has country Z diverged on teenage fertility?
Differences in national policy affecting children and their families may well
of course be only part of the explanation for the cross-national variation in
outcomes. But observing those outcomes and lining countries’ records over
time up against each other is an important part of the policy process.
Finally, it should be noted that our results relate only to the differences
between countries. But the differences within countries are also important for
any analysis of cohesion. This is true not just from the national perspective but
also from a European standpoint. The notion of solidarity within Europe does
not imply indifference to a situation of wide disparities in living standards at
the national level and it is worth noting that the First Report on Economic and
Social Cohesion pointed to evidence of weakening social cohesion within
some Member States (European Commission, 1996). The Report contained
detailed analysis of incomes and employment at the level of the region, a unit
of analysis on which EU policy has increasingly focused. The indicators of
child well-being that we have considered in this paper could usefully be
analysed below the national level to see how sub-national differences (by
region or social group) are changing over time.
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n 8.2 Collection and analysis of data on children
Besides the substantive findings, our attempts to monitor children’s well-
being over time in a number of dimensions leads to conclusions about data
sources and their analysis. In short, there is much scope for improvement.
There are numerous dimensions of child welfare that one might wish to mon-
itor over time in Europe, but which cannot be studied for lack of available
data. The researcher’s plea for more data is of course a familiar refrain but in
this case we believe that it is warranted. Only in this way will children become
“more visible… which will make it possible to identify their needs and the
issues which require priority political action” (Council of Europe, 1996, arti-
cle 6ii). The future of Europe lies with Europe’s children and data collection
and analytic efforts should match this reality.
The distinction between collection and analysis is an important one. On
some issues, the required data do in general exist – child poverty, for exam-
ple. The problem here is one of analysis. Work needs to be done to calculate
and present child poverty rates from the existing household data sets on a reg-
ular basis and in a consistent fashion across countries. Children need to be
made a priority when the choice is made of the list of topics or population sub-
groups to be analysed in the European Community Household Panel, for
example.
84
On other issues, however, the data need to be collected or made more
widely available. The latter is especially relevant for an entity such as the
European Union, and the role of Eurostat, the Union’s statistical agency, in
bringing together and publishing comparable data for Member States is of
obvious importance here. As we noted, Eurostat has some very useful publi-
cations that present data on children (especially older children). But there are
too many subjects for which data have to be obtained from other internation-
al organizations, or for which a time-consuming search through national
sources must be undertaken (with all the problems of lack of comparability
that this often entails). A regular Eurostat publication which focused on
trends in different dimensions of child well-being would be a big step for-
ward. The need for regularity in analysis and publication should be stressed.
One-off publications do not provide for regular monitoring and allow issues
to recede into the background.
Part of the data in such a publication would have to be collected afresh, or
84 The need for this is illustrated by Eurostat’s published analysis of income distribution in the ECHP.
Analysis of the first wave data (Eurostat, 1997d) included figures for the percentages of all individuals below
different poverty lines (various percentages of mean and median) in each Member State and also the percent-
ages of children beneath these lines. The analysis of the second wave data (Eurostat, 1998a) contained data for
all individuals only.assembled from national sources; we are not advocating something that would
merely be along the lines of what has been possible in this paper. Some new
subjects that need to be covered relate directly to key developments in eco-
nomic policy in Europe, for example monetary union – Atkinson (1998a) calls
for child-centred price indices and unemployment rates (similar to the work-
less household rate in Section 3.2) so that the impact of the single currency on
children can be adequately monitored.
The list of other subjects that would be candidates to be covered, relevant
to other policies at European or national level, is clearly vast. (In the case of
older children, some good examples are found in Youth in the European
Union, Eurostat, 1997). Besides some of the obvious choices that we have
been able to cover in this paper (such as various mortality rates or teenage fer-
tility) it might include low birth weight, immunization, nutritional status,
blood lead levels, and early childhood education among younger children;
smoking, alcohol and drug use, sexually transmitted diseases, and both per-
petration and victimization of serious violent crime among youth. (We offer
these merely as examples.)
Two indicators that appeal to us in the light of the analysis in this paper are
(i) information on children’s mobility and independence, as measured by
method of journey to school (see Section 4), and (ii) data on children and
young people’s learning achievement and their ability to apply knowledge, as
in the TIMSS and the OECD Adult Literacy Survey (discussed in Section 5).
The former reflects the view that measurement of children’s welfare should be
concerned with their quality of life while children, rather than focusing on
their acquistion of skills and capabilities to be used later in life. The latter
relates to this ‘investment’ aspect and is clearly relevant to a traditional view
of economic and social cohesion in the EU that stresses employment and
income opportunities.
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Appendix
Data on child well-being in the European Union
General sources
Eurostat is the obvious place to start when looking for data on children in
Europe. The Eurostat website is at http://europa.eu.int/en/comm/eurostat.
The site itself contains little in the way of statistics, but it does have lists of
available publications and databases, along with prices and order forms. 
In addition to the Eurostat publications referred to in relevant sections
below, it is worth mentioning the regular Eurostat newsletter, Statistics in
Focus. This appears in nine sub-series, one for each of the main statistical
themes covered by Eurostat; Population and Social Conditions is the series
which was of most use for this paper. Each sub-series has several issues per
year, with each issue containing a roundup of the latest results from surveys,
studies or analyses published regularly by Eurostat.
A. Economic well-being
For GDP per capita we drew on figures published by Eurostat (or by the
European Commission) which have the advantage of being presented already
in purchasing power standard (PPS) terms.  The Eurostat Yearbook ’97, for
example, gives figures for each year 1986-96 (figures in PPS terms for a more
recent year are not given on the Eurostat website).
Microdata from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP), the
source for the figures on child poverty in Table 2.1, are now available for sec-
ondary analysis – see Eurostat (1999). Our figures for child poverty in the
1980s and 1990s are from the research by Bradbury and Jäntti (1999) which
uses the household survey datasets in the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS),
described at the LIS website, http://lissy.ceps.lu. (See also the Appendix in
Atkinson (1998b).)
The earlier study of child poverty by Hagenaars et al. (1994) for the late
1980s (which was commissioned by Eurostat) is based on household budget
surveys for the then EU-12.  This is a very rich source of information on
poverty in Europe.  Besides containing extensive analysis, some 200 pages of
tables in the appendices provide detailed breakdowns of poverty among the
population as a whole, and among children, persons of other ages, regions,
and a range of socio-economic groups.  For each country the appendix tables
include head-counts, poverty gaps, and other indices of the severity of pover-
ty – based on a variety of poverty lines and equivalence scales.  Figures are
given based on both income and expenditure.The Hagenaars et al. study provides information on child poverty in house-
holds with and without work at one point in time but the 1998 OECD
Employment Outlook was the source we used to analyse the change in work-
less households.  Unlike Hagenaars et al., this source uses labour force sur-
veys.  These data are not available for secondary analysis from a single sup-
plier.  (Labour force surveys for some EU countries are however available for
secondary analysis through the Luxembourg Employment Study, described at
the LIS website given above.)
The annual OECD Employment Outlook is an excellent source of informa-
tion on a variety of labour market topics relating to children and young peo-
ple and by its nature allows the European Union countries to be compared
with North America and other OECD member states.  (The Eurostat Yearbook
’97 provides some information too.)
B. Mortality
The standard source for mortality data is the World Health Organization
(WHO). All the mortality data used in the paper are from WHO. (The total
death rate for 15 to 24 year olds is taken from UN Demographic Yearbooks,
as these were more easily at hand when we decided to include this indicator,
but the Yearbooks themselves use WHO data. See UN (1998), page 2.)
WHO data are available in the following formats:
1. WHO Health for All Database.
This is a user-friendly database on key health care indicators, covering Eastern
and Western Europe. The latest version of the database can be downloaded
from the website of the WHO Regional Office for Europe, in Copenhagen
(currently at www.who.dk/country/country.htm). The database includes
standard mortality indicators such as life expectancy, infant and under-5 mor-
tality and maternal mortality, as well as breakdowns of total deaths by main
cause. However, there are no age breakdowns by cause of death.
There is also a version of Health for All available at www.who.int/whosis/
hfa/index.htm which includes some countries outside Europe. However, this
contains a much more limited number of indicators, and a less complete time-
series. 
2. WHO World Health Statistics Annuals.
These are annual yearbooks published since 1963, giving numbers and rates
of death by country, with breakdowns by age group, gender and cause of
death. The detail provided is likely to be sufficient for many purposes, but
there are disadvantages. Most obviously, the data are not computerized and
need to be entered by hand. Second, each annual includes the most recent data
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submitted for each country, whatever the year. Thus data for a given country
for 1990 might be found in the yearbook for 1991, for 1992, for 1993 or for
1994. (Belgian data for 1989 were included in the 1993 yearbook and 1990
data have still not been published.) Finally, the age breakdown is by ten year
groups, so we have breakdowns for 5 to 14 year olds and for 15 to 24 year
olds, when sometimes it would be preferable to have five year breakdowns.
3. WHO Mortality Database.
The raw data used to put the World Health Statistics Annuals together are now
available in electronic format. These can be downloaded from www.who.int/
whosis/mort/download.htm. 
These files eliminate the need for manual data entry, while allowing the
researcher to reach a very fine degree of detail. Numbers of deaths are given
by age of individual, gender and detailed classification of cause of death.
However, they are raw data files and need work before they can be used: data
given are for numbers rather than rates, along with population figures. The
files are also very large files to download: the database covers all parts of the
world, and it is not possible to download separate files for particular countries
(although a small degree of selection is possible with respect to time period.) 
On the other hand, the files appear to be well documented, and the initial
investment into downloading and setting them up would pay off if much use
was going to be made of the data. (Had the files been available when we start-
ed putting our data together we would have done this; by the time we became
aware of them it no longer made sense to do so.)
C. Education
For enrolment and expenditure data, UNESCO is the main source used in this
paper. Expenditure data was taken from the UNESCO Statistical Yearbook
1997, and enrolment data downloaded from the UNESCO website
(http://unescostat.unesco.org/ database/Dbframe.htm).
Other regular publications worth looking at include OECD (Education at a
Glance), and various Eurostat publications (Key Data on Education in the
European Union and Education across the European Union: Statistics and
Indicators). All of these provide useful detail, but tend to give data for the
most recent available year only, making it hard work to put together a time
series — and in fact the Eurostat publications are  new, so for the moment this
cannot be done anyway. (Education across the European Union gives time-
series for some data such as number of pupils, which in principle could be
used with population data to put together enrolment rates.)
For this paper we also drew on two one-off Eurostat publications: Youth in
the European Union: From Education to Working Life (1997) and Issue No.15of Statistics in Focus: Population and Social Conditions (1998) which con-
centrated on education spending.   
For data on education standards, there are currently two surveys to look at:
(1) the IEA’s TIMSS Study (Beaton et al, Mathematics [or Science]
Achievement in the Middle School Years: IEA’s Third International
Mathematics and Science Study, 1996, or see the website of Boston College
at http://wwwcsteep.bc.edu/timss for further details including how to access
the raw data, and for progress on the 1998/99 TIMSS Repeat); 
(2) the OECD’s functional literacy studies (Literacy, Economy and Society:
Results of the first International Adult Literacy Survey, 1995 and Literacy
Skills for the Knowledge Society: Further results from the International Adult
Literacy Survey, 1997). 
Future rounds of both studies will allow analysis of trends in national per-
formance over time, and in the case of the OECD study of a wider group of
countries (currently only 11 countries are covered). 
D. Teenage fertility
For birth rate data for recent years, the best source for Europe is the Eurostat
electronic Demographic Statistics Database 1997, available on CD ROM.
This contains annual data for 1990 to 1995 on number of births by age of
mother (single year breakdowns), and population data, so birth rates can be
estimated. (We used births to women aged 19 and under as the numerator, and
population 15 to 19 as the denominator.) The database also breaks down num-
ber of births to each age group by marital status. 
For earlier years, Eurostat fertility data are available in the annual print
publication Demographic Statistics. The 1990 edition contains data for the
EU 12 from 1960 to 1990 (again, numbers of births are given alongside pop-
ulation figures, so that birth rates can be calculated). The obvious disadvan-
tage is that data have to be entered by hand. In addition, space limits the
degree of detail available: for instance, no data are given regarding marital sta-
tus of teenage mothers.
For countries outside Europe, the best source seems to be the UN
Demographic Yearbooks (in print). These were used in this paper for data up
to 1990 for new EU members Austria, Finland and Sweden. Each yearbook
gives only the latest available year for each country, so putting a time-series
together is time-consuming. And again, the degree of detail is limited: num-
bers of births are only given for under 15s and 15 to 19s (not for each age sep-
arately), and no information on marital status is given.
One problem in comparing teen birth rates across countries is that some
countries record the age of mother as the age at the end of the calendar year
in which the child was born, rather than the age at the birth itself. This can
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make a difference to the birth rates of some 30 percent. Some adjustment
based on the average ratio between the two rates in other countries is there-
fore required. 
Abortion data with age breakdowns are not easy to find. The source used in
this paper is the WHO Health for All Database (see Mortality above), which
includes the number of abortions to women under 20. However, datapoints are
only available for some countries for some years: it was possible to put togeth-
er one or two datapoints in the early 1990s for about 10 European countries,
but a longer time-series was possible for only a very few.
E. Life satisfaction
Life satisfaction data are taken from the Eurobarometer biannual surveys.
There is now a cumulative dataset which covers 1973 to 1992. We merged this
with the four six-monthly surveys held since then which have included the
question on life satisfaction (Spring and Autumn 1993 and 1994). Since then
the question appears to have been discontinued. The Eurobarometer datasets
are stored at the Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung (ZA) in
Cologne and at the Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social
Research (ICPSR) in Ann Arbor, Michigan, and are available to all interested
researchers for a charge. For further information on how to access them see
the ZA website at http://www.za.uni-koeln.de/data/en/eurobarometer/
index.htm.
F. Population
For 1990 onwards the best source for population data for Europe is the
Eurostat electronic Demographic Statistics Database 1997 on CD ROM. This
contains annual population data by gender and for each age group. 
For countries outside Europe, and for all countries prior to 1990, popula-
tion data by gender and for five-year age breakdowns can be found in the UN
Population Studies print publication The Sex and Age Distributions of the
World Populations. The 1995 revision (published 1996) is the most recent. Appendix 
Tables
A. ECONOMIC WELL-BEING
A1. GDP per capita at current market prices in purchasing power parity (PPS)
terms as percent of weighted EU-15 average
1983 1988 1993 1996
Austria 107.6 102.1 110.4 107.5
Belgium 105.4 103.3 113.9 112.6
Denmark 108.6 108.0 112.3 115.2
Finland 100.7 103.0 91.6 93.1
France 113.4 110.1 109.4 106.4
Germany 116.5 115.3 108.3 108.3
Greece 61.9 58.9 64.6 64.9
Ireland 63.6 64.6 83.4 99.8
Italy 101.6 102.0 101.9 105.1
Luxembourg 131.9 139.3 165.0 168.9
Netherlands 102.7 99.2 104.3 104.7
Portugal 55.1 58.7 67.0 67.5
Spain 70.5 72.8 78.1 77.0
Sweden 112.3 110.9 98.8 97.2
UK 98.7 102.5 99.3 99.0
mean 96.7 96.7 100.6 101.8
mean (wt) 100.1 100.0 100.0 100.0
CV 0.228 0.228 0.230 0.229
CV (wt) 0.172 0.161 0.128 0.127
max/min 2.39 2.37 2.55 2.60
Cohesion 4 mean 66.1 67.7 74.4 74.8
as % EU-15 mean
(both weighted)
Real GDP per capita 100.0 115.7 125.3 133.9
(1983=100.0)
Source: 1983: European Commission (1996, Table 2, p132) (figures given only as % of
weighted EU-15 mean); 1988-96: Eurostat (1997c, p.210). Real GDP figures from
European Commission (1996, Table 4, p133) and for 1996 from Eurostat (1997c, p.208)
(not per capita).
Note:Weighted calculations use 1980 population totals for 1983-88, 1993 total for 1993 and
1995 total for 1996. (Results for the weighted mean for 1988-96 differ somewhat from those
given in the source table.) The Cohesion Four are Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain.
82A2.  Child poverty rates in different sources (percent)
1. 2. 3.
survey ECHP wave 1 LIS surveys Budget surveys
measure income income expenditure
year 1993 mainly early 1990s 1987-89
poverty line 50% mean 50% median 50% mean
equiv. scale modified OECD NSF modified OECD
age-group 0-15 0-17 0-16
Austria - 5.6 -
Belgium 15 6.1 7.5
Denmark 5 5.9 3.5
Finland - 3.4 -
France 12 9.8 16.6
Germany 13 11.6 13.6
Greece 19 - 15.9
Ireland 28 14.8 18.8
Italy 24 21.2 20.3
Luxembourg 23 6.3 12.7
Netherlands 16 8.4 4.2
Portugal 27 - 22.9
Spain 25 13.1 17.8
Sweden - 3.7 -
UK 32 21.3 17.8
correlation with 1.00 0.72 0.73
ECHP figures
Sources:
Column 1: Eurostat (1997d), Figure 3 (N.B. figures only given to nearest integer).
Column 2: Bradbury and Jäntti (1999), Table 2.3.
Column 3: Hagenaars et al. (1994). Appendix A3, Table A2.1 (country tables).
Note:
1. The years to which the data from Bradbury and Jäntti refer are as in Table A3 with the
exception of Italy and the UK (both 1995).  The data for countries not included in
Table A3 are from 1987 (Austria and Ireland), 1989 (France), 1990 (Spain) and 1992
(Sweden).
2. The modified OECD scale is 1+0.5*adults+0.3*children. The NSF scale used by
Bradbury and Jäntti is (adults + 0.7*children)^0.85.
3. The unit of the analysis in every case is the child with children classified as poor
according to equivalized household income or expenditure. The income unit is the
household except in the LIS data for Sweden where it is the family.
83A3. Child poverty rates in the 1980s and 1990s (percent)
Year 1980s 1990s
Belgium (85,92) 4.7 6.1
Denmark (87,92) 6.0 5.9
Finland (87,91) 4.0 3.4
Germany (84,94) 7.4 11.6
Italy (86,91) 12.9 14.2
Luxembourg (85,94) 5.5 6.3
Netherlands (87,91) 6.6 8.4
Sweden (87,92) 4.6 3.7
UK (86,91) 14.3 20.3
mean 7.3 8.9
mean (wt) 10.5 13.5
CV 0.48 0.59
CV (wt) 0.35 0.38
SD 3.51 5.24
SD (wt) 3.67 5.06
Max/min 3.60 6.00
Source: Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) microdata analysed by Bradbury and Jäntti
(1999) and the basis for their Figure 3.2.
Note:
1. The table shows the percent of children living in households with equivalized income
beneath 50 percent of the median.
2. Weighted figures use 1985 population aged 0-14 for the 1980s and 1990 population
of the same age for the 1990s. 
3. See Table A2 for other notes (including definition of the equivalence scale).














mean (wt) 8.0 10.6
CV 0.56 0.50
CV (wt) 0.50 0.43
SD 4.47 4.64
SD (wt) 3.98 4.56
Max/min 7.00 3.99
Source: OECD (1998), Tables 1.6 and 1.7.
Note: Weighted figures use 1985 population aged 0-14 for 1985 and 1995 population 
for 1996.
85A5. Unemployment rates, 20-24 year-olds
1979 1983 1989 1994
Austria - - - -
Belgium - 21.7 14.6 20.4
Denmark - 17.7 13.5 12.6
Finland 7.8 8.2 5.5 30.2
France 10.9 17.3 19.1 27.7
Germany 4.3 11.7 6.8 8.9
Greece - 21.4 24.1 25.5
Ireland 6.9 16.3 17.0 22.2
Italy 20.7 25.2 30.7 30.9
Luxembourg - 5.0 1.9 6.3
Netherlands - 17.2 11.0 10.1
Portugal 15.0 18.4 11.3 13.6
Spain 15.3 32.1 31.8 41.4
Sweden 3.7 6.8 3.1 16.6
UK - 17.9 9.7 14.8
EU-14 (unweighted) 16.9 14.3 20.1
Source: OECD (1996), Table 4.3 p114 (figures for each gender weighted using partici-
pation rates in Table 4.1 p111). These unemployment rates relate to those 20-24 year-
olds participating in the labour force, in contrast to those in Table A7.
86A6. Labour force participation rates, 20-24 year-olds
1979 1983 1989 1994
Austria - - - -
Belgium - 69.6 60.6 59.1
Denmark - 84.5 84.3 76.5
Finland 75.3 76.8 76.0 64.8
France 74.5 73.4 64.6 51.9
Germany 75.6 74.8 75.9 73.2
Greece - 63.2 63.0 59.8
Ireland 79.9 82.0 77.6 72.6
Italy 63.6 66.2 67.7 54.3
Luxembourg - 77.3 73.1 68.5
Netherlands - 73.0 75.1 75.2
Portugal 80.0 75.4 70.6 65.4
Spain 69.5 69.5 70.0 64.3
Sweden 81.8 82.4 82.6 65.8
UK - 80.9 83.6 76.9
EU-14 (unweighted) - 74.9 73.2 66.3
Source: OECD (1996), Table 4.1 p111 (average of figures for each gender). 
87A7. Cohort unemployment rates, 20-24 year-olds
1979 1983 1989 1994
Austria - - - -
Belgium - 15.1 8.8 12.0
Denmark - 15.0 11.4 9.7
Finland 5.9 6.3 4.2 19.6
France 8.1 12.7 12.4 14.4
Germany 3.3 8.8 5.2 6.5
Greece - 13.6 15.2 15.3
Ireland 5.5 13.4 13.2 16.1
Italy 13.1 16.7 20.8 16.8
Luxemb. - 3.9 1.4 4.3
Netherl. - 12.6 8.2 7.6
Portugal 12.0 13.9 8.0 8.9
Spain 10.6 22.3 22.2 26.6
Sweden 3.0 5.6 2.5 10.9
UK - 14.5 8.1 11.4
EU-14 (unweighted) 12.4 10.1 12.9
EU-12 (weighted) 14.0 12.4 13.8
CV 0.33 0.49 0.44
CV (w) 0.30 0.52 0.44
SD 4.7 6.0 5.6
SD (w)
Max/min 5.73 15.59 6.14
Source: OECD (1996), Tables 4.1 p111 and 4.3 p114.
Note: These unemployment rates relate to all 20-24 year-olds, in contrast to those in
Table A5 which are calculated as a percentage of those persons participating in the
labour force. (Rates have been calculated separately for men and women and then aver-
aged, which accounts for any small differences from those implied by Tables A5 and
A6.)
88B. MORTALITY
B1. Under-5 mortality (probability of dying before age 5 per 1,000)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria 29.8 23.8 17.0 13.3 9.6 6.7
Belgium 24.5 19.0 14.7 11.5 9.7 9.6
Denmark 16.9 12.5 10.4 9.5 8.9 6.3
Finland 16.2 12.6 9.1 7.4 6.7 5.0
France 18.3 16.5 12.3 10.1 8.9 7.1
Germany 27.4 22.9 15.1 10.7 8.5 7.1
Greece 33.4 26.8 20.3 15.8 10.9 9.0
Ireland 22.8 20.8 13.7 10.6 9.7 7.3
Italy 33.4 23.2 16.2 11.8 9.2 8.5
Luxembourg 24.7 15.7 12.5 10.6 8.8 4.4
Netherlands 16.0 13.4 10.7 9.7 8.7 6.8
Portugal 62.2 46.2 29.2 21.6 14.0 9.6
Spain 24.5 22.0 15.0 10.9 9.4 7.6
Sweden 13.1 10.3 8.3 7.9 7.1 4.7
UK 21.4 18.5 14.1 11.2 9.4 7.2
Mean (unweighted) 25.6 20.3 14.6 11.5 9.3 7.1
Mean (weighted) 25.8 20.8 14.9 11.3 9.2 7.5
CV 0.45 0.41 0.34 0.29 0.17 0.22
CV (w) 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.21 0.12 0.13
SD 11.5 8.4 4.9 3.3 1.6 1.6
SD (w) 8.9 6.0 3.6 2.3 1.1 0.9
Max/min 4.8 4.5 3.5 2.9 2.1 2.2
Source: WHO (1998).
Note: 1970 figures for Portugal and Luxembourg are in fact 1971; 1995 figures are 
1992 for Belgium, 1993 for Germany, Ireland and Italy, and 1994 for Spain. Until 1990
data for Germany are for FRG; 1990 and 1995 data are for united Germany. Weighted
calculations use population data from Table F1.
89B2. Total death rate for 15-24 year olds (deaths per 100,000)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria 115.9 109.8 108.0 93.5 76.8 72.7
Belgium 86.2 89.7 89.7 73.6 78.9 -
Denmark 73.6 70.7 75.7 66.5 54.8 56.1
Finland 94.6 102.3 74.0 68.0 92.8 60.4
France 100.6 100.0 103.7 85.1 76.9 74.6
Germany 121.5 105.9 90.1 66.3 70.4 61.8
Greece 67.1 68.3 64.9 70.8 69.6 63.5
Ireland 72.2 68.7 65.4 59.7 56.9 59.4
Italy 80.5 73.9 73.2 61.2 61.9 71.3
Luxembourg 127.7 141.5 81.2 100.0 82.5 76.8
Netherlands 76.2 61.5 60.2 49.2 44.7 44.3
Portugal 94.4 127.3 112.9 102.6 108.5 102.1
Spain 75.6 67.8 65.9 69.7 84.4 65.7
Sweden 73.9 74.8 57.7 54.6 53.2 39.3
UK 67.5 67.7 63.6 53.8 57.7 53.3
Mean (unweighted) 88.5 88.7 79.1 71.6 71.3 64.4
Mean (weighted) 88.5 84.9 80.2 67.7 69.6 65.0
CV 0.22 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.23 0.23
CV (w) 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.17
SD 19.3 23.8 17.3 16.1 16.4 14.8
SD (w) 18.8 18.3 16.6 12.7 12.5 11.3
Max/min 1.9 2.3 2.0 2.1 2.4 2.6
Source: Calculated from absolute numbers of deaths in UN Demographic Yearbooks and
population data in Table F6. Data for 1970 are from UN, 1972 (pages 714-720), UN,
1973 (pages 550-556) and UN, 1974 (page 304). Data for 1975 are from UN, 1981
(pages 514-532); for 1980 from UN, 1986 (pages 566-586); and for 1985 from UN, 1994
(pages 550-570). Data for 1995 are from UN, 1998 (pages 576-598). Exception: figure
for Belgium 1990 is from WHO, 1994, page D-140.
Notes: Figures for Germany and Sweden (1970) are for 1971; for Austria (1975) 1976;
for Belgium and Spain (1985) 1986; for Belgium, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain (1990)
1989; for Italy (1995) 1992, for France and Spain 1993 and for Sweden 1994. Data for
Germany are for FRG until 1985 inclusive; for the united Germany for 1990 and 1995.
No data for Belgium are available since 1989. Weighted calculations use population data
from Table F6 (1995 population data used for 1994 calculations).
90B3. Deaths from motor vehicle accidents among children 5-14 
(deaths per 100,000)
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994
Austria 8.4 9.7 12.2 12.0 6.1 6.5 4.0 3.4
Belgium 8.4 11.7 13.7 9.1 8.8 7.8 5.6 -
Denmark 8.2 13.3 17.1 12.1 4.2 8.7 6.8 4.4
Finland 10.6 13.0 14.8 9.4 4.6 6.7 5.2 4.7
France - 8.3 8.2 6.5 6.7 5.3 4.3 3.4
Germany 11.2 13.4 17.3 10.6 8.8 5.2 4.0 3.2
Greece 2.7 4.8 3.4 5.3 5.9 5.7 6.6 4.7
Ireland 5.4 6.3 8.2 8.2 7.1 4.8 4.6 3.5
Italy 6.0 7.4 9.3 8.1 6.7 4.2 4.1 3.4
Luxembourg - 8.2 15.7 3.9 8.2 7.1 7.0 4.3
Netherlands 9.1 11.1 13.3 9.3 7.4 4.2 4.5 3.7
Portugal 6.0 7.8 9.6 12.9 13.0 8.4 9.0 7.4
Spain 2.0 4.2 5.0 5.2 5.5 5.0 4.8 4.6
Sweden 8.5 9.6 9.2 7.6 5.3 3.6 2.6 1.9
UK 6.6 7.6 7.1 5.8 5.1 5.7 4.1 2.9
Mean (unweighted) 7.2 9.1 10.9 8.4 6.9 5.9 5.2 3.9
Mean (weighted) 7.2 8.7 10.1 7.9 6.8 5.3 4.5 3.6
CV 0.37 0.31 0.38 0.31 0.31 0.25 0.30 0.31
CV (w) 0.42 0.33 0.42 0.28 0.25 0.20 0.23 0.25
SD 2.6 2.8 4.2 2.6 2.1 1.5 1.6 1.2
SD (w) 2.9 2.9 4.2 2.2 1.7 1.1 1.1 0.9
Max/min 5.7 3.2 5.1 3.3 3.1 2.4 3.4 3.9
Source: WHO (1966, 1967, 1968, 1972, 1973, 1974, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1982, 1983,
1984, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996).
Notes: Figure for Spain (1960) is for 1958; for Ireland and Luxembourg (1965) 1966; 
for Italy and Luxembourg (1975) 1974; for Belgium and Greece (1980) 1979 and for
France 1981; for Belgium (1985) 1984; for Belgium (1990) 1989; for Spain, Italy and
Ireland (1994) for 1992 and for Denmark, France and Sweden 1993. Data for Germany
are for the FRG until 1990; data for 1990 and 1994 are for the united Germany. No data
for Belgium are available since 1989. Weighted calculations use population data in Table
F2 (1995 population data used for 1994 calculations).
91B4. Traffic deaths for two groups of young males, 1970 and 1994 
(deaths per 100,000)
5 to 14 15 to 24
1970 1994 1970 1994
Austria 16.5 5.0 85.2 56.4
Belgium 17.1 5.5 62.9 57.4
Denmark 19.5 4.2 45.4 25.1
Finland 20.3 6.4 41.9 23.2
France 9.6 4.0 47.0 42.5
Germany 21.7 3.6 84.9 39.8
Greece 4.9 5.0 22.4 54.1
Ireland 10.6 5.2 26.4 37.2
Italy 12.8 4.4 47.1 48.6
Luxembourg 19.2 4.2 135.8 40.0
Netherlands 18.3 4.1 51.7 19.0
Portugal 12.4 9.3 41.2 55.0
Spain 6.7 5.0 22.9 43.7
Sweden 12.3 1.7 36.5 16.7
UK 9.6 3.8 37.0 18.0
Mean (unweighted) 14.1 4.8 52.6 38.4
Mean (weighted) 13.0 4.3 49.0 38.8
CV 0.36 0.33 0.55 0.37
CV (w) 0.40 0.26 0.40 0.32
SD 5.1 1.6 28.8 14.2
SD (w) 5.2 1.1 19.4 12.2
Max/min 4.4 5.5 6.1 3.4
Source: See Table B3.
Notes: 1994 data are for 1989 for Belgium; for 1992 for Spain, Italy and Ireland; and for
1993 for Denmark, France and Sweden. Data for Germany are for FRG for 1970 and for the
united Germany for 1994. Weighted calculations use population data from Table F2 for the
younger group (as a proxy for male population) and from Table F7 for the older group. 1995
population figures are used to weight 1994 mortality data.
92B5. Suicide rates among 15-24 year old males (deaths per 100,000)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994
Austria 27.0 24.1 32.5 32.5 25.5 26.5
Belgium 8.8 14.3 14.8 18.7 20.2 -
Denmark 13.6 17.4 22.2 20.5 16.7 15.9
Finland 24.7 48.7 42.4 40.0 57.5 50.5
France 11.6 18.4 18.8 22.0 18.3 23.5
Germany 21.3 24.5 21.7 21.7 16.8 16.5
Greece 3.2 4.0 3.5 5.7 5.2 4.2
Ireland 6.8 9.7 8.9 17.8 16.1 23.4
Italy 4.0 3.4 5.5 6.3 6.7 7.6
Luxembourg 8.2 10.3 11.1 14.7 23.2 32.6
Netherlands 5.9 8.1 9.1 11.1 8.7 9.9
Portugal 7.3 5.6 14.3 20.9 23.9 15.8
Spain 2.0 2.3 4.4 8.5 8.0 7.1
Sweden 20.8 29.3 22.8 17.8 19.4 15.7
UK 7.6 10.0 10.7 12.8 18.2 18.5
Mean (unweighted) 11.5 15.3 16.2 18.1 19.0 19.1
Mean (weighted) 10.4 13.5 14.1 15.8 14.9 14.9
CV 0.68 0.78 0.65 0.50 0.63 0.61
CV (w) 0.69 0.72 0.58 0.48 0.49 0.49
SD 7.8 12.0 10.5 9.0 12.0 11.6
SD (w) 7.1 9.6 8.1 7.4 7.3 7.5
Max/min 13.5 21.2 12.1 7.0 11.1 12.0
Source: See Table B3.
Notes: Data for Spain (1960) are for 1958; for Ireland and Luxembourg (1965) 1966; for
Italy and Luxembourg (1975) 1974; for Belgium and Greece (1980) 1979 and for France
1981; for Belgium (1985) 1984; and for Belgium (1990) 1989. 1994 data are for 1992
for Spain, Italy and Ireland; and for 1993 for Denmark, France and Sweden. Data for
Germany are for the FRG until 1990; data for 1990 and 1994 are for the united Germany.
No data for Belgium are available since 1989. Weighted calculations use population data
from Table F7 (1994 population data is used to weight 1995 mortality rates).
93B6. Deaths from suicide and unexplained violence for 45-54 year old males
(deaths per 100,000) 
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994
Austria 58.5 59.6 63.4 57.2 48.9 44.1
Belgium 32.8 29.7 41.8 44.8 33.6 -
Denmark 59.3 60.7 71.8 62.7 60.3 51.9
Finland 67.3 62.1 69.9 64 77.9 66.7
France 39.3 45.1 47.3 52.6 48.3 47.6
Germany 45.0 46.0 45.4 43.5 37.9 35.2
Greece 7.6 5.6 6.6 8.1 5.3 7.3
Ireland 8.7 14.8 28.1 14.5 26.8 22.5
Italy 12.2 9.9 14.3 16.2 12.2 14.5
Luxembourg 27.8 22.3 40.8 25.0 29.4 38.5
Netherlands 16.1 20.8 18.3 21.4 16 18.9
Portugal 14.5 24.8 32.6 40.9 38.1 28.6
Spain 9.6 9.4 9.8 17.2 13.2 13.5
Sweden 61.1 59.5 64.4 56.2 47.1 46.4
UK 17.7 19.2 20.5 23.8 24.1 20.9
Mean (unweighted) 31.8 32.6 38.3 36.5 34.6 32.6
Mean (weighted) 27.8 29.0 31.2 33.1 30.0 28.6
CV 0.66 0.62 0.56 0.51 0.55 0.51
CV (w) 0.60 0.61 0.57 0.48 0.51 0.49
SD 20.9 20.1 21.3 18.7 19.1 16.7
SD (w) 16.8 17.6 17.9 16.0 15.4 13.9
Max/min 8.9 11.1 10.9 7.9 14.7 9.1
Source: See Table B3.
Notes: Data for Spain (1960) are for 1958; for Ireland and Luxembourg (1965) 1966; for
Italy and Luxembourg (1975) 1974; for Belgium and Greece (1980) 1979 and for France
1981; for Belgium (1985) 1984; and for Belgium (1990) 1989. 1994 data are for 1992
for Spain, Italy and Ireland; and for 1993 for Denmark, France and Sweden. Data for
Germany are for the FRG until 1990; data for 1990 and 1994 are for the united Germany.
No data are available for Belgium since 1989. Weighted calculations use total popula-
tions in Table F8 as proxy for male population 45-54 (1995 population data used to
weight 1994 mortality data).
94B7. Homicide deaths for young men 15-24 (deaths per 100,000)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1994
Austria 2.8 1.8 1.1 0.9 1.8 0.4
Belgium 0.8 0.9 1.7 1.7 1.4 -
Denmark 0.5 0.5 1.3 1.7 1.3 2.5
Finland 3.6 6.2 4.3 2.7 3.6 1.9
France 0.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 0.9 1.4
Germany 1.5 1.3 1.0 0.9 1.1 1.3
Greece 0.8 1.3 1.1 1.4 1.6 1.6
Ireland 0.4 1.5 1.0 0.6 0.6 1.9
Italy 1.0 2.1 3.2 2.9 4.9 4.4
Luxembourg 4.1 - 3.5 - 3.9 -
Netherlands 0.9 1.1 1.4 0.6 1.3 0.8
Portugal 5.6 5.5 1.6 2.0 2.4 1.8
Spain 0.6 1.2 1.7 2.0 1.2 1.3
Sweden 1.3 2.3 1.0 1.3 1.8 1.8
UK 1.3 3.2 1.6 1.3 1.5 2.1
Mean (unweighted) 1.7 2.2 1.8 1.5 2.0 1.8
Mean (weighted) 1.8 1.6 1.9 1.3 2.4 1.8
CV 0.89 0.77 0.56 0.45 0.61 0.52
CV (w) 0.82 0.81 0.55 0.68 0.64 0.75
SD 1.5 1.6 1.0 0.7 1.2 0.9
SD (w) 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.9 1.5 1.3
Max/min 14.0 12.4 4.3 4.8 8.2 11.0
Source: See Table B3.
Notes: Data for Spain (1960) are for 1958; for Ireland and Luxembourg (1965) 1966; for
Italy and Luxembourg (1975) 1974; for Belgium and Greece (1980) 1979 and for France
1981; for Belgium (1985) 1984; and for Belgium (1990) 1989. 1994 data are for 1992
for Spain, Italy and Ireland; and for 1993 for Denmark, France and Sweden. Data for
Germany are for the FRG until 1990; data for 1990 and 1994 are for the united Germany.
No data are available for Belgium since 1989. Weighted calculations use population data
in Table F7 (1995 population data used to weight 1994 mortality data).
95C. EDUCATION
C1. Consolidated public education expenditure as a share of GNP
1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria 5.6 5.9 5.4 5.5
Belgium 6.1 6.2 5.1 5.7
Denmark 6.9 7.2 7.5 8.3
Finland 5.3 5.4 5.7 7.6
France 5 5.8 5.4 5.9
Germany 4.7 4.6 4.1 4.7
Greece 2.2 2.9 3.1 3.7
Ireland 6.3 6.4 5.7 6.3
Italy 4.4 5 5.4 4.9
Luxembourg 5.7 3.8 - -
Netherlands 7.6 6.4 6 5.3
Portugal 3.8 4 4.3 5.4
Spain 2.6 3.3 4.4 5
Sweden 9 7.7 7.7 8
UK 5.6 4.9 4.9 5
Mean (unweighted) 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.8
Mean (weighted) 4.9 5.0 4.9 5.2
CV 0.32 0.26 0.22 0.22
CV (w) 0.27 0.20 0.17 0.15
SD 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.3
SD (w) 1.3 1.0 0.8 0.8
Max/min 4.1 2.7 2.5 2.2
Source: UNESCO (1997), Table 4.1, except for Germany and Italy (1990) and UK
(1995) from Eurostat (1997c), p.240.
Notes: 1980 figure is in fact 1979 for Greece, Italy and Spain; 1985 is 1986 for
Luxembourg; 1990 is 1989 for Denmark; 1995 is 1994 for Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Figures for Germany for 1980
and 1985 refer to FRG; 1990 and 1995 to the united Germany. Except for 1995, Belgian
data refer to expenditure of Ministry of Education only. Portuguese figure for 1990 refers
to expenditure of the Ministry of Education only. French data refer to Metropolitan France.
96C2. Consolidated public education expenditure as a share of GNP, adjusted by
share of population aged 5 to 24
1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria 5.6 6.0 5.5 5.7
Belgium 6.3 6.6 5.3 5.9
Denmark 7.2 7.5 7.8 8.7
Finland 5.6 5.8 6.0 7.7
France 5.0 5.9 5.2 5.5
Germany 5.0 5.1 4.6 5.3
Greece 2.3 2.9 2.9 3.5
Ireland 5.2 5.1 4.3 4.6
Italy 4.4 4.8 5.4 5.1
Luxembourg 6.0 4.2 - -
Netherlands 7.1 6.2 5.9 5.3
Portugal 3.4 3.6 3.8 4.8
Spain 2.4 2.9 3.8 4.5
Sweden 10.3 8.6 8.4 8.3
UK 5.7 5.0 5.0 5.0
Mean (unweighted) 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.7
Mean (weighted) 4.9 5.0 4.9 5.2
CV 0.35 0.29 0.27 0.26
CV (w) 0.30 0.24 0.18 0.16
SD 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.5
SD (w) 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.8
Max/min 4.5 3.0 2.9 2.5
Source: Education expenditure data from Table C1 above; adjusted by population data
in Tables F2, F6 and F8.
Notes: Let A(i) = share of 5 to 24 year olds in EU population/share in population of
country i (from Tables F2, F6, F8). Let EDEXP(i) be education expenditure as a share
of GNP in country i (from Table C1). This table then shows A(i)*EDEXP(i). Weighted
calculations use population of 5 to 24 from Tables F2 and F6.
97C3. Consolidated public education expenditure as a share of GDP, by level 1995
Total Primary Secondary Tertiary
Austria 5.8 1.2 2.9 1.1
Belgium 5.9 1.2 2.8 1.3
Denmark 8.4 1.8 3.4 1.9
Finland 7.4 1.7 2.6 2.5
France 5.6 1.1 2.8 1.1
Germany 5.4 - 3.9 1.3
Greece 2.7 1.2 1.1 0.7
Ireland 3.8 0.9 1.4 1.1
Italy 4.9 1.3 2.3 0.6
Luxembourg 4.8 2.2 2.1 0.2
Netherlands 5.2 1.1 2.2 1.6
Portugal 5.1 1.9 1.9 0.9
Spain 4.4 1.2 2.0 0.8
Sweden 8.1 1.9 3.3 2.4
UK 5.2 1.4 2.3 1.2
Mean (unweighted) 5.5 1.4 2.5 1.2
Mean (weighted) 5.2 1.0 2.7 1.1
Source: Eurostat (1998).
Notes: Primary is defined as ISCED 1; Secondary as ISCED 2 and 3; and Tertiary as
ISCED 5-7. Primary figure for Greece in fact shows ISCED 0 and 1; Secondary figure
for Germany shows ISCED 0-3. Unweighted averages for primary and secondary edu-
cation are calculated without Germany. Weighted averages are from original source. The
data are adjusted for the share of the population aged 5 to 24 in the same way as the data
in Table C2.
98C4. Enrolment rates in secondary education for 16 year olds
1964/65 1969/70 1974/75 1979/80 1984/85 1989/90 1994/95
Austria 71 33 36 43 - - 90
Belgium 56 63 70 77 85 89 100
Denmark - - - 89 85 90 92
Finland - 53 - 85 - 97 92
France 50 57 69 72 75 83 92
Germany - - - - - - 96
Greece 39 45 55 59 73 76 79
Ireland 42 55 63 70 83 87 91
Italy 31 52 51 51 - - -
Luxembourg 72 47 47 65 71 75 77
Netherlands - 57 75 86 88 90 89
Portugal 19 22 36 38 - 68 78
Spain 17 27 45 54 - - 89
Sweden 68 - - 83 - 83 95
U K 2 9 -5 84 45 45 78 2
Mean (unweighted) 48 58 65 73 80 88
Mean (weighted) 45 58 60 68 75 88
CV 0.31 0.25 0.26 0.18 0.14 0.08
CV (w) 0.31 0.21 0.25 0.17 0.15 0.06
SD 15.0 14.7 17.0 13.3 10.9 7.3
SD (w) 13.8 12.2 14.9 11.6 11.4 5.5
Max/min 3.3 2.2 2.3 1.7 1.7 1.3
Source: UNESCO (1998b). 
Notes: EU averages and dispersion measures are calculated for the 12 countries for which
there is a continuous series, and on the basis of extrapolation of missing datapoints.
Enrolment rates are for full-time education, including technical and vocational education.
Data for 1964/65 are for 1965/66 for Ireland, Lux and UK; for 1966/67 for Italy and for
1968/69 for Austria. Data for 1969/70 are for 1968/69 for Belgium. Data  for  1974/75
are for 1975/76 in France, Italy and Portugal and for 1976/77 for Belgium. Data for
1979/80 are for 1977/78 in Portugal; for 1978/79 in Belgium, Finland and Italy; for
1980/81 in Denmark and the UK; and for 1981/82 in Sweden. Data for 1984/85 are for
1985/86 in Ireland, Luxembourg and the UK. Data for 1989/90 are for 1987/88 in
Luxembourg; 1990/91 in Belgium and Finland; and 1992/93 in Portugal. Data for
1994/95 are for 1992/93 in the Netherlands; and for 1993/94 in Belgium, France and
Portugal.
99C5. Share of 16 to 24 year olds who claim to have left school after the age of 16
Interview period Sample sizes
%
1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94 1975-79 1980-84 1985-89 1990-94
Belgium 76 77 86 94 2,051  1,908 2,163 1,431 
Denmark 67 73 85 94 1,408  1,531 2,008 1,352 
France 78 78 85 86 1,974  2,013 2,187 1,580 
Germany 50 67 77 67 1,477  1,960 2,142 1,655 
Greece - 72 81 86 -  1,700 2,117 1,495 
Ireland 57 63 74 82 2,211  2,418 2,482 1,819 
Italy 67 71 72 80 2,103  2,164 2,324 1,678 
Luxembourg 70 76 80 82 474 619  569 746 
Netherlands 72 85 92 92 1,314  1,655 1,814 1,230 
Portugal - 55 47 60 -  838 2,141 1,630 
Spain - 65 69 78 -  604 2,132 1,720 
UK 39 44 45 55 2,475  2,663 2,751 2,128 
Mean EU 9  64 71 77 81
(unweighted)
Mean EU 9 60 67 71 73
(weighted)
CV 0.19 0.16 0.17 0.15
CV (w) 0.25 0.19 0.21 0.17
SD 12.2 11.1 12.9 12.2
SD (w) 14.9 12.8 15.2 12.5
Max/min 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.7
Source: Eurobarometer surveys: EB cumulative file and EB39, EB40, EB41, EB42.
Notes: Eurobarometer surveys are carried out every six months. Responses given by 16
to 24 year olds to the question ‘How old were you when you left full-time education?’
were pooled for five year periods to increase sample sizes. Averages and dispersion mea-
sures are calculated for the EU9 included in the surveys from the beginning. Weighted
calculations use population 15-24 from Table F6. 1975 population data are used to
weight 1975-79 data; 1980 for 1980-84; 1985 for 1985-89 and 1990 for 1990-94.
100C6. Results from the Third International Mathematics and Science Study
1993/94
Mean scores Share not reaching international median
Maths Maths Science Science Maths Maths Science Science
7th grade 8th grade 7th grade 8th grade 7th grade 8th grade 7th grade 8th grade
Austria 509 539 519 558 63 61 65 64
Belgium (Flemish) 558 565 529 550 86 73 73 64
Belgium (French) 507 526 442 471 64 58 30 29
Denmark 465 502 439 478 44 47 30 32
France 492 538 451 498 58 63 34 37
Germany 484 509 499 531 52 49 57 54
Greece 440 484 449 497 32 37 34 38
Ireland 500 527 495 538 60 57 54 57
Netherlands 516 541 517 560 69 63 67 67
Portugal 423 454 428 480 19 19 22 28
Spain 448 487 477 517 32 36 46 47
Sweden 477 519 488 535 50 53 51 56
England 476 506 512 552 47 48 60 60
Scotland 463 498 468 517 43 44 42 48
Source: Maths from Beaton et al. (1996a): Tables 1.1 and 1.2 (mean scores) Tables 1.4 and
1.5 (share reaching international median). Science from Beaton et al. (1996b): Tables 1.1
and 1.2 (mean scores) Tables 1.4 and 1.5 (share reaching international median).
Notes: Finland and Luxembourg did not participate. Italy was ‘unable to complete the
steps necessary for their data to appear’ in the TIMSS Report. See source for detailed
notes on sampling procedure etc.
101D. TEENAGE FERTILITY
D1. Births to 15-19 year olds per 1,000 in the age group
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria 47.0 56.7 61.4 48.1 35.3 24.8 20.8 17.5
Belgium 34.7 41.7 43.2 39.0 28.2 17.6 11.4 9.2
Denmark 59.4 66.9 46.0 38.1 23.9 12.9 13.0 8.7
Finland 28.4 33.7 32.2 27.5 18.9 13.8 12.4 9.8
France 31.9 39.0 37.6 35.2 24.8 16.1 12.5 9.6
Germany 33.2 43.1 48.3 28.5 20.5 11.6 18.6 13.0
Greece 17.4 27.1 36.9 46.5 52.6 36.4 19.9 12.9
Ireland 8.8 14.0 16.3 22.8 23.0 16.6 16.5 15.1
Italy 19.1 25.3 27.1 32.5 20.6 12.1 8.6 7.0
Luxembourg 32.6 40.3 38.9 33.6 23.5 15.0 17.5 10.6
Netherlands 16.3 22.6 23.2 12.8 9.3 6.8 8.1 5.8
Portugal 26.6 25.8 29.8 37.0 41.0 32.4 24.3 20.2
Spain 9.6 11.1 13.8 21.4 25.6 18.3 11.9 8.3
Sweden 33.5 49.3 34.0 28.8 15.8 11.1 14.0 8.6
UK 33.8 45.1 49.7 36.7 30.6 29.6 32.4 28.5
Mean (unweighted) 28.8 36.1 35.9 32.6 26.2 18.3 16.1 12.3
Mean (weighted) 27.2 34.7 36.4 31.7 24.9 17.8 16.5 12.9
CV 0.45 0.41 0.35 0.28 0.39 0.45 0.39 0.47
CV (w) 0.37 0.37 0.34 0.23 0.30 0.43 0.48 0.55
SD 13.0 14.9 12.5 9.0 10.2 8.3 6.2 5.8
SD (w) 10.2 12.7 12.4 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.9 7.2
Max/min 6.7 6.0 4.4 3.8 5.7 5.3 4.0 4.9
Source: Data for 1960-85 with the exceptions of Austria, Finland and Sweden are from
Eurostat (1990); data for Austria, Finland and Sweden are from UN 1979 (1960-75) and UN
1987 (1980 and 1985). Data for 1990 and 1995 were calculated from Eurostat (1997e).
Notes: The 1960 figure for Austria actually refers to 1959; the 1995 figure for Italy and Spain
is for 1994. Birth rates are calculated as live births per 1,000 women aged 15 to 19. Data for
Austria, Finland and Sweden, and all data for 1990 and 1995 include births to women under
15. (Denominator is still female population 15-19.) For Greece, Spain, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, the UK, Austria, Sweden and Finland the definition of mother’s age was age at last
birthday. For Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands for
1960 to 1985, and for Germany and France also for 1990 and 1995, the definition given was
mother’s age reached during the calendar year in which the birth occurred. For these coun-
tries for these years, data were converted to be comparable with data using age at last birth-
day using the average ratio (for each country) of the two different birth rates over the period
1990-1995 (both definitions were available for these years). As there were no German data
on the age at last birthday, the conversion was made using the average of the ratio for all
countries across the period 1990-95 (1.35). France 1990 and 1995 figures were obtained in
same way using the average ratio for France 1991-93 (1.39). Data for Germany for 1960-85
refer to the Federal Republic of Germany; data for 1990 and 1995 refer to the united
Germany. 1960 to 1975 data for the United Kingdom refer to Great Britain only; i.e. Northern
Ireland is excluded. Weighted calculations use female population 15-19 from Table F4.
102D2. Births to 15-19 year olds as a share of total births
1960 1970 1980 1990 1995
Austria 9.9 13.6 12.3 5.9 4.4
Belgium 6.7 10.9 8.8 3.0 2.4
Denmark 14.7 11.8 8.0 3.7 2.0
Finland 6.3 10.3 5.6 2.8 2.5
France 6.4 9.4 6.6 3.5 2.4
Germany 6.3 11.6 8.4 4.6 3.5
Greece 3.5 8.4 12.6 7.2 4.7
Ireland 1.7 3.3 4.9 5.1 5.1
Italy 3.8 5.6 6.9 3.2 2.5
Luxembourg 6.4 10.6 8.1 3.9 2.1
Netherlands 3.1 5.3 3.2 2.2 1.4
Portugal 5.2 6.7 10.8 8.6 7.5
Spain 1.8 2.8 6.9 4.8 3.6
Sweden 9.5 8.1 4.5 3.1 2.1
UK 6.8 10.4 9.3 7.9 6.5
Mean (unweighted) 6.1 8.6 7.8 4.6 3.5
Mean (weighted) 5.5 8.4 7.7 4.7 3.7
CV 0.54 0.36 0.34 0.41 0.49
CV (w) 0.43 0.36 0.24 0.38 0.44
SD 3.3 3.1 2.6 1.9 1.7
SD (w) 2.3 3.0 1.9 1.8 1.6
Max/min 8.9 4.9 4.0 3.9 5.4
Source: Calculated from teen birth rates in Table D1, and total birth rates and population
figures given in matching sources; see Table D1 for further detail and notes. 
Additional notes: Data for Austria, Finland and Sweden 1960 to 1980 are for births to
women under 20 as a share of births to women of all ages. All data for 1990 and 1995
are for births to women under 20 as a share of births to women 15-49. Weighted calcu-
lations use female population 15-19 from Table F4.

















Source: Calculated from data on number of abortions to 15-19 year olds in WHO Health
for All Database and population data in Table F4.
Notes: Data presented are the total number of abortions to all females under 20 divided
by the female population 15-19. For several EU countries no abortion data are published;
in most cases this is because abortion remains illegal or very difficult to obtain legally.
For example, in Belgium abortion is legal only in cases of ‘state of distress/emergency’.
In Ireland it is legal if the life of the woman is at risk but no abortions are yet known to
have been carried out and each woman would probably need court permission. In
Portugal abortion is allowed in case of rape or serious threat to life but most doctors are
conscientious objectors and in practice the majority of abortions are still performed ille-
gally. Conscientious objection is also an obstacle in Luxembourg, where abortion is in
principle available up to 12 weeks but very difficult to obtain in practice; many women
travel to the Netherlands to abort. In Austria abortion is available on request to 12 weeks
but no data are published. (See ‘Abortion Legislation in Europe’ available from the
International Planned Parenthood Federation, European Network; further details at
www.ippf.org/regions/europe). 



















Source: Calculated from Eurostat (1997e).
Notes: Data for Italy, France and Spain are for 1994; for Belgium 1992. Weighted calcula-
tions use female population 15-19 from Table F4.
105D5. Birth rates to 16 year olds and to 19 year olds, 1994
16 yrs 19 yrs 15-19 yrs
Austria 5.8 42.1 18.9
Belgium 2.5 23.3 9.3
Denmark 2.0 24.4 9.2
Finland 2.0 29.4 10.1
France 2.9 23.7 10.0
Germany 5.3 32.5 13.7
Greece 5.3 31.8 14.2
Ireland 5.3 33.0 14.6
Italy 3.1 15.4 7.0
Luxembourg 2.4 32.5 11.8
Netherlands 2.2 16.1 6.9
Portugal 9.6 38.4 20.9
Spain 3.7 16.2 8.3
Sweden 2.1 24.4 9.5
UK 13.1 53.8 28.8
Mean (unweighted) 4.5 29.1 12.9
Mean (weighted) 5.3 28.4 13.3
CV 0.68 0.35 0.45
CV (w) 0.68 0.45 0.54
SD 3.1 10.1 5.8
SD (w) 3.6 12.8 7.2
Max/min 6.5 3.5 4.2
Source: Calculated from the Eurostat Demographic Statistics Database 1997.
Notes: Birth rates are calculated as live births to women aged 16 (or 19) at last birthday,
over female population aged 16 (or 19). French and German data are constructed from
data for mother’s age at end of calendar year as explained in notes to Table D1. Weighted
calculations use female population 15-19 from Table F4. Note that data given here are
for 1994; hence slight differences between 15 to 19 year olds birth rates in this table and
those in Table D1, which was for 1995. (Data for 1995 were not available for all coun-
tries with breakdown of age by single years.)
106E. LIFE SATISFACTION
E1. Percentage of 15-19 year olds ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ satisfied with their lives
Sample sizes
1975-9 1980-4 1985-9 1990-4 1975-9 1980-4 1985-9 1990-4
Belgium 94 92 89 89 833 640 834 748 
Denmark 97 97 96 98 571 629 839 598 
France 76 83 88 86 705 776 995 855 
Germany 82 83 86 88 795 936 1,158 804 
Greece - 68 71 75 - 788 998 761 
Ireland 87 84 83 90 1,214 1,087 1,491 1,243 
Italy 62 74 82 87 1,047 991 1,238 1,138 
Luxembourg 89 90 94 97 129 244 274 504 
Netherlands 96 97 95 99 485 767 769 641 
Portugal - - 80 87 - - 1,123 1,065 
Spain - - 84 85 - - 1,188 1,118 
UK 90 88 88 91 1,023 1,012 1,435 1,201 
EU 9 (unweighted) 86 88 89 92
EU 9 (weighted) 80 84 87 89
CV 0.12 0.08 0.05 0.05
CV (w) 0.14 0.07 0.04 0.04
SD 10.6 6.9 4.8 4.7
SD (w) 11.0 6.3 3.3 3.2
Max/min 1.6 1.3 1.2 1.2
Source: Calculated from Eurobarometer surveys: EBCUM, EB39, EB40, EB41, EB42.
(Inglehart et al, 1994; INRA 1993, 1993a, 1994, 1994a). 
Notes: Eurobarometer surverys are six monthly surveys of European public opinion and
attitudes carried out since 1970. The life satisfaction question, ‘On the whole, are you
very/fairly/not very/not at all satisfied with the life you lead?’ was asked regularly
between 1974 and 1994. The data presented here pool responses for the five year inter-
vals shown in order to increase sample sizes. Only EU member states are included in the
surveys, hence full time-series are available only for the EU 9. The Eurobarometer
datasets include a EUROPEAN WEIGHT variable that adjusts each national sample in
proportion to its country’s share in the total population of all EU countries. This weight
variable also incorporates within-country weighting information for Denmark, Spain,
Germany, France, the Netherlands and the UK to make the samples from these countries
nationally representative. The sample sizes given above show the full (unweighted) sam-
ple sizes for each country, but the percentage in each satisfaction category was calculat-
ed using the weights. For simplicity, weighted averages and dispersion measures were
then calculated using the percentages given and the population figures in Table F3.
Averages and dispersion measures are calculated only for  the EU9 for which four data
points are available. The question on satisfaction was asked in only one of the two sur-
veys carried out in 1979, 1980 and 1981. It was not asked in Greece in 1980, nor in Spain
and Portugal until 1985.
107E2. Percentage of 15-64 year olds ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ satisfied with their lives
Sample sizes
1975-9 1980-4 1985-9 1990-4 1975-9 1980-4 1985-9 1990-4
Belgium 91 84 83 88 7,810 6,817 10,326 8,446 
Denmark 95 96 95 97 7,292 6,664 9,869 8,481 
France 71 73 74 75 8,802 6,951 10,140 8,539 
Germany 84 84 86 88 7,368 7,228 10,747 12,116 
Greece - 63 66 55 - 6,133 10,024 8,449 
Ireland 88 84 79 86 7,725 7,149 10,218 8,522 
Italy 61 67 72 78 8,532 7,834 11,040 8,761 
Luxembourg 89 92 93 95 2,286 2,184 3,156 3,904 
Netherlands 93 93 93 94 7,623 7,234 10,363 8,700 
Portugal - - 67 71 - - 9,150 8,198 
Spain - - 74 75 - -  8,891 8,385 
UK 85 86 86 86 10,208 9,113 12,948 11,087 
EU 9 (unweighted) 84 84 85 87
EU 9 (weighted) 78 79 81 83
CV 0.13 0.11 0.09 0.08
CV (w) 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.07
SD 10.6 8.9 7.8 7.0
SD (w) 10.9 8.7 7.2 6.1
Max/min 1.57 1.44 1.32 1.30
Source and notes as Table E1. Weighted calculations use total populations in Table F8.
108E3.  Ratio of percentage of 15-19s ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ satisfied to percentage 
of 15-64s in this category
1975-9 1980-4 1985-9 1990-4
Belgium 1.03 1.10 1.08 1.02
Denmark 1.03 1.02 1.01 1.01
France 1.07 1.14 1.18 1.14
Germany 0.98 0.99 1.00 1.00
Greece - 1.09 1.08 1.36
Ireland 0.99 1.01 1.04 1.05
Italy 1.03 1.11 1.14 1.12
Luxembourg 1.00 0.98 1.02 1.03
Netherlands 1.04 1.04 1.01 1.05
Portugal - - 1.21 1.22
Spain - - 1.12 1.13
UK 1.05 1.03 1.02 1.05
EU 9 (unweighted) 1.02 1.05 1.06 1.05
EU 9 (weighted) 1.03 1.07 1.08 1.07
CV 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.04
CV (w) 0.03 0.05 0.07 0.05
SD 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.05
SD (w) 0.03 0.06 0.07 0.06
Max/min 1.09 1.16 1.18 1.14
Source: Tables E1 and E2 above. Weighted calculations use total populations in Table F8.
109F. POPULATION
F1. Population under 5 (thousands)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria 608 498 430 453 444 473 
Belgium 720 657 604 584 592 615 
Denmark 388 362 314 276 287 335 
Finland 348 302 320 325 309 328 
France 4,205 4,118 3,699 3,788 3,783 3,626 
Germany 4,715 3,381 2,931 2,986 4,373 4,191 
Greece 770 690 718 688 550 519 
Ireland 311 348 347 354 285 259 
Italy 4,589 4,318 3,617 3,055 2,800 2,770 
Luxembourg 24 23 21 21 23 27 
Netherlands 1,188  1,027 885 873 927 989 
Portugal 892 820 838 712 572 557 
Spain 3,209 3,317 3,362 2,542 2,096 1,935 
Sweden 581 551 487 427 540 606 
UK 4,519 3,967 3,387 3,610 3,820 3,856 
EU  total 27,067 24,379 21,960 20,694 21,401 21,084 
Source: 1970 to 1985 from UN (1991); 1990 and 1995 from Eurostat (1997e).
Note: Population as of January 1st of year in question. Data for Germany are for FRG
until 1985 and for the united Germany for 1990 and 1995.
110F2. Population 5-14 (thousands)
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria 986 1,057 1,210 1,262 1,112  925  898  943 
Belgium 1,404 1,481 1,558 1,524 1,381 1,251 1,209 1,212 
Denmark 788 739 760 782 754 678 593 566 
Finland 934 844 785 735 651 626 653 645 
France 8,042 8,263 8,400 8,476 8,307 7,483 7,605 7,760 
Germany 7,478 8,290 9,343 9,905 8,256 6,247 8,266 9,104 
Greece 1,452 1,457 1,416 1,470 1,481 1,427 1,428 1,266 
Ireland 579 582 610 644 694 702 675 628 
Italy 8,241 8,034 8,636 9,118 8,953 8,126 6,721 5,851 
Luxembourg 42 49 51 55 49 42 43 47 
Netherlands 2,289 2,259 2,369 2,433 2,273 1,946 1,788 1,850 
Portugal 1,678 1,686 1,709 1,719 1,696 1,677 1,495 1,226 
Spain 5,337 5,690 6,229 6,512 6,614 6,400 5,760 4,674 
Sweden 1,142 1,065 1,095 1,144 1,141 1,044  982 1,057 
UK 8,039 7,884 8,972 9,154 8,383 7,286 7,053 7,505 
EU  total  48,431 49,380 53,143 54,933 51,745 45,860 45,170 44,333 
Source and note as for Table F1.
111F3. Population 15-19 (thousands)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria 502  583 657 619 527 459 
Belgium 725  779 796 717 670 613 
Denmark 373  370 396 392 367 328 
Finland 426  399 382 351 301 328 
France 4.201  4,236 4,299 4,265 4,331 3,785 
Germany 3,996  4,520 5,218 4,902 4,615 4,257 
Greece 660  705 725 775 759 768 
Ireland 258  292 321 330 328 338 
Italy 3,857  4,058 4,569 4,741 4,377 3,696 
Luxembourg 24  27 28 26 22 22 
Netherlands 1,110  1,171 1,254 1,232 1,107  922 
Portugal 780  797 905 860 836 807 
Spain 2,655  2,947 3,182 3,284 3,314 3,185 
Sweden 553  536 569 578 566 512 
UK 3,893  4,159 4,596 4,540 4,005 3,442 
EU  total 24,013  25,579 27,897 27,612 26,127 23,461 
Source and note as for Table F1.
112F4. Female population 15-19 (thousands)
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria 273 245 247 287 325 303 258 222 
Belgium 269 347 355 380 390 350 327 300 
Denmark 186 202 181 180 193 190 179 160 
Finland 175 237 208 195 187 172 147 160 
France 1,361 2,029 2,062 2,080 2,112 2,085 2,117 1,852 
Germany 1,987 1,786 1,952 2,198 2,531 2,384 2,248 2,068 
Greece 311 355 323 343 351 373 369 373 
Ireland 114 126 126 143 157 161 161 165 
Italy 1,858 2,059 1,890 1,992 2,242 2,327 2,143 1,811 
Luxembourg 10 11 12 14 14 13 11 11 
Netherlands 446 577 542 573 613 602 542 451 
Portugal 378 405 388 394 436 422 412 397 
Spain 1,227 1,301 1,322 1,456 1,559 1,594 1,617 1,556 
Sweden 291 306 270 261 278 282 277 250 
UK 1,760 2,094 1,896 2,024 2,248 2,212 1,944 1,671 
EU  total 10,646 12,080 11,774 12,520 13,636 13,470 12,754 11,448 
Source and note as for Table F1.
113F5. Population under 20 (thousands)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria 2,325 2,343 2,192 1,998 1,870 1,874 
Belgium 3,005 2,960 2,780 2,551 2,471 2,440 
Denmark 1,520 1,514 1,461 1,346 1,247 1,229 
Finland 1,556 1,436 1,353 1,302 1,264 1,300 
France 16,814 16,829 16,292 15,536 15,720 15,171 
Germany 18,054 17,806 16,381 14,135 17,254 17,552 
Greece 2,851 2,864 2,924 2,890 2,737 2,553 
Ireland 1,184 1,284 1,359 1,386 1,287 1,225 
Italy 17,080 17,493 17,125 15,922 13,898 12,317 
Luxembourg 100  103 97 92 88 97 
Netherlands 4,672 4,631 4,410 4,051 3,822 3,760 
Portugal 3,368 3,336 3,429 3,248 2,903 2,590 
Spain 12,108 12,777 13,148 12,225 11,170  9,794 
Sweden 2,229 2,231 2,197 2,049 2,088 2,175 
UK 17,359 17,280 16,363 15,436 14,878 14,802 
EU  total 104,225  104,887  101,511 94,167 92,698 88,878 
Source and note as for Table F1.
114F6. Population 15-24 (thousands)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria 1,011 1,099 1,248 1,278 1,183 1,032 
Belgium 1,443 1,528 1,587 1,509 1,411 1,299 
Denmark 788 745 766 789 769 702 
Finland 874 819 766 716 655 631 
France 8,318 8,482 8,527 8,562 8,603 8,083 
Germany 7,721 8,760 9,881  10,195  11,140 9,298 
Greece 1,294 1,343 1,422 1,501 1,529 1,557 
Ireland 470 536 590 620 595 626 
Italy 7,952 7,876 8,611 9,359 8,997 8,139 
Luxembourg 47 54 58 56 51 48 
Netherlands 2,295 2,301 2,456 2,503 2,371 2,067 
Portugal 1,501 1,533 1,725 1,714 1,608 1,635 
Spain 5,179 5,601 6,061 6,547 6,551 6,496 
Sweden 1,214 1,101 1,125 1,165 1,179 1,097 
UK 8,177 8,050 8,721 9,287 8,640 7,502 
EU  total 48,284 49,828 53,544 55,801 55,281 50,214 
Source and note as for Table F1.
115F7. Male population 15-24 (thousands)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria 515 556 629 649 604 526 
Belgium 737 783 810 770 721 662 
Denmark 405 382 392 404 394 358 
Finland 448 419 392 372 334 322 
France 4,252 4,315 4,327 4,340 4,369 4,108 
Germany 3,949 4,461 5,097 5,243 5,713 4,778 
Greece 665 694 728 780 777 799 
Ireland 240 274 301 317 303 320 
Italy 4,043 3,999 4,371 4,757 4,577 4,146 
Luxembourg 24 27 29 28 26 25 
Netherlands 1,177 1,175 1,254 1,278 1,210 1,052 
Portugal 743 766 890 867 813 827 
Spain 2,614 2,809 3,080 3,346 3,347 3,320 
Sweden 621 563 575 596 604 560 
UK 4,167 4,124 4,454 4,740 4,430 3,852 
EU  total 24,600 25,347 27,329 28,487 28,222 25,653 
Source and note as for Table F1.
116F8. Total population (thousands)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995
Austria 7,467 7,579 7,549 7,558 7,690 8,040 
Belgium 9,656 9,796 9,852 9,858 9,948  10,131 
Denmark 4,929 5,060 5,123 5,122 5,135 5,216 
Finland 4,606 4,711 4,780 4,902 4,974 5,099 
France 50,772 52,699 53,880 55,170 56,577 58,020 
Germany 60,651 61,829 61,566 61,024 79,113 81,539 
Greece 8,793 9,047 9,643 9,934  10,121  10,443 
Ireland 2,954 3,177 3,401 3,552 3,507 3,595 
Italy 53,822 55,441 56,434 57,141 56,694 57,269 
Luxembourg 339 362 364 367 379 407 
Netherlands 13,032 13,653 14,144 14,484 14,893 15,424 
Portugal 9,044 9,093 9,766  10,157 9,920 9,912 
Spain 33,779 35,596 37,542 38,602 38,826 39,177 
Sweden 8,043 8,193 8,310 8,350 8,527 8,816 
UK 55,632 56,226 56,330 56,618 57,456 58,500 
EU  total 323,519 332,462 338,684 342,839 363,760 371,587 
Source and note as for Table F1.
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